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INTRODUCTION
Together with our partner law enforcement agencies, and with the assistance of the
community, the FBI will continue to pursue those who support violent extremism and
promote the radicalization of others, whether online or in person.
—Department of Justice Press Release1
My concern is that [the FBI is] not looking at criminal behavior. We’re not looking at
violent behavior. But we’re focusing on religious practices and that this is evident, and I
could cite other evidence . . . of training materials and written materials of the FBI
that describe people who, you know, wear Muslim clothing, et cetera, as being signals
that they may be violent.
—Representative Jan Schakowsky (D-IL), before the United States
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on
Domestic Threat Intelligence2
In the last ten years, the federal government’s commitment to
counterterrorism has spurred innumerable changes to our legal system, with the
emergence of new laws, norms, and mechanisms,3 and with the repurposing of
preexisting tools.4 The preventative framework—where the government aims to
prevent future terrorism—now defines counterterrorism programs at home and
abroad.5 A preventative approach propels questions about how to understand,

1. U.S. Attorney’s Office E. Dist. of Va., Leader of “Revolution Muslim” Sentenced to 138 Months for
Using Internet to Solicit Murder, Encourage Violent Extremism, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE (June 22, 2012),
http://www.justice.gov/usao/vae/news/2012/06/20120622mortonnr.html.
2. Rep. Mike Rogers Holds a Hearing on Intelligence, CQ-ROLLCALL POL. TRANSCRIPTIONS,
Oct. 6, 2011 [hereinafter Hearing on Intelligence], available at 10/5/11 EMEDIAPT 17:31:00 (Westlaw).
3. These changes were rooted in preexisting legal structures. James Forman, Jr., Exporting
Harshness: How the War on Crime Helped Make the War on Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 331, 332–41 (2009).
4. The material support statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B (2006 & Supp. III 2009), and
even the naval base at Guantánamo Bay, are examples of tools that existed before 9/11 but were put
to new uses after.
5. See, e.g., COUNTERTERRORISM SECTION, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COUNTERTERRORISM WHITE
PAPER 11, 29 (2006), available at http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/169/include/terrorism
.whitepaper.pdf (“[O]ur full engagement in the preventive mode has moved our focus to the
preparatory stages of terrorist planning and to those who would support and actively encourage such
activity. Thus, we rely strongly on the material support statutes to prosecute those who provide funds,
services, equipment and all types of assistance to terrorists, terrorist organizations, and designated
state sponsors of terrorism . . . .”); Sahar F. Aziz, Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism
in a Post-9/11 America, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 429, 431–37 (2011); Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy?
Anticipatory Prosecution and the Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 429–36 (2007)
[hereinafter Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy?]; Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support
Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 26–36 (2005) [hereinafter Chesney, Sleeper
Scenario]; Matthew C. Waxman, Police and National Security: American Local Law Enforcement and
Counterterrorism After 9/11, 3 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 377, 379–85 (2009); Petra Bartosiewicz,
Op-Ed., How Not to Catch a Terrorist, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2011, at A22; Petra Bartosiewicz, To Catch a

2013]

POLICING “RADICALIZATION”

811

model, and manage risk to the foreground.6 The government has embraced
“radicalization” as the parlance for that risk, spawning a growing number of
“counter-radicalization” and “countering violent extremism” programs focused on
monitoring and influencing the political and religious cultures of Muslim
communities in the United States.
Radicalization suggests that the path from Muslim to terrorist is a predictable
one produced by or correlated with religious and political cultures of Muslim
communities. Government radicalization discourses and programs are almost
entirely fixated on Islam and Muslims, despite data that the terrorist threat
emanating from Muslims is minimal to nonexistent, including in comparison to
violence from white-supremacist and right-wing groups.7 The Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and the New York City Police Department (NYPD) have led
the way in theorizing radicalization and shifting national security policing towards
a focus on gathering intelligence on Muslim communities.8 Radicalization has

Terrorist: The FBI Hunts for the Enemy Within, HARPER’S MAG., Aug. 2011, at 37 [hereinafter
Bartosiewicz, To Catch a Terrorist ]. See generally DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE:
WHY AMERICA IS LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR (2007) (describing and critiquing government antiterrorism efforts).
6. In the realm of terrorism, the chances are small but the potential consequences huge, the
argument goes; so it makes sense for the government to act aggressively and preventatively, even if
the risk of the act itself is relatively minor. See, e.g., Samuel J. Rascoff, Domesticating Intelligence, 83 S.
CAL. L. REV. 575, 604–16 (2010) (“[T]he post-9/11 domestic intelligence process is properly
regarded as a form of risk assessment.”); see also Clive Walker, Neighbor Terrorism and the All-Risks
Policing of Terrorism, 3 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 121, 130 (2009) (“[T ]he operation of all-risks
policing powers involves the police treating anyone and everyone as a risk and taking action on the
basis of leads even more vague and haphazard than intelligence or suspicion.”).
7. A recent report found:
For the second year in a row, there were no fatalities or injuries from Muslim-American
terrorism. Meanwhile, the United States suffered approximately 14,000 murders in 2012.
Since 9/11, Muslim-American terrorism has claimed 33 lives in the United States, out of
more than 180,000 murders committed in the United States during this period. Over the
same period, more than 200 Americans have been killed in political violence by white
supremacists and other groups on the far right, according to a recent study published by
the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy. Sixty-six Americans were
killed in mass shootings by non-Muslims in 2012 alone, twice as many fatalities as from
Muslim-American terrorism in all 11 years since 9/11.
Charles Kurzman, Muslim-American Terrorism: Declining Further, TRIANGLE CTR. ON TERRORISM &
HOMELAND SEC. 1 (Feb. 1, 2013), http://kurzman.unc.edu/files/2011/06/Kurzman_MuslimAmerican_Terrorism_February_1_2013.pdf (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted); see also Spencer
Ackerman, Report: U.S. Muslim Terrorism Was Practically Nil in 2012, WIRED: DANGER ROOM (Feb. 1,
2013, 12:57 PM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/02/american-muslim-terrorism. See
generally COUNTERTERRORISM DIV., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, TERRORISM 2002–2005, at
1–2 (2006), available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terrorism-2002-2005/terror02
_05.pdf (differentiating domestic extremists from “violent global jihadist movement”); Mark Follman
et al., A Guide to Mass Shootings in America, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 27, 2013, 7:45 AM),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/07/mass-shootings-map (detailing mass shootings from
1982 to 2012).
8. See, e.g., JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42553, COUNTERING
VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES 3, 7–9 (2012) (discussing “countering violent
extremism” efforts by the Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, and FBI);
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come to frame all aspects of Muslim life as central to the counterterrorism
intelligence-gathering project: from those who attend mosque and sport a beard
compliant with religious tradition, to those who express outrage at the United
States’s increasing reliance on drone strikes in Muslim-majority countries; and
from mosques to hookah bars and points in between. Law enforcement’s
contribution to our understanding of radicalization, and the resultant police
practices, are the subject of this Article.
After 9/11, the FBI, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the NYPD
adopted a preventative approach to countering terrorism, emphasizing the need
for proactive intelligence gathering and “forward-leaning”9 preventative
prosecutions.10 That intelligence gathering is now defined through a concern with

Samuel J. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam? The Law and Strategy of Counter-Radicalization, 64 STAN. L.
REV. 125, 146 n.93 (2012) [hereinafter Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam?] (noting the Obama
administration’s preference for the “violent extremism” language). Other federal agencies are similarly
concerned with radicalization. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., PROTECTING THE FORCE: LESSONS
FROM FORT HOOD 4, 12, 15–18, 20 (2010), available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/dodprotectingtheforce-web_security_hr_13jan10.pdf (referring to the need for the Department of
Defense to respond to the problem of “self-radicalization”). Radicalization policing might be
understood as a modern-day application of the old Al Capone approach to policing: where law
enforcement charges a big-time criminal with lesser pretextual charges as a way to get him off the
streets. See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy
of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 618–24 (2005). But when law enforcement is
policing radicalization, the concern is not for some past crime. The concern in policing radicalization
is the prevention of a future crime, predicted by the religious and political commitments of a
community or an individual.
9. Bartosiewicz, To Catch a Terrorist, supra note 5, at 39 (describing a memo by FBI Director
Robert Mueller issued days after 9/11 announcing a new policy of “‘forward-leaning—preventative—
prosecutions’”).
10. See, e.g., COUNTERTERRORISM SECTION, supra note 5; Counterterrorism Units, NYPD,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/administration/counterterrorism_units.shtml (last visited
Apr. 15, 2013); Directorate of Intelligence: Intelligence Philosophy, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/intelligence/philosophy (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (“The FBI has a mandate from Congress, the
President, the Attorney General, and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to protect national
security by producing intelligence in support of its own investigative mission, national intelligence
priorities, and needs of other customers.”); Directorate of Intelligence: Mission, FBI,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/intelligence/mission (last visited Apr. 15, 2013) (“The FBI’s national
security mission is to lead and coordinate intelligence efforts that drive actions to protect the United
States.”). For an argument about the comparative advantages of engaging local law enforcement in
intelligence gathering in counterterrorism work and looking to the NYPD as an example, see Samuel
J. Rascoff, The Law of Homegrown (Counter) Terrorism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1715, 1728–36 (2010)
[hereinafter Rascoff, The Law of Homegrown (Counter) Terrorism] (arguing in part that local
counterterrorism intelligence is “situated to play a vital role in gathering the intelligence necessary for
understanding the radicalization process”). See also David A. Harris, The War on Terror, Local Police, and
Immigration Enforcement: A Curious Tale of Police Power in Post-9/11 America, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 1–2
(2006) (discussing how state and local law enforcement’s refusal to become involved in immigration
enforcement “both illuminates a turning point in American policing, and teaches us important lessons
in how we must go forward in the war on terror if we are to succeed”); Matthew C. Waxman, National
Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, 64 STAN. L. REV. 289 (2012) (discussing the role of state and local
government in post-9/11 national security law and policy, and arguing for a federalism frame that
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radicalization, substantially expanding what is considered the legitimate scope of
police work. Legal scholarship has grappled with the preventative paradigm11 but
largely ignored the government’s new theory for predicting future terrorism.12
While some have forcefully argued that the threat of radicalization is overstated,13
scholars have provided inadequate critical attention to either the construction of
radicalization as a process or the growing number of government programs based
thereon.14 This Article is aimed at that gap; the Article examines how government
concern with radicalization and increased allowances for law enforcement
intelligence gathering have allowed law enforcement to marshal significant
resources towards monitoring American Muslim communities.15

emphasizes vertical intergovernmental arrangements to promote and mediate policy values over the
long term).
11. See, e.g., COLE & LOBEL, supra note 5, at 109; Aziz, supra note 5; Chesney, Beyond
Conspiracy?, supra note 5; Chesney, Sleeper Scenario, supra note 5; Waxman, supra note 5.
12. See Aziz Z. Huq, Modeling Terrorist Radicalization, 2 DUKE F. FOR L. & SOC. CHANGE 39
(2010) [hereinafter Huq, Modeling Terrorist Radicalization]; Aziz Z. Huq, The Signaling Function of Religious
Speech in Domestic Counterterrorism, 89 TEX. L. REV. 833 (2011) [hereinafter Huq, The Signaling Function];
Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam?, supra note 8, at 155–62; Rascoff, The Law of Homegrown (Counter)
Terrorism, supra note 10. There is more scholarly engagement with radicalization once you step outside
the legal academic literature. See Arun Kundnani, Radicalisation: The Journey of a Concept, 54 RACE &
CLASS 3 (2012); Faiza Patel, Rethinking Radicalization, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. passim (Mar. 8, 2011),
http://brennan.3cdn.net/f737600b433d98d25e_6pm6beukt.pdf. On the British experience in
particular, see ARUN KUNDNANI, INST. OF RACE RELATIONS, SPOOKED!: HOW NOT TO PREVENT
VIOLENT EXTREMISM 6–7, 10–22 (2009), available at http://www.irr.org.uk/pdf2/spooked.pdf, and
Paul Thomas, Failed and Friendless: The UK’s ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ Programme, 12 BRIT. J. POL. &
INT’L REL. 442, 444–47, 450 (2010).
13. E.g., Compilation of Hearings on Islamist Radicalization—Volume I: Hearings Before the H. Comm.
on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 71–77 (2011) [hereinafter King Hearing I ] (statement of Leroy Baca,
Sheriff, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department); id. at 228–31 (statement of Bert Useem,
Department Head and Professor, Sociology Department, Purdue University); see also John Mueller &
Mark G. Stewart, The Terrorism Delusion: America’s Overwrought Response to September 11, 37 INT’L
SECURITY 81, 87–89 (2012); Charles Kurzman, Muslim-American Terrorism in the Decade Since 9/11,
TRIANGLE CTR. ON TERRORISM & HOMELAND SEC. 2–9 (Feb. 8, 2012), http://kurzman.unc.edu/
files/2011/06/Kurzman_Muslim-American_Terrorism_in_the_Decade_Since_9_11.pdf (analyzing
data regarding terrorism from the past decade).
14. Academics and advocacy groups have started to write critically of the concept. Huq,
Modeling Terrorist Radicalization, supra note 12, at 56–69; Kundnani, supra note 12, at 8–22; Rascoff,
Establishing Official Islam?, supra note 8, at 162–79; Letter from Alliance for Justice et al. to Senator
Diane Feinstein, Chairman, U.S. Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence (Sept. 26, 2011), available at
http://www.defendingdissent.org/pdf/letters/feinsteinIntelAuth.pdf (opposing the Wolf Amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act, which would set up a radicalization commission); Michael
German, Radically Wrong: A Counterproductive Approach to Counterterrorism, ACLU BLOG RTS.
(Feb. 14, 2013, 10:52 AM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-free-speech/radically-wrongcounterproductive-approach-counterterrorism; Patel, supra note 12, at 8–12.
15. Examining the government’s concept is important because the state has a particular
“[i]nvestment in ‘radicalization’ modeling,” as it “yields dividends in the form of legitimacy for
policies of investigation and prosecution bottomed on the state’s claim of expertise.” Huq, Modeling
Terrorist Radicalization, supra note 12, at 40. These claims are particularly “forceful in the terrorism
domain because, unlike other areas of risk regulation . . . it is a field where the state claims to have
privileged access to information and where it has comparatively few academic competitors.” Id.
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There is no singular, official, government-wide understanding of radicalization.16 Indeed, more often than not, government officials and documents refer to
“radicalization,” “radical” and “radicalized” Muslims, “radical Islam,” “violent
extremists,” and so on, without explanation of what precisely these terms mean.17
Importantly, however, these references assume causal connections between
radicalism, extremism, Islam, and terrorism.
Despite diversity and indeterminacy in these narratives, government
accounts of radicalization converge upon three important themes. First,
radicalization is an observable and, to some extent, predictable process by which
Muslims become terrorists, willing and able to commit violence against the United
States (or American interests) in the name of Islam or the global Muslim
community.18 Second, in its effort to combat terrorism, the government has a role
to play in monitoring and countering radicalization.19 Third, radicalization is an
outcome of certain religious and political cultures within Muslim communities.
Stated another way, religious and political cultures within Muslim communities
foment radicalization in individuals. This should be a fairly uncontroversial
summation of the federal government’s approach. Putting the pieces together, the
16. There is a growing academic and think tank literature trying to understand radicalization as
a process in the real world. See, e.g., JIHADI TERRORISM AND THE RADICALISATION CHALLENGE IN
EUROPE passim (Rik Coolsaet ed., 2008); CLARK MCCAULEY & SOPHIA MOSKALENKO, FRICTION:
HOW RADICALIZATION HAPPENS TO THEM AND US passim (2011); Peter Neumann, Nat’l Sec.
Preparedness Grp., Preventing Violent Radicalization in America, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. 15–19 ( June
2011), http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/NSPG.pdf.
17. Similarly, the term “terrorism” is socially constructed and contested, including by courts.
See, e.g., Wadie E. Said, Humanitarian Law Project and the Supreme Court’s Construction of Terrorism, 2011
BYU L. REV. 1455, 1456–57, 1460 (2011) (explaining the Supreme Court’s use of the word
“terrorism” throughout history).
18. See MITCHELL D. SILBER & ARVIN BHATT, NYPD INTELLIGENCE DIV., RADICALIZATION IN THE WEST: THE HOMEGROWN THREAT 21 (2007), available at http://www.nypdshield.org/
public/sitefiles/documents/nypd_report-radicalization_in_the_west.pdf; Patel, supra note 12, at 1–2.
19. Samuel J. Rascoff notes that counter-radicalization is “open-ended and undertheorized” as
a concept, but “the core intuition behind counter-radicalization is that the prevention of future
violence requires official involvement in shaping the ideational currents that are thought to underpin
that violence.” Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam?, supra note 8, at 126–27, 145 (discussing, in addition
to various forms of counter-radicalization, “de-radicalization,” and explaining that government
“efforts to bring about change in ideation may also take the form of attempts to roll back an
individual’s or group’s existing radical commitments”). He describes the change that counterradicalization has wrought in this way:
[C]ounter-radicalization has changed the structure of government. It involves three
interrelated phenomena: the creation of a domestic intelligence network for the purpose of
informing counter-radicalization efforts; the creation and repurposing of government posts
for a counter-radicalization infrastructure; and the imposition of counter-radicalization
goals into the traditional welfare state.
Id. at 155–56. He credits the rise of the domestic counter-radicalization agenda to three things: (1) the
rise conforms to “the preemptive logic of counterterrorism, which focuses on strategies that minimize
the risk and intensity of future terrorist attacks”; (2) the rise is viewed as an exercise of “‘soft power’”
preferable to the mixed record that the United States has on the exercise of “‘hard power’” in the
national security context; and (3) the increased sense that there is a “‘homegrown’ dimension” to the
terrorist threat. Id. at 127–29.
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federal government’s embrace of radicalization discourse results directly in the
proliferation of government counter-radicalization programs,20 as well as related
initiatives to counter violent extremism,21 targeted at monitoring and shaping the
forms that religion and politics take in Muslim communities,22 and emphasizing
the need for “cooperation” from Muslim communities.23
Radicalization has transformed the landscape of preventative
counterterrorism policing, placing political and religious cultures of Muslim
communities at the center of the counterterrorism project, with unexamined costs.
20.
21.

Id. at 145, 148.
See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO
PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES (2011) [hereinafter EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf; Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Working Grp.,
Homeland Security Advisory Council, HOMELAND SEC. 15–26 (last visited Dec. 21, 2013),
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac_cve_working_group_recommendations.pdf. The administration uses both phrases—violent extremism and radicalization—and the terms seem to stand for the
same conceptual framework.
22. There is a growing racial and religious profiling literature on how post-9/11 policies
discriminatorily target American Muslim communities, from airport screening and questioning at the
border to charitable giving and surveillance. See, e.g., SHIRIN SINNAR ET AL., ASIAN LAW CAUCUS &
STANFORD LAW SCH. IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS CLINIC, RETURNING HOME: HOW U.S. GOVERNMENT
PRACTICES UNDERMINE CIVIL RIGHTS AT OUR NATION’S DOORSTEP 4–5 (2009), available at
http://www.asianlawcaucus.org/sites/asian-law-caucus/files/Returning%20Home.pdf [hereinafter
SINNAR ET AL., RETURNING HOME]; Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law: Post-September 11 Racial
Violence as Crimes of Passion, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1267–77 (2004); Linda E. Fisher, Guilt by
Expressive Association: Political Profiling, Surveillance and the Privacy of Groups, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 621,
622–623, 625 (2004); Kevin Lapp, Pressing Public Necessity: The Unconstitutionality of the Absconder
Apprehension Initiative, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 573, 573–76 (2005); Tom Lininger, Sects,
Lies, and Videotape: The Surveillance and Infiltration of Religious Groups, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1201, 1244–48
(2004); Shirin Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement: The First Amendment and Counterterrorism Interviews, 77
BROOK. L. REV. 41, 47–49, 54–56 (2011) [hereinafter Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement]; Under the
Radar: Muslims Deported, Detained, and Denied on Unsubstantiated Terrorism Allegations, CTR. FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS & GLOBAL JUSTICE 1–4 (May 4, 2011), http://www.privacysos.org/sites/all/files
/undertheradar(2).pdf; Thomas Cincotta, Manufacturing the Muslim Menace: Private Firms, Public Servants,
and the Threat to Rights and Security, POL. RES. ASSOCIATES 32 (2011), http://www.publiceye.org/liberty
/training/Muslim_Menace_Complete.pdf; Unreasonable Intrusions: Investigating the Politics, Faith &
Finances of Americans Returning Home, MUSLIM ADVOCATES (Apr. 2009), https://
d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/muslimadvocates/pages/178/attachments/original/1360963837/U
nreasonable_Intrusions_2009.pdf?1360963837; Jennifer Turner, Blocking Faith, Freezing Charity: Chilling
Muslim Charitable Giving in the “War on Terrorism Financing,” ACLU 59–75 (June 16, 2009),
http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/humanrights/block-ingfaith.pdf. Murad Hussain has called much of
this “cultural profiling.” Murad Hussain, Note, Defending the Faithful: Speaking the Language of Group
Harm in Free Exercise Challenges to Counterterrorism Profiling, 117 YALE L.J. 920, 926 (2008) (discussing
post-9/11 “cultural profiling” as “law enforcement policies that specifically target expressions of
cultural identity as proxy criteria thought to be correlated with criminality, terrorist connections, or
other subversive propensities”). Debating the utility of racial profiling in the national security context
is beyond the scope of this Article. Sharon Davies has done an elegant job unpacking the debate. See
Sharon Davies, Profiling Terror, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 45 (2003).
23. See Aziz Huq, The Social Production of National Security, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 637, 685 (2013);
Sahar F. Aziz, Policing Terrorists in the Community, 5 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. (forthcoming 2014)
(manuscript at 38) (on file with author).
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The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a brief history of law
enforcement’s production and embrace of radicalization. Part II analyzes the
seminal NYPD report Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat.24 Part III
provides a schematic for understanding radicalization policing. Part III.A lays out
the standards governing the FBI’s and NYPD’s policing, with a focus on the
relaxed standards on intelligence gathering in the post-9/11 era. Part III.B
identifies and explores the core preventative policing techniques of policing
radicalization: mapping, aggressive recruitment and deployment of informants,
voluntary or pretextual interviews, community engagement, and Internet
monitoring. Part IV identifies harms related to policing radicalization. Part IV.A
introduces how radicalization attaches stigma to Muslim religious and political
cultures and geographies. Part IV.B examines the fundamental tensions that
radicalization produces between law enforcement and Muslim communities, and
Muslim and American identities. Part IV.C examines the pressure radicalization
creates on American Muslim identity performances.
A few notes on vocabulary are in order.
In referring to “radicalization,” I refer to the discursive construct rather than
any actual process, with a particular focus on government constructions.
Government concern with radicalization and violent extremism is fairly
coterminous25—greater religiosity and politicization in Muslims is associated with
the threat of terrorism. Similarly, government counter-radicalization and
countering violent extremism programs both reflect the proposition that
government must monitor and influence the religious and political cultures of
Muslim communities as a way to ward off future terrorism. While I am concerned
with both radicalization and violent extremism frameworks for understanding
terrorist threats, I default towards the terminology of radicalization, since the
concept is more theorized. Any marginal differences are beyond the scope of this
Article.
I refer repeatedly to the religious and political cultures of Muslim communities. I use this phraseology to capture government concern with monitoring and
influencing the religious ideas and practices and the political ideas and activities in
Muslim communities. Government concern is both general (viz., the political and
religious ideas that have currency in the imagined national American Muslim
community) and site specific—attuned to the political and religious ideas with
currency in a particular place where Muslims gather (e.g., a mosque or a Muslim

24. SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18.
25. See, e.g., STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 112TH
CONG., A TICKING TIME BOMB: COUNTERTERRORISM LESSONS FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S
FAILURE TO PREVENT THE FORT HOOD ATTACK 17 (2011) [hereinafter S. COMM. ON HOMELAND
SEC., A TICKING TIME BOMB], available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov//imo/media/doc/Fort
_Hood/FortHoodReport.pdf (“The process by which an individual transitions to a violent Islamist
extremist is known as radicalization.”).
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student group). It is also individual and community based. Drawing on the
discipline of political geography and its conversation with law,26 I occasionally use
the term “geography” to capture law enforcement’s efforts to surveil and generate
profiles on specific sites where Muslims gather and Muslim religious and political
cultures emerge. Radicalization lends itself to this project by constituting Muslim
gathering spaces as suspicious spaces.
Herein lies the larger problem with radicalization. While in some ways it
offers only a thin veneer over suspicion of Muslims and Islam (or conflations
between Muslims, Islam, and terrorism), the veneer is thick enough to change the
terms of the debate. Law enforcement’s concern with mosques, antiwar
sentiments, hijabs, and niqabs is now cloaked in expertise about the process by
which Muslims become terrorists. In a colorblind world where intent defines our
understanding of discrimination, the language of justification for government
action can make all the difference.27

26. See, e.g., NICHOLAS K. BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER, at
xi–xiv (1994) (“[C]oncealed within legal thought and legal practice are a number of representations—
or ‘geographies’—of the spaces of political, social, and economic life. . . . While struggling to make
sense of the complexity and ambiguity of social life, legal agents—whether judges, legal theorists,
administrative officers, or ordinary people—represent and evaluate space in various ways. . . . These
juridical representations touch all aspects of legal life . . . . The legal representation of space must be
seen as constituted by—and, in turn, constitutive of—complex, normatively charged and often
competing visions of social and political life under law.”); DAVID DELANEY, RACE, PLACE, AND THE
LAW 1836–1948, at 6–10 (1998) (“It is hard to understate the central significance of geographical
themes—space, place, and mobility—to the social and political history of race relations and antiblack
racism in the United States.”); Franz von Benda-Beckmann et al., Space and Legal Pluralism:
An Introduction, in SPATIALIZING LAW: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL GEOGRAPHY OF LAW IN SOCIETY 1,
3–9 (Franz von Benda-Beckmann et al. eds., 2009) (“All social and legal institutions, relations and
practices are located and distributed in space. . . . Law is also used for creating spaces for more
specific purposes with special legal regimes that are superimposed on this general geographical
political and administrative grid, such as economic zones, zones for urban planning, ‘problem’ or
‘safety’ zones . . . . Within legal spaces, we also find constructions of ‘dangerous’ spaces as opposed to
‘good’ or sanctioned spaces . . . . Legal constructions of space are used as an instrument to control
people and resources.”); Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal
Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1844–45 (1994) (“[P]olitical geography—the position and function
of jurisdictional and quasi-jurisdictional boundaries—helps to promote a racially separate and unequal
distribution of political influence and economic resources. . . . Thus, racial segregation persists in the
absence of explicit, legally enforceable racial restrictions.” (footnote omitted)); Steve Herbert, The
Geopolitics of the Police: Foucault, Disciplinary Power and the Tactics of the Los Angeles Police Department, 15
POL. GEOGRAPHY 47, 50 (1996) (“Because of its high level of technological and organizational
sophistication, the LAPD is an unusually appropriate object of attention for an examination of the
geopolitics of contemporary discipline.”).
27. Through her “preservation-through-transformation” theory, Reva Siegel has explained
how social hierarchies sustain themselves in part by evolving their justificatory rhetoric. Reva B.
Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2119 (1996); Reva
Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49
STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (1997).
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I. RADICALIZATION BRIEFLY HISTORICIZED
The process by which an individual transitions to a violent Islamist extremist is known
as radicalization.
—Special Report by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs28
Why is it that a whole range of political, cultural, social, and even economic events has
often seemed reducible in so Pavlovian a way to ‘Islam’? What is it about ‘Islam’ that
provokes so quick and unrestrained a response?
—Edward Said29
The following account charts the course of radicalization as a concept
articulated, accepted, and implemented by agencies of the U.S. government and
the NYPD. The account is not intended to be exhaustive, nor does it explore with
any detail the broad array of policies spawned by radicalization. It is simply meant
to convey the rapid ascent of radicalization as a concept and government policy
priority. Throughout this Article, I focus on the DOJ, FBI, and NYPD. The
DOJ—of which the FBI is a part—is the primary law enforcement entity
responsible for policing and prosecuting terrorism and terrorism-related activity.30
The NYPD’s counterterrorism efforts are the next most prominent. The NYPD is
engaged with counterterrorism policing through its Intelligence and Counterterrorism Divisions (as well as its Community Affairs Bureau), and in collaboration
with the FBI through the New York Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF).31

28.
29.

S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC., A TICKING TIME BOMB, supra note 25.
EDWARD W. SAID, COVERING ISLAM: HOW THE MEDIA AND THE EXPERTS
DETERMINE HOW WE SEE THE REST OF THE WORLD 9 (1981).
30. When NYPD counterterrorism work culminates in a terrorism-related indictment, it is
typically a federal indictment. But New York recently made use of the terrorism provisions in its state
criminal code for the first time in prosecutions against Ahmed Ferhani and Mohamed Mamdouh. See
William K. Rashbaum & Colin Moynihan, Most Serious Charges Are Rejected in Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES,
June 15, 2011, at A28 (describing the charges on which the state grand jury elected to indict the
defendants); see also Joseph Goldstein & William K. Rashbaum, City Bomb Plot Suspect Called Fan of
Qaeda Cleric, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, at A1 (discussing the New York state-level prosecution
against Jose Pimentel). In decisions much-speculated about, the FBI declined to be involved in these
cases. Goldstein & Rashbaum, supra; Michael Greenberg, The Problem of the New York Police, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS (Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/oct/25/problem-new
-york-police [hereinafter Greenberg, The Problem of the New York Police].
31. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER DICKEY, SECURING THE CITY: INSIDE AMERICA’S BEST
COUNTERTERROR FORCE—THE NYPD 163 (2009) (stating that as of early 2006, at least the upper
echelons of the FBI and the NYPD were working together to combat terrorism); LEONARD LEVITT,
NYPD CONFIDENTIAL: POWER AND CORRUPTION IN THE COUNTRY’S GREATEST POLICE FORCE
236–37 (2009) (discussing the New York City police commissioner’s appointment of the NYPD’s
first deputy commissioner of counterterrorism, whose responsibilities include fashioning a police
response to terrorism in New York City and supervising the detectives in the FBI-led JTTF); Richard
Falkenrath, Deputy Comm’r for Counterterrorism, N.Y. Police Dep’t, Address at the Wash. Inst. for
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On both sides of the Atlantic, radicalization and counter-radicalization are
new concepts for understanding the threat of terrorism at home and the role of
government in responding. Radicalization theories are relatively new in Europe
and even newer in the United States.32 Radicalization and counter-radicalization

Near E. Policy (June 23, 2009), available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/falkenrath
20090623.pdf (discussing information-sharing and other counterterrorism cooperation between the
NYPD and FBI); Counterterrorism Units, supra note 10 (describing the NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau
and its various divisions); Protecting America from Terrorist Attack: Our Joint Terrorism Task Forces, FBI,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism_jttfs (last visited Apr. 15, 2013)
(describing the FBI JTTFs); see also Michael Greenberg, New York: The Police and the Protesters, N.Y.
REV. BOOKS (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/oct/11/new-york
-police-and-protesters [hereinafter Greenberg, New York: The Police and the Protesters] (discussing the
countertterrorism activities of the NYPD Intelligence Division and its interactions with the FBI and
JTTF); Greenberg, The Problem of the New York Police, supra note 30 (discussing terrorist plots revealed
as failed or foiled by the FBI or NYPD).
32. Huq, Modeling Terrorist Radicalization, supra note 12, at 41 n.10 (noting the author’s inability
to find any references to radicalization prior to 2001); Kundnani, supra note 12, at 4–10 (tracing the
emergence of the radicalization theories in European accounts to 2004). On the American borrowing
of the British/European experience, see Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam?, supra note 8, at 148, which
notes that “American domestic counter-radicalization is emerging mainly as a (modified) import from
Europe, chiefly from the United Kingdom,” and Kundnani, supra note 12, at 3–7. On the British
experience itself, see KUNDNANI, supra note 12, and Thomas, supra note 12. See also Huq, Modeling
Terrorist Radicalization, supra note 12, at 51–56. The concept gained traction during a period when the
Bush administration’s approach to prosecuting terrorism through the federal courts was under
considerable attack, from entities inside and outside of the government. Starting as early as 2003 and
through 2007, a number of prominent investigations into the Bush administration’s Article III
terrorism-related prosecutions determined that the administration was bloating its record. COLE &
LOBEL, supra note 5, at 110–11 (“The key to understanding the administration’s claim that it has
obtained more than four hundred criminal indictments and two hundred convictions in ‘terrorismrelated’ cases is the word ‘related.’ . . . [T]he majority of [those] indictments and convictions . . . are
for minor, nonviolent offenses such as making false statements on a federal form, immigration
infractions, or credit card fraud.”); Dan Eggen & Julie Tate, U.S. Campaign Produces Few Convictions on
Terrorism Charges, WASH. POST, June 12, 2005, at A1; Scott Shane & Lowell Bergmann, Adding Up the
Ounces of Prevention, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2006, at C1; Karen J. Greenberg & Daniel Freifeld, Terrorist
Trials, 2001–2007: Lessons Learned, CTR. ON L. & SEC. 1 (Oct. 2007), http://www.lawandsecurity
.org/portals/0/documents/08_ttrc2007update1.pdf; Terrorist Trial Report Card: U.S. Edition, CTR. ON
L. & SEC. 3 (2006), http://www.lawandsecurity.org/portals/0/documents/09_ttrccomplete.pdf;
Terrorist Trials: A Report Card, CTR. ON L. & SEC. 1–2 (Feb. 2005), http://www.lawandsecurity
.org/portals/0/documents/12_terroristtrialreportcard.pdf (“The legal war on terror has yielded few
visible results. There have been relatively few indictments, fewer trials, and almost no convictions on
charges reflecting dangerous crimes.”); TRAC, Criminal Terrorism Enforcement Since the 9/11/01 Attacks:
A TRAC Special Report, SYRACUSE UNIV. (Dec. 8, 2003), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports
/terrorism/report031208.html. In February 2007, the DOJ’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
issued a damning report examining the DOJ’s terrorism-related statistics. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S INTERNAL CONTROLS OVER
TERRORISM REPORTING (2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/plus/a0720
/final.pdf. The OIG “found that the Department components and the Department as a whole did
not accurately report terrorism-related statistics. The Department components lacked adequate
internal controls for gathering, verifying, and reporting terrorism-related statistics.” Id. at xvii. For
example, the FBI overstated the number of terrorism-related convictions “because the FBI initially
coded the investigative cases as terrorism-related when the cases were opened, but did not recode
cases when no link to terrorism was established.” Id. at viii, 17–19 (describing various cases where the
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programs are primarily if not almost exclusively concerned with Muslim
communities.
The chronology of the U.S. government’s rapid embrace of radicalization
starts in earnest in 2006.33 At that time, the FBI issued an Intelligence Assessment,
The Radicalization Process: From Conversion to Jihad, asserting the existence of an
identifiable and predictable process by which a Muslim becomes a terrorist.34 The
FBI identified the four stages of radicalization as “preradicalization,”
“identification,” “indoctrination,” and “action.”35 In addition to proposing what
on its face seems a reductionist view of how someone might decide to commit any
crime—let alone a crime of great magnitude—the twelve-page document includes
almost no citations, sourcing, or indication of methodology. Four out of the five
sources listed in the document’s seven footnotes are from the 1990s, one from the
FBI failed to properly recode cases). The greatest inaccuracies were a result of coding “statistical data
as terrorism or anti-terrorism related [without] support that a case showed any reasonable link to
terrorist activity.” Id. at xi–xii; see also id. at 42–56. Similar to the FBI, the Executive Office for United
States Attorneys (EOUSA), and the Offices of the United States Attorneys (USAO) inaccurately
reported because “the USAOs categorized the cases against the defendants under the anti-terrorism
program activity when the case was filed but did not change the categorization based upon further
investigation or based on the actual evidence found or offenses for which the defendants were
convicted.” Id. at xiii. The DOJ OIG’s report echoed an earlier report by the Government
Accountability Office that found similar lack of oversight in DOJ’s reporting of terrorism statistics, as
well as inconsistencies between the FBI’s and EOUSA’s classification schemes. U.S. GOV’T.
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-266, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT: BETTER MANAGEMENT
OVERSIGHT AND INTERNAL CONTROLS NEEDED TO ENSURE ACCURACY OF TERRORISMRELATED STATISTICS 6 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/236927.pdf (finding at
least 132 of 288 cases misclassified as terrorism-related). For a view in line with the government’s
defense, see Robert M. Chesney, Federal Prosecution of Terrorism-Related Offenses: Conviction and Sentencing
Data in Light of the “Soft-Sentence” and “Data-Reliability” Critiques, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 851, 889
(2007) (concluding that the overall pattern of dispositions and sentences indicates the DOJ’s program
has been successful). But see Richman & Stuntz, supra note 8 (discussing the success of U.S.
preemptive counterterrorism tactics, but emphasizing their possible costs to credibility).
33. The earliest reference to a U.S. government concern with Muslim “radicalization” seems
to be from 2003, regarding prisons. Terrorism: Radical Islamic Influence of Chaplaincy of the U.S. Military and
Prisons: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech. & Homeland Sec. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
108th Cong. 8–9 (2003) (statement of John S. Pistole, Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division,
Federal Bureau of Investigation) (“U.S. correctional institutions are a viable venue for . . .
radicalization and recruitment. . . . To assist in ferreting out potential radicalization issues within the
Federal Bureau of Prisons system, the Bureau of Prisons maintains a presence on the FBI’s National
Joint Terrorism Task Force.”); see also The Homeland Security Implications of Radicalization: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Intelligence, Info. Sharing, & Terrorism Risk Assessment of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 109th
Cong. 14 (2006) (statement of Donald Van Duyn, Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division,
Federal Bureau of Investigations) (“[T]he FBI and the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) have been actively
engaged in efforts to detect, deter, and interdict efforts by terrorist and extremist groups to radicalize
or recruit in US prisons since February 2003.”).
34. FBI COUNTERTERRORISM DIV., THE RADICALIZATION PROCESS: FROM CONVERSION
TO JIHAD 2 (2006). Although not made public, this document was leaked.
35. Id. at 3. In 2003, a professor of psychology guest wrote an article for the FBI Law
Enforcement Bulletin theorizing four stages of “radicalization.” See Randy Borum, Understanding the
Terrorist Mind-Set, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., July 2003, at 7 (arguing that “four observable stages
appear to frame a process of ideological development” of a terrorist).
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1960s.36 The next pivotal development came in 2007, when the NYPD
Intelligence Division published a pivotal almost 100-page public report,
Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat.37 That report mirrors the 2006 FBI
Intelligence Assessment, theorizing the process from Muslim to terrorist, with
similar stages and markers, but in much greater detail.38
The FBI Intelligence Assessment and the NYPD report sowed the idea of
radicalization and counter-radicalization into government discourse.39 Since 2007,
U.S. federal and local government literature has taken for granted a problem with
Muslim radicalization in the United States; government programming based on
that assumption has developed at a clip. In Congress, for example, both the House
and Senate Homeland Security Committees have devoted considerable resources
to the development of the radicalization discourse, emphasizing the need for the
government to monitor and respond to radicalization.40 More recently, the White

36. FBI COUNTERTERRORISM DIV., supra note 34, at 12 nn.1–7.
37. SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18.
38. The four stages take on a slightly modified parlance from the FBI: “[p]re-radicalization,”
“[s]elf-identification,” “[i]ndoctrination,” and “[j]ihadization.” Id. at 21. Each stage has “specific
signatures associated with it.” Id.; see infra Part II.
39. For another accounting of the federal and state government literature, see Huq, Modeling
Terrorist Radicalization, supra note 12, at 43–51 (discussing both state-level and federal-level responses
to “radicalization” in the U.S.). Huq suggests that the NYPD’s publication of the “radicalization”
theory was related to the NYPD’s drive to establish itself as the preeminent national security law
enforcement entity, even over the FBI. Id. at 64–65. On the larger questions of federal and state law
enforcment competition and cooperation, see Waxman, supra note 10; Matthew Waxman, Policing
Terrorism, DEFINING IDEAS (May 4, 2012), http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/
article/116471 (arguing federalism is key to forming a more efficient counterterrorism system).
40. Under Peter King’s leadership, in 2011 and 2012, the House Homeland Security
Committee held a series of hearings premised on the assertion that American Muslims are radicalizing
at an increasing rate and pose a significant threat to the United States. See Compilation of Hearings on
Islamist Radicalization—Volume III: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 75 (2012)
(statement of Rep. Peter T. King, Chairman H. Comm. on Homeland Sec.) (reiterating the necessity
of the hearings based on “a crisis of radicalization to violence . . . within the Muslim-American
community”); Compilation of Hearings on Islamist Radicalization—Volume II: Joint Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Homeland Sec. and the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. 2 (2011)
[hereinafter King Hearing II ] (statement of Rep. Peter T. King, Chairman, H. Comm. on Homeland
Sec.) (“[Responding] to . . . a growing security threat from radicalization both within the military as
well as against military personnel and their families residing in the United States.”); King Hearing I,
supra note 13, at 278 (statement of Rep. Peter T. King, Chairman, H. Comm. on Homeland Sec.)
(“[A]l-shabaab . . . is engaged in an on-going [sic] successful effort to recruit and radicalize dozens of
Muslim American jihadis who pose a direct threat to the United States.”); id. at 204 (addressing the
“issue of Islamic radicalization in U.S. prisons . . . . because the danger remains real and present”); id.
at 2 (arguing that the need for the hearings is based on al-Qaeda’s attempts to “recruit and radicalize”
people in the United States). Witnesses at these hearings have balked at King’s premises. See King
Hearing I, supra note 13, at 73–74 (statement of Leroy Baca, Sheriff, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department) (arguing that no particular religion is more susceptible to radicalization and that
cooperation and relationship building are more effective than arrests and enforcement); id. at 231
(statement of Bert Useem, Department Head and Professor, Sociology Department, Purdue
University) (“U.S. prisons are not systematically generating a terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland.”);
id. at 200 (statement of Rep. Keith Ellison) (noting the threat of prison radicalization “seems to be
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House has embraced the need to “counter violent extremism” and
“radicalization,” playing a leadership role in encouraging such programs in its 2010
and 2011 national security strategy papers.41 The Obama administration’s 2011
Strategic Implementation Plan, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism
in the United States, announces prioritization of government programs supporting
false, or, at least, overstated” (quoting Bert Useem & Obie Clayton, Radicalization of U.S. Prisoners, 8
AM. SOC’Y CRIMINOLOGY 561, 586 (2009))). Under Joe Lieberman’s imprimatur, the Senate
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, too, has held a series of hearings and
issued a number of reports embracing and expounding on the NYPD’s radicalization theory. See, e.g.,
King Hearing II, supra, at 45 (noting that the Senate Committee’s report heavily relied on the NYPD’s
RADICALIZATION IN THE WEST report); A Ticking Time Bomb: Counterterrorism Lessons from the U.S.
Government’s Failure to Prevent the Fort Hood Attack: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. &
Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. 14 (2011) (statement of Samuel J. Rascoff, Assistant Professor of
Law, New York University School of Law) (recommending cooperation with Muslim communities as
an effective means of counter-radicalization); Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming in U.S. Cell
Blocks?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 1 (2006)
(statement of Sen. Susan M. Collins, Chairwoman, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental
Affairs) (citing a need to learn more about radicalization in prisons); STAFF OF S. COMM. ON
HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 112TH CONG., ZACHARY CHESSER: A CASE STUDY
IN ONLINE ISLAMIST RADICALIZATION AND ITS MEANING FOR THE THREAT OF HOMEGROWN
TERRORISM 3–4 (2012) [hereinafter S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC., ONLINE ISLAMIST
RADICALIZATION], available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CHESSER%20FINAL
%20REPORT(1).pdf (examining the phenomenon of online radicalization through Zachary Chesser);
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 110TH CONG., VIOLENT
ISLAMIST EXTREMISM, THE INTERNET, AND THE HOMEGROWN TERRORIST THREAT 4–5 (2008)
[hereinafter S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC., VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM] (adopting the
NYPD’s four-stage radicalization model). Mitch Silber testified about the report before the Senate
Homeland Security committee. Violent Islamist Extremism—2007: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 110th Cong., 140–54 (2007) (testimony of Mitchell D. Silber,
Senior Intelligence Analyst, Intelligence Division, New York City Police Department). Tellingly, the
Congressional Research Service’s recent reports on “American jihadist terrorism” and countering
violent extremism take for granted the existence of a legible, predictable radicalization process, while
at the same time counseling some degree of caution. Both cite to the NYPD report to define
radicalization. See BJELOPERA, supra note 8, at 3–4; JEROME P. BJELOPERA & MARK A. RANDOL,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41416, AMERICAN JIHADIST TERRORISM: COMBATING A COMPLEX
THREAT 1–2, 11–14 (2010); see also JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41416,
AMERICAN JIHADIST TERRORISM: COMBATING A COMPLEX THREAT 12 (2013) (referring to the
NYPD report as “widely circulated within the law enforcement community”).
41. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS, supra note 21,
at 2–3, 5–6 (discussing the need to prevent and counter radicalization and extremism); EXEC. OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 19, 26, 37 (2010) [hereinafter EXEC. OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (discussing generally how to fight
radicalism and extremism); EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM 6, 9–12 (2011) [hereinafter EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STRATEGY
FOR COUNTERTERRORISM], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism
_strategy.pdf (stating that cooperation is necessary to fight radicalization and discussing strategies to
defeat al-Qaeda and its ideologies); Lorenzo Vidino, Countering Radicalization in America: Lessons From
Europe, U.S. INST. PEACE 2 (Nov. 2010), http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR262%20%20
Countering_Radicalization_in_America.pdf (noting the Obama administration has recently “ask[ed]
several governmental agencies to craft policies to ‘counter violent extremism’ and devise appropriate
counterradicalization plans”).
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community-based approaches to “countering violent extremism.”42 While the
Obama plan is short on details,43 its issuance suggests more government
community-engagement programs across the board. The U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)44

42. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS, supra note 21, at
2–7; see also EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 41, at
19–22, 26–27 (discussing plans to advance security interests by working with the international
community to disrupt al-Qaeda forces); EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STRATEGY FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM, supra note 41, at 6–7, 9–12 (discussing strategy of building international
security partnerships to counter al-Qaeda).
43. For an analysis of the White House’s proposal, see Huq, supra note 23. See also German,
supra note 14 (“Rather than challenge the radicalization theory with the many studies that refute it, the
Obama administration issued a plan for preventing violent extremism. While the White House
deserves some credit for using more careful language and for emphasizing the need for community
engagement, it perpetuates the notion that ‘radicalization to violence’ is a discernible process that
government can identify, predict and interdict, and establishes policies that again threaten civil
liberties.”).
44. Some have argued that DHS and NCTC have rejected religiosity as a proxy for violence,
or the idea of one “radicalization” pathway to terrorism. Huq, Modeling Terrorist Radicalization, supra
note 12, at 49–50; Patel, supra note 12, at 13. But former DHS Secretary Napolitano regularly referred
to the need for the government to counter violent extremism. Understanding the Homeland Threat
Landscape—Considerations for the 112th Congress: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong.
12 (2011) (statement of Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security) (referring to
the need to counter violent extremism, and to DHS’s efforts to “compile . . . case studies that
examine recent incidents involving terrorism . . . . [that] focus on common behaviors and indicators
regarding violent extremism”); Janet Napolitano, Partnering with Communities to Counter Violent
Extremism, HOMELAND SEC. (Mar. 6, 2011), http://www.dhs.gov/node/7913 (“We therefore see
countering violent extremism as both a ‘whole of government’ and ‘whole of nation’ effort.”); Office
of the Press Sec’y, Secretary Napolitano Meets with State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement on Countering
Violent Extremism, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov
/news/2012/01/18/secretary-napolitano-meets-state-local-and-tribal-law-enforcement-counteringviolent (chronicling Secretary Napolitano’s meetings with law enforcement officials to “engage them
on the critical task of preventing violent extremism”); see also HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, NATIONAL
STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 22 (2007) (proposing that law enforcement agencies should
“identify and address sources of violent extremist radicalization in the Homeland”). Napolitano has
spoken about the threat of “right-wing extremism,” but in June 2009, DHS retracted a report entitled
Rightwing Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and
Recruitment, after the report sparked controversy. OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., RIGHTWING EXTREMISM: CURRENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
CLIMATE FUELING RESURGENCE IN RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT (2009), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/rightwing.pdf; see also R. Jeffrey Smith, Homeland Security Department
Curtails Home-Grown Terror Analysis, WASH. POST (June 7, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/homeland-security-department-curtails-home-grown-terror-analysis/2011/06/02/AGQEaDLH
_story.html. Daryl Johnson, the author of the report on rightwing extremism, stated, “Other reports
written by DHS about Muslim extremists . . . got through without any major problems,” while “[o]urs
[on right wing extremism] went through endless reviews and edits, and nothing came out.” Smith,
supra; see also Amy Goodman, Former DHS Analyst Daryl Johnson on How He Was Silenced for Warning of
Far-Right Militants in U.S., DEMOCRACY NOW! (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.democracynow
.org/2012/8/9/former_dhs_analyst_daryl_johnson_on (speaking about the backlash he experienced
after the right-wing extremism report was disclosed to the public). The Washington Post reported that
DHS “cut the number of personnel studying domestic terrorism unrelated to Islam, canceled
numerous state and local law enforcement briefings, and held up dissemination of nearly a dozen
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have also worked to model, assess, and encourage government programs to
respond to “radicalization” and “violent extremism.”45
The FBI and DOJ policies reflect a clear prioritization of countering
radicalization and violent extremism.46 The DOJ and FBI regularly refer to
radicalization, and to Muslim individuals adhering to “extremist” or “radical”
ideologies, as the targets of their investigations and prosecutions.47 FBI training

reports on extremist groups.” Smith, supra; see also Spencer Ackerman, DHS Crushed This Analyst for
Warning About Far-Right Terror, WIRED (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/
08/dhs/all (relating how “‘they dissolved [Johnson’s] team’” after the DHS repudiated the report on
rightwing extremism).
45. See RICHARD A. BEST, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41022, THE NATIONAL
COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER (NCTC)—RESPONSIBILITIES AND POTENTIAL CONGRESSIONAL
CONCERNS 6 (2011) (referring to a 2006 NCTC implementation plan which included as an objective
“containing violent extremism”); THE NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., COUNTERTERRORISM
2012 CALENDAR 140 (2012) (“Radicalization is a dynamic and multi-layered process involving several
factors that interact with one another to influence an individual. There is no single factor that explains
radicalization and mobilization.”); Hearing on Intelligence, supra note 2 (recording statements by Matthew
Olsen, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, that the NCTC includes within its mandate
“the problem of countering violent extremism” and that the NCTC, with FBI and DHS, is “train[ing]
local state law enforcement to better spot the signs of radicalization”); About Us, NAT’L
COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., http://www.nctc.gov/about_us/about_nctc.html (last visited Apr. 15,
2013) (“NCTC’s Radicalization and Extremist Messaging Group leads the [Intelligence Community’s]
efforts on radicalization issues.”); see also 50 U.S.C. § 404o(d)(2) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (establishing
the NCTC with a mission to “conduct strategic operational planning for counterterrorism activities”).
46. In some forums, the FBI has suggested it does not sanction the idea of a fixed
radicalization process. See Homeland Threats and Agency Responses: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland
Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. 12 (2012) (statement of Kevin L. Perkins, Associate Deputy
Director, FBI) (“These individuals have no typical profile; their experiences and motives are often
distinct.”); Huq, Modeling Terrorist Radicalization, supra note 12, at 48 (quoting a few FBI statements on
radicalization). This doublespeak is a common trend. In a report on “32 Terrorism Cases Against the
Homeland” prepared by the New York State Intelligence Center, for example, the authors write:
“There is no definitive terrorist profile. However, we were able to identify trends in basic pedigree
information to suggest that these individuals are largely young males, between the ages of 18–33, who
explicitly support or follow radical Islamic ideology.” N.Y. STATE INTELLIGENCE CTR., THE
VIGILANCE PROJECT: AN ANALYSIS OF 32 TERRORISM CASES AGAINST THE HOMELAND 4 (2010);
see also Falkenrath, supra note 31 (“The analysts who follow radicalization have a number of different
theories about what is driving this, and as a former academic—a former professor—I must say I’m
not yet persuaded as to which theory is right. The NYPD intelligence division put out a very
important report about two years ago on radicalization laying out its analysis of ten major cases of
homegrown radicalization and the steps that the individuals went through. And we think that’s a pretty
good framework for evaluating these different plots.” (emphasis added)).
47. Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year of 2013: Hearings
Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 112th Cong. 11 (2012) (statement of Robert S.
Mueller, III, Director, FBI) (framing as particularly important “al Qaeda’s use of on-line chat rooms
and Web sites to recruit and radicalize followers to commit acts of terrorism”); id. at 7 (statement of
Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, FBI) (referring to a case of “homegrown violent extremists” as
“exemplif[ying] the need to continue to enhance our intelligence capabilities and to get the right
information to the right peoplebefore any harm is done”); Ten Years After 9/11–2011: Hearings Before
the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. 215 (2011) (statement of Robert S.
Mueller, III, Director, FBI) (“Individuals may be radicalized over the Internet even if they do not
receive direct guidance or training from a terrorist group.”); FBI COUNTERTERRORISM DIV., supra
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note 34 (presenting a “model of the radicalization process for a legal US person who is a convert to
Islam”); Dennis A. Ballas, Prisoner Radicalization, FBI (Oct. 2010), http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/
publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/October-2010/confronting-science-and-market-positioning
(discussing “the threat of inmate radicalization”); Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Al Qaeda
Operative Convicted by Jury in One of the Most Serious Terrorist Plots Against America Since 9/11, U.S. DEP’T
JUST. (May 1, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/May/12-nsd-565.html (quoting Loretta E.
Lynch, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York) (referring to the defendant’s “‘journey of
radicalization’”); Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Maryland Man Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to
Provide Material Support to Terrorists, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (May 4, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
2012/May/12-nsd-579.html (quoting FBI Special Agent Charge Venizelos) (referring to the
defendant as a “radicalized teen,” and commenting that “[t]his investigation and the guilty plea
announced today underscores [sic] the continuing threat we face from violent extremism and
radicalism, both from within our country and from across the world”); Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub.
Affairs, North Carolina Resident Found Guilty of Terrorism Violations, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (June 14, 2012),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/June/12-nsd-755.html (“[S]ome defendants also allegedly
radicalized others to believe that violent jihadwas [sic] a personal religious obligation.”); Dep’t of
Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Two Indicted for Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to Terrorists, U.S.
DEP’T JUST. (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/October/11-nsd-1385.html
(quoting Mark Giuliano, Executive Assistant Director of the FBI’s National Security Branch)
(warning that individuals have “used the Internet to further their radicalization and contribute to the
radicalization of others”); Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Virginia Man Accused of Attempting to
Bomb U.S. Capitol in Suicide Attack, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
2012/February/12-nsd-234.html (quoting Lisa Monaco, Assistant Attorney General for National
Security and James W. McJunkin, Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI Washington Field Office,
respectively), (announcing the arrest of a “homegrown violent extremist[]” who adhered to a “radical”
version of Islam); Saudi National Charged with Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to HAMAS and Other
Violent Jihadists, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Mar. 4, 2004), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/March/04
_crm_137.htm (announcing the indictment of a graduate student from Saudi Arabia for operating
websites on behalf of various Islamic organizations and “radical” Saudi sheikhs); Two Plead Guilty to
Domestic Terrorism Charges of Conspiring to Attack Military Facilities, Jewish Targets, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Dec.
14, 2007), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/December/07_nsd_1006.html (announcing the
guilty pleas of two members of a domestic “radical Islamic organization”); U.S. Attorney’s Office
Dist. of Mass., Massachusetts Man Charged with Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to Terrorists, FBI (Oct.
21, 2009), http://www.fbi.gov/boston/press-releases/2009/bs102109a.htm (“[C]oconspirators
attempted to radicalize others and inspire each other by, among other things, watching and
distributing jihadi videos.”); U.S. Attorney’s Office E. Dist. of Va., Leader of Revolution Muslim Pleads
Guilty to Using Internet to Solicit Murder and Encourage Violent Extremism, FBI (Feb. 9, 2012), http://
www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-releases/2012/leader-of-revolution-muslim-pleads-guilty-to-usinginternet-to-solicit-murder-and-encourage-violent-extremism (quoting Raymond W. Kelly, NYPD
Commissioner) (“‘Morton used the Internet to conspire to solicit murder, and . . . encouraged others
to solicit the murder of an artist whose material he deemed offensive.’”); U.S. Attorney’s Office E.
Dist. of Va., supra note 1 (quoting James W. McJunkin, Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI’s
Washington Field Office) (“‘[T]he FBI will continue to pursue those who support violent extremism
and promote the radicalization of others . . . .’”); U.S. Attorney’s Office N. Dist. Ala., Uzbek National
Pleads Guilty to Charges of Threatening to Kill the President and Providing Material Support to Terrorist Activity,
U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/usao/aln/News/February%202012
/February%2010,%202012%20Uzbek.html (quoting FBI Special Agent in Charge Patrick J. Maley)
(“‘This case serves as a reminder of the dangers of the Internet on radicalizing our youth right in our
own back yards . . . .’”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2012 PERFORMANCE BUDGET: OFFICE
OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS 31 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2013justification
/pdf/fy13-ojp-justification.pdf (documenting $4,000,000 for research to develop “a better
understanding of the domestic radicalization phenomenon”).
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materials describe indices of radicalization considered worthy of police scrutiny.48
Other materials further correlate devoutness in Muslims with violence.49 While the
FBI stated that “[s]trong religious beliefs should never be confused with violent
extremism,” the 2006 FBI Intelligence Assessment is “still in official use.”50 It is

48. See Hearing on Intelligence, supra note 2 (“My concern is that [the FBI is] not looking at
criminal behavior. We’re not looking at violent behavior. But we’re focusing on religious practices and
that this is evident, and I could cite other evidence . . . of training materials and written materials of
the FBI that describe people who, you know, wear Muslim clothing, et cetera, as being signals that
they may be violent.”); FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FBI-CTC COLLABORATIVE AFTERACTION REPORTS NAC 09-15, at 2 (2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/
20111019/ACLURM009767.pdf (“It would have been nice to have . . . more time and focus on the
significance of different types of clothing and other significant indicators in a person’s appearance and
items of their possible radicalization level.”); see also JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE, ORIENTATION
AND OPERATIONS TRAINING (2010), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/
20111019/ACLURM005626.pdf (listing orientation sessions such as “Arab Culture, Basic Islam, and
Radicalization”); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS’ SELECTION OF MUSLIM RELIGIOUS SERVICES PROVIDERS 6 n.6
(2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20111110/ACLURM001509.pdf (defining radicalization as “the process by which inmates who do not invite or plan overt terrorist acts
adopt extreme views, including beliefs that violent measures need to be taken for political or religious
purposes”).
49. See Spencer Ackerman, FBI Teaches Agents: ‘Mainstream’ Muslims are ‘Violent, Radical’, WIRED
(Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/09/fbi-muslims-radical/all (“At the
Bureau’s training ground in Quantico, Virginia, agents are shown a chart contending that the more
‘devout’ a Muslim, the more likely he is to be ‘violent.’”); Spencer Ackerman, New Evidence of AntiIslam Bias Underscores Deep Challenges for FBI’s Reform Pledge, WIRED (Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.wired
.com/dangerroom/2011/09/fbi-islam-domination/all [hereinafter Ackerman, New Evidence] (“[ T]he
[FBI] library also contains books by anti-Islam authors that portray the religion as devoted to murder
and world domination.”).
50. Ackerman, New Evidence, supra note 49 (quoting FBI Nat’l Press Office, Response to Media
Reporting Regarding Counterterrorism Training, FBI (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/
press-releases/response-to-media-reporting-regarding-counterterrorism-training). Ackerman asked the
FBI to reconcile its statement with the fact that the FBI Intelligence Assessment is still in use. FBI
spokesman Christopher Allen replied, “The assessment you cite includes a series of indicators of
radicalization. These indicators do not conflict with our statement that strong religious beliefs should
never be confused with violent extremism.” Ackerman, New Evidence, supra note 49; see also
BJELOPERA, supra note 8, at 3 n.6 (citing Carol Dyer et al., Countering Violent Islamic Extremism: A
Community Responsibility, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Dec. 2007, at 6, for the proposition that the
FBI’s own four-stage model of radicalization closely follows that of the NYPD); Carol Dyer et al.,
supra, at 3, 4 (“The FBI assesses the radicalization process as four stages: preradicalization, identification, indoctrination, and action.”); Letter from Am. Civil Liberties Union et al. to Robert S. Mueller,
III, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation 2 (Oct. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Letter to Mueller], available at
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/sign_on_letter_to_dir_mueller_re_radicalization_report_10_4_11
.pdf (“Contrary to your statement that strong religious beliefs should not be confused with violent
extremism, the 2006 FBI report states that these religious practices indicate a person is on a path to
becoming a violent extremist. The report encourages law enforcement officials unfairly and
inappropriately to view Muslim converts as potential threats.”). In response to the revelations about
biased training, Deputy Attorney General James Cole issued a memo calling for review of materials,
particularly those on counterterrorism and countering violent extremism. Memorandum from James
Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen. to Heads of Components and U.S. Attorneys 1 (Mar. 20, 2012), available
at http://www.justice.gov/dag/training-guiding-principles.pdf (citing Memorandum from James
Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Heads of Components and U.S. Attorneys (Sept. 28, 2011)). In his
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nearly impossible to reconcile these two statements given that the Intelligence
Assessment clearly equates “radical” Muslim religious and political activity to
terrorism. For example, the Intelligence Assessment identifies “indicators the FBI
has developed in order to identify an individual going through the radicalization
process”—those indicators include “[w]earing traditional Muslim attire,”
“[g]rowing facial hair,” “[f]requent attendance at a mosque or prayer group,”
“[t]ravel to a Muslim country,” “[i]ncreased activity in a pro-Muslim social group
or political cause,” and “[p]rosletyzing.”51
The embrace of radicalization discourse results directly in the proliferation of
government counter-radicalization programs,52 as well as related initiatives to
counter violent extremism,53 targeted at shaping the forms that religion and
politics take in Muslim communities.54 Since 2010, federal agencies, including the
FBI, DOJ, DHS, and NCTC, have taken on new “counter-radicalization”
initiatives, ranging in form from engagement in and outreach to Muslim
communities, to creating imam councils of “moderate” imams, to forming greater
intelligence collection networks.55 The pace of these programs is hard to keep up
with. Most recently, in 2012, the FBI established a Countering Violent Extremism
office in its National Security Branch;56 in February 2013, the White House

2012 memorandum, he announced his ratification of principles for FBI training, drafted by a working
group on training issues within the Attorney General’s Arab-Muslim Engagement Advisory Group.
Id.
51. FBI COUNTERTERRORISM DIV., supra note 34, at 10; see also Letter to Mueller, supra note
50 (relisting ‘“indicators’” of a convert’s extremism).
52. “Counter-radicalization programs have proliferated across a wide variety of countries over
the last five years. American domestic counter-radicalization is emerging mainly as a (modified)
import from Europe, chiefly from the United Kingdom.” Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam?, supra
note 8, at 148 (footnote omitted).
53. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS, supra note
21 (outlining how the federal government will support community-based efforts to prevent violent
extremism); Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Working Grp., supra note 21 (presenting findings
and recommendations related to community-based prevention of violent extremism).
54. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam?, supra note 8, at 126–27 (“[T]he core intuition behind
counter-radicalization is that the prevention of future violence requires official involvement in
shaping the ideational currents that are thought to underpin that violence.”).
55. Id. at 145–46, 153–59; see also Working with Communities to Disrupt Terror Plots: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Intelligence, Info. Sharing & Terrorism Risk Assessment of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec.,
111th Cong. 53 (2010) (statement of Deborah A. Ramirez, Executive Director, Partnering for
Prevention and Community Safety Initiative, Northeastern University School of Law) (discussing the
need for a “systematic strategy to obtain and use community information to thwart terrorism and to
fight extremism”).
56. Homeland Threats and Agency Responses: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. &
Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. 8 (2012) (statement of Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of
Homeland Security).
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announced its plan to launch an interagency working group to counter “online
radicalization to violence.”57
In addition to influencing policing, a concern with radicalization has also
started to shape the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. While prosecutions are
beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that a growing number of
national security prosecutions target political and religious speech.58 This targeting

57. Quintan Wiktorowicz, Working to Counter Online Radicalization to Violence in the United States,
WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Feb. 5, 2013, 10:02 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/02/05/
working-counter-online-radicalization-violence-united-states.
58. One version of the critique is that Muslim defendants are prosecuted with their speech. See
Huq, The Signaling Function, supra note 12 (analyzing the legal and policy significance of state reliance
upon religious speech as a predictor of terrorism risk); Steven R. Morrison, Terrorism Online: Is Speech
the Same as it Ever Was?, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 963, 970 (2011) (“Speech has become a target of
terrorism investigations.”); see also Targeted and Entrapped: Manufacturing the “Homegrown Threat” in the
United States, CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL JUSTICE 16 (2011), http://www.nlg-npap.org
/system/files/targetedandentrapped.pdf. Granted, proving political motivation can be part of the
prosecution’s burden to meet. But prosecutors regularly introduce inflammatory evidence with
unclear relevance to the facts on trial. Introducing YouTube videos watched and religious literature
consumed by defendants, for example, has become commonplace in terrorism-related trials. CTR. FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL JUSTICE, supra, at 16; Wadie E. Said, The Terrorist Informant, 85 WASH. L.
REV. 687, 712 (2010) [hereinafter Said, The Terrorist Informant] (discussing prosecutions where there is
a concern that entrapment tactics were deployed); id. at 717 (“The [Siraj Matin] trial saw the admission
of evidence of Siraj’s support for al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hamas leaders, violence against Jews, and books
and videos endorsing and praising so-called violent jihad, which bolstered the government’s
predisposition argument.”); id. at 722–23 (“The prosecution [against the Fort Dix Five] also
introduced evidence showing that the defendants had repeatedly watched al-Qaeda videos and
downloaded lectures that spoke in favor of Islamist violence, in addition to their firing weapons in the
woods on several occasions.”). In Fahad Hashmi’s case, the government intended to introduce a
surveillance tape of Hashmi’s political activities at trial. Laura Rovner & Jeanne Theoharis, Preferring
Order to Justice, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1331, 1391–97 (2012). While prosecutors regularly introduce
evidence of political speech into the proceedings, they oppose efforts by defense counsel to include
the larger political context to which the defendant may have been speaking. See, e.g., Government’s
Motion in Limine to Preclude Argument and Evidence Related to the United States Government’s
Political Policies and Activities Abroad and in Domestic (Criminal) Terrorism Investigations and
Related Matters, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-cr-10017-GAO (D. Mass. Oct. 3, 2011), ECF No.
280; Government’s Motion in Limine to Limit Defense Comment and Inquiry Regarding
Inadmissible Subject Matter, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-cr-10017-GAO (D. Mass. Oct. 3,
2011), ECF No. 279; see also Rovner & Theoharis, supra. For a distinct yet related concern about the
perils of a distinct sort of “terrorism enforcement as a kind of foreign policy tool, that is, geared at
prosecuting individuals connected to organizations targeting foreign individuals and entities” rather
than “as a matter of direct national security,” see Wadie E. Said, The Material Support Prosecution and
Foreign Policy, 86 IND. L.J. 543, 545 (2011). Said observes:
Historically, the terrorism trial concerned itself with acts of violence with a United States
nexus. In such a case, an inquiry as to underlying foreign policy was not legitimate, since
what was being criminalized was actual violence. As the terrorism prosecution post-9/11
has focused on conduct further removed from violent activity, the question of what
standards allow a group to be classified as terrorist becomes more relevant. When all
nonstate violence can be deemed terrorist, it is legitimate to require the government to
articulate standards for groups to follow if they are to overcome their designated FTO
status.
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is facilitated by the material support ban, now the predominant charge in
terrorism-related prosecutions, with an already broad scope that is further
magnified when used, as it regularly is, in combination with a conspiracy charge.59
Most prominent is the government’s prosecution against Tarek Mehanna.60 The
government brought material support, conspiracy, and attempt charges against
Mehanna, as well as charges of providing false information to the FBI.61 The

Id. at 593–94; see also Laila Al-Arian, Who Stands with the Accused?, NATION, June 2–9, 2012 at 31–34;
Noor Elashi, Echoes of Korematsu: The Holy Land Five Case, COUNTERPUNCH (Aug. 31, 2011),
http://www.counterpunch.org/2011/08/31/the-holy-land-five-case.
59. Terrorist Trial Report Card: September 11, 2001–September 11, 2011, CTR. ON L. & SEC.
19–21 (2011), http://www.lawandsecurity.org/portals/0/documents/ttrc%20ten%20year%20Issue
.pdf [hereinafter Terrorist Trial Report Card 2011]; see also RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN,
JR., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN FEDERAL
COURTS 11–12 (2009), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf
/090723-LS-in-pursuit-justice-09-update.pdf (showing that the material support statutes were the
most commonly charged substantive offenses in the authors’ data); Steven R. Morrison, Conspiracy
Law’s Threat to Free Speech, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 866, 874, 876 (2013) (discussing two material
support cases in conspiracy law context); Chesney, supra note 32, at 857 (discussing charges under the
material support statute as one of several terrorism prevention strategies adopted by the DOJ);
Steven R. Morrison, The System of Modern Criminal Conspiracy (Nov. 11, 2012), http://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1955158 (arguing that modern U.S. conspiracy law is
systemically different from its prior iterations). The most recent Terrorist Trial Report Card found
that the most commonly charged crimes are material support for terrorists and foreign terrorist
organizations, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B (2012), and general criminal conspiracy. 18 U.S.C. § 371
(2012). Terrorist Trial Report Card 2011, supra, at 13–14. From 2009–2011, the most common charges
are the same, but also include conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim, or injure persons or property in a
foreign country. Id. at 14; see also 18 U.S.C. § 956A (2012). Human Rights First’s 2009 report reached
similar conclusions, although it also noted the aiding-and-abetting (18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)) statute was
among the most commonly charged. ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra, at 26. Both reports find the money
laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2012), false statements, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012), and weapons charges,
18 U.S.C. § 924 (2012), provisions to be charged next most frequently. ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra, at
28 fig.12; Terrorist Trial Report Card 2011, supra, at 13 tbl.12.
60. The government’s prosecution against Tarek Mehanna has been most loudly criticized as
an attack on the First Amendment—indeed for demonstrating the “Muslim exemption” to the First
Amendment. See, e.g., Andrew F. March, Op-Ed., A Dangerous Mind, N.Y. TIMES SUNDAY REV., Apr.
12, 2012, at 1; David Cole, 39 Ways to Limit Free Speech, N.Y. REV. BOOKS BLOG (Apr. 19, 2012, 3:15
PM), http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/apr/19/39-ways-limit-free-speech; Nancy Murray,
It’s Official. There Is a Muslim Exemption to the First Amendment, BOSTON.COM (Apr. 12, 2012, 5:00 PM),
http://boston.com/community/blogs/on_liberty/2012/04/its_official_there_is_a_muslim.html; see also
Ross Caputi, If Tarek Mehanna Is Guilty So Am I, COMMON DREAMS (Apr. 16, 2012), https://www
.commondreams.org/view/2012/04/16-13; Francis Reynolds, Laila Al-Arian: Free Speech Under Attack
for Muslim-Americans, NATION (June 25, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/video/168534/laila-al
-arian-free-speech-under-attack-muslim-americans. On behalf of and co-counseled with the Center
for Constitutional Rights, I submitted an amicus brief in the appeal of the judgment against Mehanna.
See Brief of Amicus Curiae Center for Constitutional Rights in Support of Defendant-Appellant Tarek
Mehanna and Reversal of the Judgment Below, Dec. 26, 2012.
61. Second Superseding Indictment at 1, 11, 19–20, 23, 26, 28, 30, 32, 34–35, United States v.
Mehanna, Cr. No. 09-cr-10017-GAO (D. Mass. June, 17, 2010), ECF No. 83; U.S. Attorney’s Office
Dist. of Mass., supra note 47; U.S. Attorney’s Office Dist. of Mass., Two Men Charged with Material
Support to Terrorists, Conspiracy to Kill in a Foreign Country, and Other Offenses, FBI (Nov. 5, 2009),
http://www.fbi.gov/boston/press-releases/2009/bs110509.htm.
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underlying facts centered on his translation and posting of documents online,
including an old Arabic text, 39 Ways to Serve and Participate in Jihad, downloading
videos, engaging in online chats critical of U.S. foreign policy, and traveling to
Yemen in 2004.62 The prosecution’s theory centralized Mehanna’s translation of
39 Ways as a response to Osama bin Laden’s call for global Muslim jihad and
Mehanna’s vocal opposition to U.S. foreign policy in Muslim-majority countries.63
The prosecution framed Mehanna as a “media wing” for al-Qaeda,64 aiming to
inspire jihad through propagation of ideology.65 The defense suggested he was
simply a fierce critic of U.S. policies, engaging in protected speech activity.66
Similarly, while the prosecution framed Mehanna’s trip to Yemen as a failed

62. Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 61, at 6–9, 14; see also Government’s
Sentencing Memorandum at 2–3, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-cr-10017-GAO (D. Mass. Apr.
10, 2012), ECF No. 430; Defendant’s Memorandum on Appropriate Sentence Under the Sentencing
Guidelines at 3–5, United States v. Mehanna, No. 1:09-cr-10017-GAO (D. Mass. Apr. 9, 2012), ECF
No. 429; U.S. Attorney’s Office Dist. of Mass., Tarek Mehanna Sentenced to 17.5 Years on TerrorismRelated Charges, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Apr. 12, 2012), www.justice.gov/usao/ma/news/2012/April/
MehannaTarekSentencingPR.html (describing conviction and sentencing).
63. See Transcript of Record at 3-32 to 3-53, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-cr-10017GAO (D. Mass. Oct. 27, 2011), ECF No. 386. This raises a related but distinct concern that the
government introduces evidence of terrorist violence, or videos of Osama bin Laden, even where that
evidence is entirely disconnected to the facts charged against the defendant, presumably to suggest a
connection between the defendant and the portrayed terrorist violence. See, e.g., Walt Nett, Judge Rejects
Videos in Aldawsari Case, AMARILLO GLOBE-NEWS, June 16, 2012, at A6 (showing that the judge
excluded the Arabic version but allowed into evidence the English version of the videos that the
defense argued were unrelated to the facts at hand); Milton J. Valencia, Jury Will See Bin Laden Video in
Trial, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 27, 2011, at B2; Milton J. Valencia, Terror Trial Jury Shown Attack Videos, BOS.
GLOBE, Nov. 8, 2011, at B1, B4 (the judge permitted prosecutors to show jurors “a series of violent
videos . . . depicting suicide bombings and glorifying the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks . . . to depict
Mehanna as an Al Qaeda supporter who translated and distributed the videos to non-Arabic speakers,
to willfully promote Al Qaeda’s ideology”); see also Al-Arian, supra note 58, at 31–32 (stating that
author’s father faced charges including “conspiracy to kill and maim persons abroad,” even though
“prosecutors freely admitted that [her] father had no connection to any violence”); Elashi, supra note
58 (describing Mehanna’s defense’s strategy for appeal, including on the grounds that the district
court “[a]bused its discretion by allowing ‘inflammatory evidence of little or no probative value,’
which included multiple scenes of suicide bombings”); Murray, supra note 60 (explaining Mehanna
was convicted of various material support to terrorism charges despite the fact that “[n]o evidence
was presented in court directly linking him to a terrorist group”).
64. Transcript of Record, supra note 63, at 3-49.
65. See, e.g., id. at 3-47. The government’s oft-discredited expert, Evan Kohlmann, contributed
to the government’s situating of Mehanna as part of the larger threat of violent extremism and radical
Islam. See generally Transcript of Record at 26-141, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-cr-10017-GAO
(D. Mass. Dec. 2, 2011). Indeed, Marc Sageman, another expert on terrorism issues who works
regularly for the U.S. government, was called as a defense expert at trial to discredit Kohlmann. See
generally Transcript of Record at 34-13, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-cr-10017-GAO (D. Mass.
Dec. 14, 2011). For the broader criticisms of Kohlmann, see Petra Bartosiewicz, Experts in Terror,
NATION, Feb. 4, 2008, at 18, 18–21; Wesley Yang, The Terrorist Search Engine, N.Y. MAG., Dec. 13,
2010, at 40; Jonathon M. Seidl, Defense Trying to Stop ‘Terrorism’ Expert from Testifying at Ft. Hood Shooter
Trial, BLAZE (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.theblaze.com/stories/defense-trying-to-stop-terrorismexpert-from-testifying-at-ft-hood-shooters-trial.
66. See Transcript of Record, supra note 63, at 3-68 to 3-74.
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attempt to visit a training camp,67 Mehanna says he was going abroad for religious
schooling.68 Mehanna was found guilty at trial and faces a seventeen-year sentence.
The prosecution has been criticized vehemently for its attack on the First
Amendment—indeed for demonstrating the “Muslim exemption [sic]” to the First
Amendment.69 The First Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed. The
government’s prosecution of Mehanna does not stand alone. Instead, it
exemplifies a new trend in focusing criminal prosecutions on religious and
political speech in order to serve a larger counter-radicalization agenda.70

67. See id. at 3-29.
68. See id. at 3-70 to 3-71 (“Yemen is known for . . . the study of Islamic law. The government
of Yemen funds these schools. People can attend by just showing up. They’re not political at all; they
are simply religious schools. And Tarek had talked to people that at some point in his life he would
like to go to Yemen and study at these schools: study Arabic and study Islamic law.”).
69. See, e.g., March, supra note 60; Cole, supra note 60; Murray, supra note 60; see also Reynolds,
supra note 60.
70. Consider these prosecutions:
x
The prosecution against Zachary Chesser and Jesse Morton, on material support,
conspiracy, and Internet-use-related charges, primarily regarding communication of threats
and solicitation of “violent jihadists,” based on posts to RevolutionMuslim.com and other
websites where defendants posted YouTube videos and articles, including lectures by
Anwar al-Aulaqi. At the heart of allegations was a post by both defendants regarding South
Park’s then-upcoming episode depicting Muhammad, which the prosecution characterized
as constitutive of threats, and the defendants later characterized as invitations for
discussion of the issues to avoid misunderstanding. Both men pled guilty.
For Jesse Curtis Morton, see Statement of Facts at 16–19, United States v. Morton, No. 1:12-cr-35LO (E.D. Va. Feb. 9, 2012), ECF No. 24 (detailing some of Morton’s conduct in relation to the case);
Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Morton, No. 1:12-cr-35-LO (E.D. Va. Feb. 9, 2012), ECF No.
23 (stating that Morton pled guilty to a three-count criminal information); Position of the United
States with Respect to Sentencing Factors at 9, United States v. Morton, No. 1:12-cr-35-LO (E.D. Va.
June 14, 2012), ECF No. 37 (arguing for prison sentence of 151 months); Criminal Information at 1,
United States v. Morton, No. 1:12-cr-35-LO (E.D. Va. Feb. 9, 2012), ECF No. 20 (listing the
criminal charges against Morton); Affidavit of Special Agent Paula R. Menges at 16, United States v.
Morton, No. 1:12-cr-35-LO (E.D. Va. May, 13 2011), ECF No. 3 (concluding that Morton knowingly
and unlawfully communicated threats); Defendant’s Sentencing Memorandum and Position with
Respect to Sentencing Factors at 12, United States v. Morton, No. 1:12-cr-35-LO (E.D. Va. June 18,
2012), ECF No. 38 (requesting a prison sentence of forty-six to fifty-seven months followed by a
period of supervised release); U.S. Attorney’s Office E. Dist. of Va., supra note 47; U.S. Attorney’s
Office E. Dist. of Va., supra note 1. For Zachary Adam Chesser, for whom many documents were
sealed, see Statement of Facts at 12–14, United States v. Chesser, No. 1:10-cr-395-LO (E.D. Va. Oct.
20, 2010), ECF No. 32 (detailing some of Chesser’s conduct); Plea Agreement at 1, United States v.
Chesser, No. 1:10-cr-395-LO (E.D. Va. Oct. 20, 2010), ECF No. 31 (stating that Chesser pled guilty
to a three-count criminal information); Position of the United States with Respect to Sentencing
Factors at 12, United States v. Chesser, No. 1:10-cr-395-LO (E.D. Va. Feb. 18, 2011), ECF No. 46
(arguing for a prison sentence of 360 months); Defendant’s Position with Regard to Sentencing
Factors at 31, United States v. Chesser, No. 1:10-cr-395-LO (E.D. Va. Feb. 18, 2011), ECF No. 44
(requesting a prison sentence of 240 months); S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC., ONLINE ISLAMIST
RADICALIZATION, supra note 40, at 21 (concluding that Chesser was a harbinger of violent extremism
online); Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Virginia Man Pleads Guilty to Providing Material Support to
a Foreign Terrorist Organization and Encouraging Violent Jihadists to Kill U.S. Citizens, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Oct.
20, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/October/10-nsd-1174.html; Dep’t of Justice Office
of Pub. Affairs, Virginia Man Sentenced to 25 Years in Prison for Providing Material Support and Encouraging
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Violent Jihadists to Kill U.S. Citizens, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Feb. 24, 2011),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-nsd-238.html; U.S. Attorney’s Office E. Dist. of
Va., Fairfax County Man Accused of Providing Material Support to Terrorists, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (July 21,
2010), http://www.justice.gov/usao/vae/news/2010/07/20100721chessernr.html.
x
The prosecution against Javed Iqbal and Saleh Elahwal, on material support, conspiracy,
and other charges, for providing access to Al-Manar, Hezbollah’s TV station, through their
satellite television businesses. Hezbollah is a designated foreign terrorist organization
(FTO), and both Hezbollah and Al-Manar are designated as Specially Designated Global
Terrorists (SDGT). Both men ultimately pled guilty to providing satellite transmission
services to Al-Manar in exchange for money.
See Government’s Letter in Support of Sentencing at 1, United States v. Iqbal, No. 1:06-cr-1054-RMB
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2009), ECF No. 107 (arguing for a sixty-three-month sentence); Government’s
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Pre-Trial Motions at 1, United States v. Iqbal,
No. 1:06-cr-1054-RMB (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2007), ECF No. 37 (arguing for denial of the defendants’
pre-trial motions); Indictment at 3–18, United States v. Iqbal, No. 1:06-cr-1054-RMB (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
15, 2006), ECF No. 9 (listing eleven counts against the defendants); Joint Memorandum of Law in
Support of Defendants’ Pre-Trial Motions at 50, United States v. Iqbal, No. 1:06-cr-1054-RMB
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2007), ECF No. 35 (arguing for dismissal of the indictment or alternative relief);
Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office S. Dist. N.Y., New Jersey Man Sentenced to 17 Months in
Prison for Providing Material Support and Resources to Hizballah (June 23, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/June09/elahwalsalehsentencingpr.pdf; Press Release,
U.S. Attorney’s Office S. Dist. N.Y., Staten Island Man Sentenced to 69 Months in Prison for
Providing Material Support and Resources to Hizballah (Apr. 23, 2009), available at http://
www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/April09/iqbaljavedsentencingpr.pdf; Press Release, U.S.
Attorney’s Office S. Dist. N.Y., Staten Island Satellite TV Operator Pleads Guilty to Providing
Material Support to Hizballah TV Station (Dec. 23, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/
nys/pressreleases/December08/iqbaljavedpleapr.pdf; Man Pleads Guilty to Providing Material Support to
Hizballah TV Station, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Dec. 30, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/
December/08-nsd-1156.html.
x
The prosecution against Jubair Ahmad, on a material support charge, for preparing a video
containing a prayer in support of jihad and mujahideen on behalf of Lashkar-i-Taiba, an
FTO. Ahmad pled guilty.
See Statement of Facts at 3–4, United States v. Ahmad, No. 1:11-cr-554-TSE (E.D. Va. Dec. 2, 2011),
ECF No. 43 (describing Ahmad’s conduct with regard to the case); Plea Agreement at 1, United
States v. Ahmad No. 1:11-cr-554-TSE (E.D. Va. Dec. 2, 2011), ECF No. 42 (pleading guilty to the
charge); Position of the United States with Regard to Sentencing at 2, United States v. Ahmad, No.
1:11-cr-554-TSE (E.D. Va. Apr. 3, 2012), ECF No. 45 (requesting that the court apply the statutory
maximum of 180 months); Criminal Information, United States v. Ahmad, No. 1:11-cr-554-TSE
(E.D. Va. Dec. 2, 2011), ECF No. 39 (charging Ahmad with unlawfully, knowingly, and willfully
providing material support to Lashkar-i-Taiba); Defendant’s Position with Regard to Sentencing
Factors at 1, United States v. Ahmad, No. 1:11-cr-554-TSE (E.D. Va. Apr. 7, 2012), ECF No. 49
(requesting that the court impose a sentence of twenty-four months).
Because the defendants pled guilty in each of these cases, the underlying facts are difficult to
discern. Chesser and Morton have published open letters contesting the version of facts to which they
pled. See, e.g., Zachary Chesser, Victims of the American Inquisition, ASEERUN (Feb. 17, 2012), http://
aseerun.org/2012/02/20/victims-of-the-american-inquisition (stating Chesser’s account of the events
leading up to his incarceration); Younus Abdullah Muhammad (Jesse Morton), Seeking Clarification: A
Reaction to My Arrest for South Park Opposition, ISLAMPOLICY (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.islampolicy
.com/2012_01_08_archive.html (presenting Morton’s version of his statements regarding the creators
of South Park). Even on the government’s version of the facts, each of these cases, and the potential
pattern they represent of targeting speech, are worthy of close examination and further scrutiny.

2013]

POLICING “RADICALIZATION”

833

II. RADICALIZATION DEFINED AND DECONSTRUCTED
Now, let me talk a little bit about the threat and issues related to radicalization. We
take the threat very seriously, obviously.
—Richard Falkenrath, Deputy Commissioner for Counterterrorism,
New York City Police Department71
Despite the impetus to find a terrorist profile or hallmarks of radicalization to hone in
on incipient terrorists, empirical research has emphatically and repeatedly concluded
that there is no such profile and no such easily identifiable hallmarks.
—Brennan Center for Justice Report72
The NYPD Intelligence Division’s 2007 report Radicalization in the West: The
Homegrown Threat is the most exhaustive account produced by a law enforcement
entity in the United States.73 Government agencies regularly cite the report,
bolstering its authority.74 Understanding radicalization discourse, its ambitions and
limitations, requires a critical examination of the report. This Part charts the
Intelligence Division’s argument and engages with the limitations of its study.
Prepared by NYPD Senior Intelligence Analysts Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin
Bhatt, the NYPD report theorizes the process of going from Muslim to terrorist.
While Silber and Bhatt suggest there is no fixed trajectory for radicalization, they
extrapolate just that, suggesting a predictability that allows for sound direction for
terrorism policing.75

71. Falkenrath, supra note 31.
72. Patel, supra note 12, at 8.
73. SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18. See Huq, Modeling Terrorist Radicalization, supra note 12, at
43–56, for more on the state and federal government literature, as well as information on the British
counterpart; see also Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam?, supra note 8, at 145–61 (discussing the
background of U.S. domestic counter-radicalization and its various manifestations). There is also a
larger academic literature on “radicalization,” much of which collapses Muslim identity manifestations
(individual and collective) with potential for terrorism. See Kundnani, supra note 12 (examining
critically the academic literature).
74. See, e.g., S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC., A TICKING TIME BOMB, supra note 25, at 17 n.6
(noting the Senate report’s “framework is adapted from a publicly available description of the
radicalization process by the [NYPD] Intelligence Division,” and then citing to the NYPD
radicalization report); S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC., VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM, supra note
40, at 4–5 (referring to and summarizing the NYPD model of “radicalization” in framing the role of
the Internet in generating “violent Islamist extremism”). In the wake of the Associated Press (AP)
reports on the NYPD Intelligence Division’s program of blanket surveillance of Muslim
communities, the federal government, and the FBI in particular, distanced itself from the NYPD.
Jason Grant, FBI Leader: Muslims’ Trust Is Broken He Breaks Silence on Spying Backlash, STAR-LEDGER,
Mar. 7, 2012, available at http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/03/recent_nypd_spying_uproar
_shak.html; Samantha Henry, NJ FBI: NYPD Monitoring Damaged Public Trust, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Mar. 7, 2012, http://www.ap.org/content/ap-in-the-news/2012/nj-fbi-nypd-monitoring-damagedpublic-trust; Pete Yost, Holder Disturbed by Reports on NYPD Muslim Spying, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar.
8, 2012, http://www.ap.org/content/ap-in-the-news/2012/holder-disturbed-by-reports-on-nypd
-muslim-spying.
75. SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18, at 8, 84 (stating that while “[t]here is no useful profile to

834

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:809

Silber and Bhatt begin concerned with Muslims and Islam.76 They interpose
as the target of terrorism prevention a process they call “radicalization.” Silber and
Bhatt express a need to intervene at an “earlier point” where “the potential
terrorist or group of terrorists begin and progress through a process of
radicalization,” culminating in “a terrorist attack.”77 To that end, they delineate a
four-stage radicalization process: “pre-radicalization,” “self-identification,”
“indoctrination,” and “jihadization,” each associated with “specific signatures.”78
The first stage, “pre-radicalization,” is concerned with “[f]ifteen to thirty-five
year-old male Muslims who live in male-dominated societies”79 and “enclaves of
ethnic, Muslim communities—communities that are dominated by Middle
Eastern, North African, and South Asian cultures.”80 Rather than articulate
anything nearing a description of a discrete stage in a multi-step process, the
report defines preradicalization’s circumference as spatial and cultural, gendered,
classed, and aged. The immigrant Muslim neighborhood becomes a site of
suspicion. Silber and Bhatt hypothesize that “[m]iddle class families and students”
are of greatest concern, including “the bored and/or frustrated, successful college
students, the unemployed, the second and third generation, new immigrants, petty
criminals, and prison parolees.”81
assist law enforcement or intelligence,” there is “remarkable consistency in the behaviors and
trajectory of each of the plots across all the stages”).
76. Huq, Modeling Terrorist Radicalization, supra note 12, at 59 (noting that the NYPD by its
“decision to couple Islam and terror . . . and by the sampling methodology” treats “the ‘Muslim’ a
priori as a source of risk and harm”).
77. SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18, at 5.
78. Id. at 21.
79. Id. at 24. The report reasons: “These individuals are at an age where they often are seeking
to identify who they really are while trying to find the ‘meaning of life’. [sic] This age group is usually
very action-oriented.” Id. The emphasis on male-dominated societies is worth noting, especially given
the popular narrative that situates Muslim cultures as threatening due, in part, to their dogged
commitment to backward values. See Amna Akbar & Rupal Oza, “Muslim Fundamentalism” and Human
Rights in an Age of Terror and Empire, in GENDER, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND COUNTER-TERRORISM:
HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES (Margaret Satterthwaite & Jayne C. Huckerby eds., 2013) (discussing
the prevalence of these narratives among conservatives and liberals, including certain feminist human
rights activists).
80. SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18, at 24. Silber and Bhatt argue that these communities
“often serve as ‘ideological sanctuaries’ for the seeds of radical thought.” Id. at 24. “Pre-radicalization
is the point of origin for individuals before they begin this progression. . . . The majority of the
individuals involved in these plots began as ‘unremarkable’ - they had ‘ordinary’ jobs, had lived
‘ordinary’ lives and had little, if any criminal history.” Id. at 6. The focus on immigrant communities is
puzzling when one considers the significant proportion of African Americans within American
Muslim communities. See, e.g., Allison Keyes, A History of Black Muslims in America, NPR (Aug. 23,
2005), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4811402; U.S. Religious Landscape
Survey, PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE 40 (Feb. 2008), http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/
report-religious-landscape-study-full.pdf; Muslim Americans: No Signs of Growth in Alienation or Support for
Extremism, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 8–9 (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy
-pdf/Muslim%20American%20Report%2010-02-12%20fix.pdf.
81. SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18, at 24. At the same time, they note that “[ l ]ittle, if any,
criminal history” binds the men in the cases they examined for the report. Id. at 25.
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The second stage, “self-identification,” involves gravitation toward “Salafi
Islam” and a “Salafi mosque.”82 (In the United States, Salafism tends to be
understood as a homogeneous “fundamentalist” strain of Islam—indeed the
primary strain of concern. To the contrary, Salafism is a mode of interpretation
with various geographical and historical iterations.)83 The associated factors are
widespread expressions of Muslim identity or religiosity: “pilgrimage to Mecca,”
“[g]rowing a beard,” and “pa[ying] off the mortgage on [one’s] house because
Islam forbids paying interest on loans.”84 Here, Muslim religious practice—core
First Amendment activity, unconnected to any suspicion of criminal activity—
becomes a predictor for criminality.
Equally troubling, Silber and Bhatt situate dissent with mainstream American
political discourse, and identification with other Muslims, as integral to
radicalization. “[A]lienation, discrimination, racism[—]real or perceived”—and
“exposure” to “international conflicts involving Muslims,” trigger this stage.85
“Becoming involved in social activism and community issues” is a signature
factor.86
In the third phase, “indoctrination,” “an individual progressively intensifies
his beliefs, wholly adopts jihadi-Salafi87 ideology and concludes, without question,
that the conditions and circumstances exist where [militant jihad] is required to
support and further the cause.”88 This stage is marked by “[w]ithdrawal from the
[m]osque,” “[p]oliticization of [n]ew [b]eliefs,” “[h]olding meetings and
discussions with an increasing radical agenda in more private settings,” and
“watching jihadi videos . . . that highlight[] atrocities committed against

82.
83.

Id. at 6, 32–33.
See, e.g., PRINCETON READINGS IN ISLAMIST THOUGHT: TEXTS AND CONTEXTS FROM
AL-BANNA TO BIN LADEN 3–5, 19–23 (Roxanne L. Euben & Muhammed Qasim Zaman eds., 2009);
Henri Lauzière, The Construction of Salafiyya: Reconsidering Salafism from the Perspective of Conceptual History,
42 INT’L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 369 (2010); see also Akbar & Oza, supra note 79, at 162 (“[T]erms such
as . . . ‘salafi’ seem to stand in for an entire set of arguments and political positions as if they are
obvious markers—without need of verification—of bad, threatening, Muslims.”); Diala Shamas &
Nermeen Arastu, MUSLIM AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES COAL. ET AL., Mapping Muslims: NYPD Spying and Its
Impact on American Muslims, CUNY SCH. L. 16 (2013), http://www.law.cuny.edu/academics/clinics/
immigration/clear/Mapping-Muslims.pdf (describing Salafism and the difference between Salafism
and radicalization).
84. SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18, at 61.
85. Id. at 32.
86. Id. at 33.
87. This hyphenated term, in itself, it seems, a product of the “War on Terror,” collapses two
terms—jihad and Salafi—regularly misused in the United States. See Akbar & Oza, supra note 79, at
162.
88. SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18, at 7; see also id. at 38 (“The key aspect of this stage is the
acceptance of a religious-political worldview that justifies, legitimizes, encourages, or supports
violence against anything kufr or un-Islamic, including the West, its citizens, its allies, or other
Muslims whose opinions are contrary to the extremist agenda.”).
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Muslims.”89 Similar to the second stage, possessing particular religious and
political ideologies is posited to hasten the radicalization process.
The first three stages of radicalization are focused on where Muslims live and
congregate, manifestations of religious and political beliefs, and social or religious
activities.90 In the final stage, “jihadization,” the process finally culminates in an
intent to commit a criminal act.91 Jihadization includes a number of substages, one
of which is “[a]ttack [p]lanning.”92 “‘Outward Bound’-like [a]ctivities,” such as
“camping, white-water rafting, paintball games, target shooting,” are construed as
training activities.93 “[T]ravel[] abroad” (in particular, to Pakistan, Iraq,
Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Somalia)94 is in itself troubling, the report asserts, as
travel might involve attendance at a training camp or at a “religious retreat steeped
with extremist thought.”95 The report also discusses “[m]ental [r]einforcement
[a]ctivities” as indicators, including visiting “[e]xtremist websites, chatrooms, and
blogs” and watching “[j]ihadist videos and tapes.”96
At the report’s core are troubling conclusions: that Muslim religiosity and
politicization predictably correlate with terrorism; and that Muslim collective
spaces—where Muslim political and religious cultures would emerge—are sites for
radicalization. Silber and Bhatt frame a concern with “radicalization” as a reason
to target the religious and political cultures of Muslim communities. The first stage
focuses on young men situated in Muslim communities or institutions,

89. Id. at 38–39, 63.
90. Interestingly, Silber and Bhatt define the criminal act with a very particular intent: “[T]he
ultimate objective for any attack is always the same—to punish the West, overthrow the democratic
order, reestablish the Caliphate, and institute sharia.” Id. at 45.
91. Id. at 7, 45.
92. Id. at 47. This substage includes “[d]rawing maps, videotaping targets, and staking out
target areas,” as well as “[a]cquiring [m]ateriel/[d]eveloping the [d]evice” most “commercially
available or reasonably obtainable” like “[f]ertilizer-based devices, commercial explosives, cell phones
and explosive ignition devices.” Id. These activities are occasionally “associated with low-end criminal
activity and almost always suspicious activity such as: cooking chemicals . . . [and] purchasing large
amounts of any one chemical or material.” Id.
93. Id. at 46; see also Chris Hawley, NYPD Monitored Muslim Students All over the Northeast,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 18, 2012), http://www.ap.org/content/ap-in-the-news/2012/nypdmonitored-muslim-students-all-over-northeast (reporting that the NYPD sent an undercover officer
on a whitewater rafting trip with eighteen Muslim students).
94. SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18, at 45. The FBI Intelligence Assessment also frames travel
as an important part of “radicalization.” FBI COUNTERTERRORISM DIV., supra note 34, at 8
(“Overseas travel can be a significant experience that appears to accelerate the radicalization process.
Although radicalization can occur without overseas travel, it appears to provide the networking and
experience necessary to participate in operational activity. The experience may vary from religious or
language instruction to basic paramilitary training.”). As Darryl Li and Ramzi Kassem have powerfully
shown, the reasons for this travel could be multifold. Ramzi Kassem, From Altruists to Outlaws: The
Criminalization of Traveling Islamic Volunteers, 10 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E.L. 85, 85–87 (2011);
Darryl Li, A Universal Enemy?: “Foreign Fighters” and Legal Regimes of Exclusion and Exemption Under the
“Global War on Terror”, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 355, 369–73 (2010).
95. SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18, at 45–46.
96. Id. at 47.
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encompassing a reason to scrutinize where these men socialize and with whom
these men associate. The later stages focus on increasingly religious and politicized
Muslims who identify with a global concept of Muslim community and who resist
American cultural norms and foreign policy. According to Silber and Bhatt, while
expressing Muslim identity or hanging out in Muslim spots does not guarantee
radicalization, it will always point towards the dangerous possibility:
It is useful to think of the radicalization process in terms of a funnel.
Entering the process does not mean one will progress through all four
stages and become a terrorist. However, it also does not mean that if one
doesn’t become a terrorist, he or she is no longer a threat. Individuals
who have been radicalized but are not jihadists may serve as mentors and
agents of influence to those who might become the terrorists of
tomorrow.97
The report also identifies various Muslim gathering places as radicalization or
extremism “incubators” that facilitate radicalization.98 As such, they invite law
enforcement surveillance of Muslim religious and political cultures and
geographies.
The flaws in Silber and Bhatt’s methodology make clear the inherent
unreliability of the radicalization theory. A certain impulse towards racial and
religious typecasting may seem obvious on the surface of their theory. After all,
they start by singling out Muslims and Islam for posing the threat of radicalization,
and by isolating Muslim religious and political cultures as fundamental to the
problem. But even if one agrees with the parameters of their study, their case
studies are woefully inadequate to justify an aggressive policing regime. The report
relies on an incredibly small number of case studies—eleven cases total, with five
American cases as the focus99—for the ambitious conclusions it draws.
The case studies are mismatched to the report’s ambitious conclusions. Silber
and Bhatt draw out a whole assortment of details from the lives of men in their
case studies, pointing to them as indicative of a process of radicalization. The
report places causal value on whichever details it chooses to recognize in the case
studies—details that may be altogether disconnected from the crime with which
the men were ultimately charged. For example, because the U.S. examples it
identifies all involved second-generation immigrants the report identifies

97. Id. at 10. Similarly, the FBI Intelligence Assessment finds: “The evidence suggests that the
radicalization of an individual is a fluid process that does not have a time table and does not always
lead to action. US converts, under the right circumstances, may enter, exit, or even re-enter the
radicalization process at any stage.” FBI COUNTERTERRORISM DIV., supra note 34, at 4.
98. SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18, at 18, 22, 68, 70–72 (listing “radicalization incubators,”
which include “cafes, cab driver hangouts, flophouses, prisons, student associations, nongovernmental organizations, hookah (water pipe) bars, butcher shops and book stores”).
99. See id. at 5, 87. In the language of the NYPD, the report reviewed “nearly one dozen
terrorist-related case studies”: five from within the United States and six from abroad. Id. at 7, 17.
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immigrant communities as the relevant ground for “pre-radicalization.”100 Or, the
report discusses a man Mike, who asked his friends to start calling him Maher,
suggesting that the name change is indicative of “radicalization.”101 Similarly, the
report discusses men who spent time in an Islamic bookstore or with Muslim
student associations on college campuses, and constructs those venues as
radicalization “[i]incubators.”102 The list goes on and on. The report suggests that
convergence in particular details between the small number of case studies should
be sufficient to invest the details with predictive authority. But apart from pointing
to occasional convergence, Silber and Bhatt offer no reason to find a causal nexus
between the details they identify as radicalization markers and the crimes with
which these men were charged.
Moreover, the report purports to model behavior for terrorism based on a
number of cases where the defendants were not even charged with committing a
violent terrorist act.103 The five American cases are particularly noteworthy. None
involved the commission of any violent crime. Four out of five seemed to have
never involved any intent to commit violent crime.104 For example, the
government charged Fahad Hashmi for allowing Junaid Babar to store socks,
ponchos, and raincoats in his apartment; Babar then allegedly transferred those
materials to al-Qaeda.105 Three of the cases deal with trips abroad, allegedly to

100. Id. at 59–60.
101. Id. at 61. The AP’s reporting revealed the NYPD was in fact scrutinizing Muslims in
New York who changed their names:
The New York Police Department monitors everyone in the city who changes his or her
name, according to interviews and internal police documents obtained by The Associated
Press. For those whose names sound Arabic or might be from Muslim countries, police
run comprehensive background checks that include reviewing travel records, criminal
histories, business licenses and immigration documents.
Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, NYPD Keeps Files on Muslims Who Change Their Names, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Oct. 26, 2011), http://ap.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2011/NYPD-keeps-files-on
-Muslims-who-change-their-names (discussing an investigation that revealed how NYPD monitored
name changes on the basis that “would-be terrorists could use their new names to lie low in New
York”).
102. SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18, at 70, 72–73.
103. See Huq, Modeling Terrorist Radicalization, supra note 12, at 57 (“The NYPD report mixes
studies of completed terrorism conspiracies with incidents in which an attack was apparently
forestalled; it discusses both realized and potential threats.”).
104. Silber and Bhatt are somewhat self-conscious about their reliance on cases that did not
culminate in an act of violence. In discussing the three travel cases, they offer: “The lack of rich
details on these U.S. cases, coupled with the fact that they were disrupted at a relatively early stage,
obscured the fact that radicalization had occurred. Nevertheless, the three U.S. cases still provided
sufficient evidence to corroborate parts of each of the four stages . . . .” SILBER & BHATT, supra note
18, at 58.
105. See Rovner & Theoharis, supra note 58, at 1347–53; see also Indictment, United States v.
Hashmi, No. 1:06-cr-442-LAP (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2006), ECF No. 1 (listing four counts against
Hashmi); Defendant’s Response to Government’s Motion to Admit Certain Evidence at Trial at 1–2,
United States v. Hashmi, 1:06-cr-442-LAP (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2009), ECF No. 123 (referring to
evidence that Hashmi permitted Babar to store goods in his apartment). A number of questions have
been raised about the government’s prosecution against Hashmi, including the possibility that Babar
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fight or train with terrorists: (1) the case against the “Lackawanna Seven” for a
May 2001 trip to Afghanistan, where the men did not like the anti-American
sentiment they encountered at the camp and quickly returned to the United
States;106 (2) the case against the “Portland Seven,” where the men were turned
away at the border of Afghanistan as they allegedly tried to enter to fight alongside
the Taliban;107 and (3) the “Virginia Paintball Case,” where some of “the men are
alleged to have attended a training camp run by Lashkar-i-Taiba, a militant group
committed to driving India from Kashmir” and to have urged others “to fight
with the Taliban in Afghanistan—before the United States attacked Afghanistan.”108

was working with the government as an informant all along. Rovner & Theoharis, supra note 58, at
1352–53, 1403 n.371 (citing the court’s statement that Babar would be sentenced to time served for
his “‘exceptional’” service as he “‘began cooperating even before his arrest’”).
106. See Criminal Complaint at 6–11, United States v. Goba, No. 1:02-m-107 (W.D.N.Y. Sept.
13, 2002), ECF No. 1; COLE & LOBEL, supra note 5, at 117–18 (explaining that even though the FBI
found no evidence that the men were involved in criminal activity, out of fear of being tried as enemy
combatants, the men pled guilty to single counts of material support and received seven to ten year
jail sentences); Matthew Purdy & Lowell Bergman, Where the Trail Led: Between Evidence and Suspicion;
Unclear Danger: Inside the Lackawanna Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2003, at N1; see also Roya Aziz &
Monica Lam, Profiles: The Lackawanna Cell, FRONTLINE (Oct. 16, 2003), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/shows/sleeper/inside/profiles.html (providing profiles of each of the “Lackawanna
Seven”); How Dangerous Was the Lackawanna Cell?, FRONTLINE (Oct. 16, 2003), http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sleeper/inside/howdangerous.html (interviewing various experts
regarding the dangerousness of the “Lackawanna Seven”); Interview Sahim Alwan, FRONTLINE (Oct.
16, 2003), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sleeper/interviews/alwan.html (interviewing one of the “Lackawanna Seven”).
107. Indictment at 8–11, United States v. Battle, No. 02-cr-399-JO (D. Or. Oct. 3, 2002),
ECF No. 1. On October 3, 2002, the men were indicted for unsuccessfully trying to join a terrorist
organization. Al Saoub never returned and was killed in Afghanistan in October 2003. Id. The rest of
the men pled guilty and received sentences of various lengths, from three years in a work camp to
eight years. COLE & LOBEL, supra note 5, at 119 (“The Portland reference presumably refers to six
men who pleaded guilty to attempting to travel to Afghanistan to fight alongside the Taliban. They
never made it there. While the citizens among them could certainly have been tried for attempted
treason, there was no allegation that any were involved in terrorism.”); Hal Bernton, 2 More Defendants
in Portland’s Terrorism Case Enter Guilty Pleas, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 17, 2003, at B1; Two Defendants in
‘Portland Cell’ Case Plead Guilty to Conspiracy to Contribute Services to the Taliban, Federal Weapons Charges,
U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Sept. 18, 2003), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03_crm_513
.htm.
108. COLE & LOBEL, supra note 5, at 118; see also Indictment at 7–10, United States v. Royer,
No. 1:03-cr-296-LMB (E.D. Va. June 25, 2003), ECF No. 1 (describing the group’s involvement with
Lashkar-i-Taiba). The case,
which netted the government eleven ‘terrorism’ convictions, involved a group of men in
Virginia accused of playing paintball games, owning hunting rifles, and planning to fight
for Muslim causes in Kashmir. . . . As with the Lackawanna defendants, none of the men
was ever charged with planning to undertake terrorist activity of any kind, here or abroad.
COLE & LOBEL, supra note 5, at 118; see also Huq, The Signaling Function, supra note 12, at 845–46
(looking at the prosecution against Ali al-Timimi, one of the defendants in the Virginia case, as an
example of how “religious speech or dogma can be a basis for solicitation or aiding-and-abetting
charges” in the terrorism context and “suggest[ing] that such prosecutions can rely on ambiguous
religious statements that require interpretation”); Jerry Markon, ‘Va. Jihad’ Case Hailed as Key in War on
Terror, WASH. POST, June 8, 2006, at A3 (articulating the view of those who saw the case as
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At least one case features a plot with a heavy-handed government
informant.109 The fifth of the five American cases, against Shahawar Siraj Matin,
involved what one might consider a traditional terrorist plot: to blow up the
Herald Square subway station in New York City. It emerged at trial, however, that
an NYPD informant worked on Matin for months to encourage anger in Matin
toward American foreign policy against Muslims. The informant repeatedly poked
and prodded Matin that it was his duty to take violent action against the United
States, and suggested the method and means to obtain the necessary materials to
commit such violent action.110 The case has been widely criticized for the
techniques employed by the government in obtaining the indictment and
conviction, though when the defense raised the entrapment defense at trial, it
failed, as it almost always does.111
So, the NYPD actively participated in—molded even—what it purports to
study. To say the least, creating a model for terrorist radicalization based on
government-facilitated plots seems of limited value for its predictive power. It
creates a dangerous “feedback loop: the police influence the content and direction
of prosecutions and then rely on those prosecutions as evidence of the underlying
crime problem.”112 That evidence, in turn, further constitutes the need for the
aggressive police powers.
Somewhat ironically, the NYPD does not discuss the few violent plots
prosecuted after 9/11 that did not involve coercive government interference.113
Those plots are few in number—and do not in themselves justify the expansive

“target[ing] Muslim men who had done nothing more than innocuously play paintball in the woods
and who never intended attacks inside the United States”).
109. See Huq, Modeling Terrorist Radicalization, supra note 12, at 58.
110. See, e.g., United States v. Siraj, 468 F. Supp. 2d 408, 414–16 ( E.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 533
F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2008); AMITAVA KUMAR, A FOREIGNER CARRYING IN THE CROOK OF HIS ARM A
TINY BOMB 124 (2010); Said, The Terrorist Informant, supra note 58, at 715–32 (discussing Matin and
other cases); Robin Shulman, The Informer: Behind the Scenes, or Setting the Stage?, WASH. POST, May 29,
2007, at C1; Targeted and Entrapped, supra note 58, at 33–37; Terrorist Trial Report Card 2011, supra note
59, at 26; see also Bartosiewicz, To Catch a Terrorist, supra note 5, at 41 (discussing the “more active role”
informants are given); Entrapment or Foiling Terror? FBI’s Reliance on Paid Informants Raises Questions About
Validity of Terrorism Cases, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Oct. 6, 2010), http://www.democracynow.org
/2010/10/6/entrapment_or_foiling_terror_fbis_reliance [hereinafter Entrapment or Foiling Terror? ]
(investigating three cases).
111. Siraj, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 414–17, 420–23; see also Huq, Modeling Terrorist Radicalization,
supra note 12, at 58 (listing coercion, entrapment, and other incentives in cases involving the use of
informants).
112. Huq, Modeling Terrorist Radicalization, supra note 12, at 58 (“In relying on cases involving
informants—including one in New York City—the NYPD report thus relies on facts created by the
police themselves.”).
113. Trevor Aaronson, The Informants, MOTHER JONES, Sept.–Oct. 2011, at 32, 32–33 (“With
three exceptions, all of the high-profile domestic terror plots of the last decade were actually FBI
stings. (The exceptions are Najibullah Zazi, who came close to bombing the New York City subway
system in September 2009; Hesham Mohamed Hadayet, an Egyptian who opened fire on the El-Al
ticket counter at the Los Angeles airport; and failed Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad.)”).
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radicalization paradigm. In fact, it is unclear whether there exists an American set
of data on which such a theory for modeling radicalization to actual violence could
even be extrapolated.114 The vast majority of the 500 to 600 terrorism-related
prosecutions are precisely that, terrorism-related, often with an unclear nexus to
any violence or intention to commit violent acts.115 Far from typically including
violence, the criminal prohibition on material support,116 now charged in the vast
114. Writing in 2007, Cole and Lobel critically analyzed the Bush administration’s record of
terrorism prosecutions in the federal courts. COLE & LOBEL, supra note 5, at 115 (“Virtually all of the
convictions on terrorism charges the Justice Department has obtained since 9/11 involve no acts of
terrorism per se, nor conspiracy to engage in terrorist acts, nor even the aiding and abetting of
terrorist crimes, but only material support to a group the government has labeled terrorist. . . .
Because [material support laws] are so sweeping, a conviction under these laws does not mean that a
terrorist has been convicted, or that any terrorism has been prevented.”); see also Eric Umansky,
Department of Pre-Crime, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 29, 2008), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/
2008/02/department-pre-crime (dubbing the material support laws “a prosecutor’s dream,” as they
“don’t require evidence of a plot or even of a desire to help terrorists,” providing “the government a
shot at convictions traditional criminal laws could never provide”). Cole and Lobel further
deconstructed the Bush administration’s claims about the five “terror cells” it claimed to have
disrupted. COLE & LOBEL, supra note 5, at 116–17 (“[The men] were charged under the materialsupport laws, which make it possible to convict individuals without showing that they have actually
undertaken, planned, supported, or even thought about furthering terrorist activity. None of the
putative cell members was charged with, much less convicted of, attempting or conspiring to engage
in any actual terrorist conduct. Indeed, there was little or no reason to believe that any of them were
actual terrorists waiting to strike.”); see also id. at 111–14, 121–22 (discussing inadequacies in the
government’s cases against Sami Al-Arian, Sami al-Hussayen, James Yee, Brandon Mayfield,
Muhammad Salah, and Abedelhaleem Ashqar; José Padilla and Yaser Hamdi; and counting as
potential successes for the preventative paradigm the prosecutions against Iyman Faris and Ahmed
Abu Ali). For a different view of Abu Ali, drawing from his interrogation under torture, see Wadie E.
Said, The Message and Means of the Modern Terrorism Prosecution, 21 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
175, 183–87 (2012). Cole and Lobel further note Richard Reid as the only person actually attempting
to carry out a terrorist act and Zacarias Moussaoui as one of only four convicted for conspiracy to
engage in terrorist conduct, but say neither can be attributed as a success to the preventative
paradigm. COLE & LOBEL, supra note 5, at 120 (describing that a flight attendant noticed Reid in the
act, and Moussaoui was arrested prior to the institutionalization of the preventative paradigm).
115. Whereas the Mother Jones fall 2011 study identified 508 post-9/11 terrorism defendants,
Aaronson, supra note 113, at 36–37, the Center for Law and Security’s fall 2011 study identified 578.
Terrorist Trial Report Card 2011, supra note 59, at 7.
116. Two provisions in the criminal code penalize material support to foreign terrorist
organizations (FTOs), so designated by the Secretary of State in consultation with the Secretary of
Treasury and Attorney General: section 2339A and section 2339B. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B (2012).
The designation must be based on a finding that the entity engages in “terrorist activity” or
“terrorism,” and thereby “threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security of
the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(C) (2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1189(d)(4) (2012). So-designated FTOs
may seek review of the designation in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit within thirty days of designation. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c)(1) (2012). Whereas section 2339A
criminalizes providing material support knowing that such support would be used in support of
terrorism, section 2339B dispenses with the specific intent requirement. Section 2339B makes it a
federal crime to “knowingly provide[ ] material support or resources to a foreign terrorist
organization . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1). For definitions of “terrorist activity” and “terrorism,” see
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2012) and 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2012), respectively. The mental state
required to violate section 2339B is knowledge of either the group’s designation as a terrorist
organization or the group’s commission of terrorist acts, not specific intent to further terrorism. 18
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majority of terrorism-related cases,117 has been subject to serious critique precisely
for its breadth,118 the pressure it puts on the First Amendment,119 and the
discretion it gives prosecutors.120 Typically, material support charges do not
U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1); CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33035, MATERIAL SUPPORT OF
TERRORISTS AND FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS: SUNSET AMENDMENTS 6 (2005).
Congress created the crime of material support in 1996 as part of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)’s Title III—International Terrorism Prohibitions. H.R. REP.
NO. 104-518, at 35 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). Post-9/11, Congress expanded the definition of “material
support or resources” to cover “expert advice or assistance,” Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 805, 115 Stat. 272, 377 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339A); and “service,”
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub L. No. 108-458, § 6603, 118 Stat.
3638, 3762–64 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); H.R. REP. NO. 108-796, at
128 (2004) (Conf. Rep.). Congress also clarified that the mental state required to violate section 2339B
was knowledge of either the group’s designation as a terrorist organization or the group’s commission
of terrorist acts, not specific intent to further terrorism, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1); defined “training” as
“instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge,” 18
U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(2); defined “expert advice or assistance” as “advice or assistance derived from
scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge,” 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(b)(3). A Review of the Tools to
Fight Terrorism Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech. & Homeland Sec. of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 6 (2004) (joint statement of Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Att’y Gen., Department
of Justice and Barry Sabin, Chief, Counterterrorism Section, Criminal Division, Department of
Justice); H.R. REP. NO. 108-796, at 128; DOYLE, supra, at 4, 6. Congress further clarified that
“personnel” meant a person who had
knowingly provided, attempted to provide, or conspired to provide a foreign terrorist
organization with 1 or more individuals (who may be or include himself) to work under
that terrorist organization’s direction or control or to organize, manage, supervise, or
otherwise direct the operation of that organization. Individuals who act entirely
independently of the foreign terrorist organization to advance its goals or objectives shall
not be considered to be working under the foreign terrorist organization’s direction and
control.
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 § 6603; H.R. REP. NO. 108-796, at 129;
DOYLE, supra, at 5.
117. Terrorist Trial Report Card 2011, supra note 59, at 19 (“Since 2007, material support has
gone from being charged in 11.6% of cases to 69.4% in 2010. In 2011 so far, 87.5% of cases involve a
material support charge.”). The majority of charges involve material support to terrorism, general
criminal conspiracy, false statements, money laundering, and immigration and identity fraud. Id. at
13–14, 19–21; ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 59; Chesney, supra note 32, at 856, 860.
118. Aiding Terrorists: An Examination of the Material Support Statute: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 25 (2004) [hereinafter Aiding Terrorists] (statement of David Cole, Professor
of Law, Georgetown University Law Center) (testifying that “the statute is vague and over-broad”).
The statutory scheme defines material support or resources to include provision of
any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments
or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance,
safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities,
weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or
include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials.
18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(4) (providing the same definition).
119. Aiding Terrorists, supra note 118, at 24–26; David Cole, The First Amendment’s Borders: The
Place of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project in First Amendment Doctrine, 6 HARVARD L. & POL’Y REV.
147 (2012); Morrison, Conspiracy Law’s Threat to Free Speech, supra note 59; Rovner & Theoharis, supra
note 58, at 1348–57; Wadie E. Said, Humanitarian Law Project and the Supreme Court’s Construction of
Terrorism, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1455, 1498–1508.
120. COLE & LOBEL, supra note 5, at 115 (“Because [material support laws] are so sweeping, a
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actually include any act of violence. Moreover, a growing number of high-profile
prosecutions that feature a violent terrorist plot—the majority it seems—rely on
government informants that encourage, design, or facilitate the plots.121 That the
government-facilitated violent plots far outnumber any nongovernment-facilitated
violent plots should give rise to skepticism about the nature of the underlying
threat.
The problem, of course, is that despite a claim to the contrary, Silber and
Bhatt’s NYPD report is not a neutral study confined to the Ivory Tower.122 A
series of Pulitzer Prize–winning investigative reports by the Associated Press (AP)
conviction under these laws does not mean that a terrorist has been convicted, or that any terrorism
has been prevented.”); Umansky, supra note 114. The Supreme Court rejected First and Fifth
Amendment challenges to the scheme in a pre-enforcement challenge on facts fairly dissimilar from
the typical context in which the statute is used. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705,
2722, 2730 (2010). On the grounds of particular importance here, the Court rejected plaintiffs’ First
Amendment concerns primarily on the grounds that the statute did not criminalize “independent
advocacy,” as opposed to work done under the direction of a foreign terrorist organization. Id. at
2709–11. The Court found the independent advocacy distinction relevant for its Fifth Amendment
analysis as well. The Court went to pains to explain that “personnel” and “service” did not include
“independent advocacy.” Id. at 2720–21. The Court further reasoned that the material statute did not
prevent plaintiffs from speaking on any topic and advocacy, so long as they did not do so at the
direction of, or in coordination with, a foreign terrorist organization. The dissent argued that the
majority’s distinction between directed and independent advocacy was unfounded in First
Amendment jurisprudence. Id. at 2733–37 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Court also rejected plaintiffs’
Fifth Amendment void-for-vagueness challenge on the grounds that plaintiffs’ activities fell clearly
within the terms “training” and “expert advice or assistance.” Id. at 2720.
121. See, e.g., Aaronson, supra note 113, at 32 (describing how, in one year, FBI sting
operations resulted in prosecutions against 158 defendants, of which forty-nine had participated in
plots led by an FBI operative instigating terrorist action); see also Terrorist Trial Report Card 2011, supra
note 59, at 26 (“Since 2009, the federal government has expanded its use of aggressive and often
controversial investigations, whereby a confidential informant or undercover officer makes contact
with a potential terror suspect and assists him in the planning of an attempted terror crime.”).
122. The NYPD report stirred some controversy, drawing criticism that it would engender
racial and religious profiling. Memorandum from Aziz Huq, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Concerns with
Mitchell D. Silber & Arvin Bhatt, N.Y. Police Dep’t, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown
Threat 1 (Aug. 30, 2007), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/436ea44aae969ab3c5_sbm6vtxgi.pdf
(“The Report applies a highly questionable methodology to draw conclusions unwarranted by its
insufficient data set, conclusions that will likely result in racial and religious profiling deleterious both
to civil liberties and to genuine efforts at attaining security.”); Letter from Raymond W. Kelly, Police
Comm’r, N.Y. Police Dep’t, to Faiza Ali, Muslim Am. Civil Liberties Coal. (Oct. 6, 2008), available at
http://brennan.3cdn.net/b881ffda53e1324896_43m6bp19j.pdf; Letter from Muslim Am. Civil
Liberties Coal. to Raymond Kelly, Police Comm’r, N.Y. Police Dep’t (Sept. 8, 2009) [hereinafter
Muslim Am. Civil Liberties Coal. 2009 Letter], available at http://www.brennancenter.org/page//Justice/20090908.MACLC%27s.Response.to.Clarification.pdf; Letter from Muslim Am. Civil
Liberties Coal. to Raymond Kelly, Police Comm’r, N.Y. Police Dep’t (Oct. 23, 2008), available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/Justice/10.23.MACLC.pdf; Letter from Muslim Am. Civil
Liberties Coal. to Raymond Kelly, Police Comm’r, N.Y. Police Dep’t (Nov. 23, 2007), available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/Justice/MACLC%20Community%20Statement.pdf. In response, the NYPD reissued the report with a two-page statement of clarification noting the report
was not meant as a “policy prescriptive.” SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18, at 11–12. But see Muslim
Am. Civil Liberties Coal. 2009 Letter, supra (responding to the NYPD’s statement of clarification as
insufficient).
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later revealed the NYPD Intelligence Division’s operation of a “Demographics
Unit.”123 Leaked documents from that unit borrowed heavily from the NYPD
report’s vocabulary and logic,124 suggesting the report was effectively functioning
as an operational guide.125 The NYPD’s program, as well the FBI’s related
approach, will be explored next.
123. Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, Documents Show NY Police Watched Devout Muslims,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2011/
Documents-show-NY-police-watched-devout-Muslims [hereinafter Apuzzo & Goldman, Police
Watched Devout Muslims]; Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, Inside the Spy Unit That NYPD Says Doesn’t
Exist, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.ap.org/content/ap-in-the-news/2011/insidethe-spy-unit-that-nypd-says-doesnt-exist; Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, With CIA Help, NYPD
Moves Covertly in Muslim Areas, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.ap.org/content/apin-the-news/2011/with-cia-help-nypd-moves-covertly-in-muslim-areas [hereinafter Apuzzo &
Goldman, NYPD Moves Covertly]; Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, NYPD Built Secret Files on Mosques
Outside NY, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.ap.org/content/ap-in-the-news/2012/
nypd-built-secret-files-on-mosques-outside-ny; The Demographics Unit, NYPD, http://wid.ap.org/
documents/nypd-demo.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2013). In a deposition regarding the NYPD’s
Demographics Unit—now called the Zone Assessment Unit—the commanding officer of the NYPD
stated clearly that none of the information collected by that unit resulted in any leads to any actual
terrorism investigations. Deposition of Thomas Galati at 27, 36, 72–86, Handschu v. Special Servs.
Div., No. 71 Civ. 2203 (CSH) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2002) [hereinafter Galati Deposition], available at
http://www.nyclu.org/files/releases/Handschu_Galati_6.28.12.pdf; see also Justin Elliott, Fact Check:
How the NYPD Overstated Its Counterterrorism Record, PROPUBLICA (July 10, 2012), http://www.pro
publica.org/article/fact-check-how-the-nypd-overstated-its-counterterrorism-record; Adam Goldman
& Matt Apuzzo, NYPD: Muslim Spying Led to No Leads, Terror Cases, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 21,
2012), http://www.ap.org/content/ap-in-the-news/2012/nypd-muslim-spying-led-to-no-leads-terror
-cases [hereinafter Goldman & Apuzzo, NYPD: Muslim Spying]; Adam Serwer, NYPD: Muslims’
Conversations About Anti-Muslim Bias Justify Spying on Muslims, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 23, 2012),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/08/nypd-muslim-surveillance-transcript-redacted; Seth
Freed Wessler, The Real Reason Why Big Brother’s Still Spying on New York City’s Muslims, COLORLINES
(Aug. 29, 2012), http://colorlines.com/archives/2012/08/nypd_muslim_spying_fail.html.
124. DEMOGRAPHICS UNIT, NYPD INTELLIGENCE DIV., EGYPTIAN LOCATIONS OF
INTEREST REPORT 7–37 (2006) [hereinafter DEMOGRAPHICS UNIT, EGYPTIAN LOCATIONS OF
INTEREST REPORT ], available at http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/documents/nypd/nypdegypt.pdf (listing Egyptian “Locations of Interest,” which include coffee shops, restaurants, grocery
stores, cafes, Halal meat stores, and book stores); DEMOGRAPHICS UNIT, NYPD INTELLIGENCE
DIV., SYRIAN LOCATIONS OF CONCERN REPORT [hereinafter DEMOGRAPHICS UNIT, SYRIAN
LOCATIONS OF CONCERN REPORT], available at http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/documents/
nypd/nypd-syria.pdf (stating that Syrian “Locations of Interest” include bars, cafes, bakeries,
restaurants, grocery stores, and newsstands); SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18, at 22 (“radicalization
incubators” include “cafes, cab driver hangouts, flophouses, prisons, student associations, nongovernmental organizations, hookah (water pipe) bars, butcher shops and book stores”); Adam
Goldman et al., NYPD Eyed US Citizens in Intel Effort, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 22, 2011), http://
www.ap.org/content/ap-in-the-news/2011/nypd-eyed-us-citizens-in-intel-effort (“Police documented where Moroccans bought groceries, which hotels they visited and where they prayed.”).
125. See, e.g., Apuzzo & Goldman, supra note 101; Hawley, supra note 93; Eileen Sullivan,
NYPD Spied on City’s Muslim Anti-Terror Partners, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.ap
.org/content/ap-in-the-news/2011/nypd-spied-on-citys-muslim-anti-terror-partners. For the whole
series of the AP’s reporting on the NYPD’s Demographics Unit, see Highlights of AP’s Pulitzer PrizeWinning Probe into NYPD Intelligence Operations, ASSOCIATED PRESS, http://ap.org/nypd (last visited
Apr. 9, 2013); see also Ramzi Kassem, Praying While Muslim: How the NYPD’s Covert Intelligence Operation
Has Criminalized an Entire Community, NATION, July 2–9, 2012, at 25 (providing background on NYPD
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III. POLICING THE NEW TERRORISM
Shamiur Rahman, a 19-year-old American of Bangladeshi descent who has now
denounced his work as an informant, said police told him to embrace a strategy called
“create and capture.” He said it involved creating a conversation about jihad or
terrorism, then capturing the response to send to the NYPD.
—Associated Press126
I have never made a lead from rhetoric that came from a Demographics report . . . .
—Thomas Galati, Commanding Officer of the NYPD Intelligence
Division127
For the FBI and NYPD, the preventative framework has facilitated a shift
from being law enforcement agencies to being dual purpose intelligence gathering
and law enforcement agencies.128 Radicalization has transformed the project of
counterterrorism intelligence gathering into one squarely focused on gathering as
much information as possible about Muslim life in the United States, with a
particular emphasis on political and religious cultures of Muslim communities.
This Part describes how radicalization theory translates into contemporary police
practice. The policing tactics described here are enabled by constitutional doctrine,
including the Fourth Amendment, typically thought of as the bulwark against the
state’s intrusions. The problem is not of constitutional exceptionalism then, but

Demographics Unit operations and anecdotal evidence of NYPD surveillance); Amna Akbar,
Blueprints: Mapping US Muslim Communities, ALJAZEERA (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.aljazeera.com/
indepth/opinion/2011/09/201191994512478104.html (discussing the theories behind the NYPD’s
and FBI’s rationale for mapping Muslim communities).
126. Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, Informant: NYPD Paid Me to ‘Bait’ Muslims, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.ap.org/content/ap-in-the-news/2012/informant-nypd-paid-meto-bait-muslims (“For his work, [Rahman] earned as much as $1,000 a month and goodwill from the
police after a string of minor marijuana arrests.”).
127. Galati Deposition, supra note 123, at 124.
128. Moreover, the related growth of cross-governmental collaboration through Joint
Terrorism Task Forces, fusion centers, shared databases like eGuardian, and federal-state-local
enforcement has created exponential growth in the information and enforcement power available to
the government. See Federal Government Intelligence Sharing with State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement: An
Assessment Ten Years After 9/11: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Counterterrorism and Intelligence of the H.
Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 13–15 (2012) (statement of Eric Velez-Villar, Assistant Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice); STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON
INVESTIGATIONS, S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOV’T AFFAIRS, 112TH CONG., FEDERAL
SUPPORT FOR AND INVOLVEMENT IN STATE AND LOCAL FUSION CENTERS (Comm. Print 2012);
JOHN ROLLINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34070, FUSION CENTERS: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR
CONGRESS 1–2 (2008); eGuardian Frequently Asked Questions (Mar. 8, 2010), available at http://
www.aclu.org/files/assets/aclueg000020.pdf; Michael German & Jay Stanley, What’s Wrong with Fusion
Centers?, ACLU 3–5 (2007), http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/privacy/fusioncenter_20071212.pdf;
Protecting America from Terrorist Attack, supra note 31.
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rather the extensive powers afforded to government by current constitutional
doctrine.129
Before laying out the core preventative policing techniques, I will provide a
general overview of the relevant standards for each agency.130 Part III.A lays out
the standards governing the FBI’s and NYPD’s policing. Relaxed standards and
minimal accountability mechanisms have created a legal landscape in which the
FBI and NYPD exercise broad unchecked authority to collect intelligence. Part
III.B identifies a number of policing techniques as core to “radicalization”
policing: mapping, aggressive recruitment and deployment of informants,
voluntary or pretextual interviews, community engagement, and Internet trolling.
Subparts A and B paint a picture of how policing standards and practices have
combined to focus on radicalization and therefore the religious and political
cultures of Muslim communities.131
A. Standards
In the last decade, the FBI and NYPD have expanded their investigative
powers and discretion. Each agency no longer requires the police to suspect
criminal wrongdoing before it deploys a stunning array of investigative arsenal. In
fact, both agencies rely on precisely those techniques for which the ex ante
internal standards have become de minimis; those tactics are also nearly immune
from ex post facto judicial challenge.132
The FBI is governed primarily by the Attorney General’s Investigative

129. For an argument that the Fourth Amendment adopts the perpetrator’s perspective,
resulting in disproportionate burdens on communities of color, see Devon W. Carbado, (E)Racing the
Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 965–74 (2002).
130. See, e.g., COLE & LOBEL, supra note 5, at 1–19; Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement, supra
note 22, at 58–61; Kassem, supra note 125; Emily Berman, Domestic Intelligence: New Powers, New Risks,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 26–30 (2011), http://brennan.3cdn.net/b80aa0bab0b425857d
_jdm6b8776.pdf. While I lay out reasons why challenging these techniques is difficult, the question of
the legality of the policing techniques presented here is beyond the scope of this Article. There is a
growing literature, and a number of lawsuits asking the question. See, e.g., Complaint at 2–4, Hassan v.
City of New York, No. 2:12-cv-03401-SDW-MCA (D.N.J. June 6, 2012), ECF No. 1; Tracey Maclin,
“Voluntary” Interviews and Airport Searches of Middle Eastern Men: The Fourth Amendment in a Time of Terror,
73 MISS. L.J. 471, 493–510 (2003); Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement, supra note 22, at 56–57.
131. See Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam?, supra note 8, at 156 (“[ T ]he government has
invested heavily in intelligence collection and analysis as part of a comprehensive approach to
domestic counter-radicalization. Counter-radicalization inevitably entails judgments about which
individuals or communities have already or may become radicalized as well as the nature of the
radicalization process itself. Thus, the government has employed the nascent domestic intelligence
apparatus to locate the boundaries—both conceptually and empirically—between radical and nonradical Islam.” (footnotes omitted)).
132. This is particularly significant because standards for both the FBI and NYPD, and for
other local police departments around the country, were developed in response to public pressure
demanding change from McCarthy era excesses of police power. See Paul G. Chevigny, Politics and Law
in the Control of Local Surveillance, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 735, 736–38 (1984).
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Guidelines (the Guidelines), issued at the discretion of the Attorney General.133
The original Guidelines were promulgated by Attorney General Edward Levi in
1976 to ward off the possibility of a congressional statutory charter in the face of
public outrage over J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI and of the Church Committee’s
findings about the FBI’s extensive disruptive surveillance of communists, black
and women’s liberationists, and the New Left more generally.134 The Guidelines
“proceed[ed] from the proposition that Government monitoring of individuals or
groups because they hold unpopular or controversial political views is intolerable
in our society.”135 The Levi Guidelines included three increasingly robust
investigative phases: preliminary, limited, and full investigations. Commencement
of each stage required a nexus to criminal activity. Each phase permitted more
intrusive investigative techniques, but required higher suspicion thresholds and
included greater procedural safeguards.
The Guidelines have been significantly relaxed since 9/11, allowing the FBI
to exercise greater power with fewer procedural constraints or suspicion
thresholds.136 In 2002 and 2008, Attorneys General John Ashcroft and Michael
Mukasey issued the Guidelines that have governed the FBI in the post-9/11 era.

133. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION’S COMPLIANCE WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S INVESTIGATIVE
GUIDELINES 36–59 (2005) [hereinafter OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., FBI COMPLIANCE],
available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0509/index.htm; Berman, supra note 130, at 7, 13
(outlining the role of the Attorney General and the Guidelines in constraining the FBI). Importantly,
the DOJ’s guidance bans profiling based on race and ethnicity in law enforcement practices, but it
does not explicitly ban profiling based on religion or national origin, and does not apply to national
and border security contexts. See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE
REGARDING THE USE OF RACE BY FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 1 (2003), available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/guidance_on_race.pdf.
134. Lininger, supra note 22, at 1213–14; Berman, supra note 130, at 9–10; see also OFFICE OF
THE INSPECTOR GEN., FBI COMPLIANCE, supra note 133, at 29–36 (summarizing the FBI’s preGuidelines activities).
135. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., FBI COMPLIANCE, supra note 133, at 36 (citing FBI
Oversight: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong. 257 (1976) (testimony of Edward H. Levi, Att’y General, Department of Justice)).
136. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES FOR
DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS (2008) [hereinafter OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., GUIDELINES
FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS], available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/guidelines
.pdf; OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS (2002), available at http://www.fas.org/
irp/agency/doj/fbi/fbiundercover.pdf; OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND TERRORISM
ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATIONS (2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/general
crimes2.pdf. For a discussion of the history of the FBI Guidelines, with a focus on post-9/11
changes, see Berman, supra note 130. See also COLE & LOBEL, supra note 5, 1–19; Sinnar, Questioning
Law Enforcement, supra note 22, at 58–61. See generally JEROME P. BJELOPERA & MARK A. RANDOL,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41780, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND TERRORISM
INVESTIGATIONS 1 (2011) (noting the Guidelines and DIOGs provide “the FBI more leeway to
engage in proactive investigative work that does not depend on criminal predication (i.e., a nexus to
past or future criminal activity)”).
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Importantly, the 2008 Guidelines created the “assessment,” a new stage of FBI
investigation, prior to what used to be the first stage of investigation, a
“preliminary investigation.”137 While an assessment requires no “particular factual
predication” or suspicion of wrongdoing or criminal activity, it authorizes the use
of intrusive investigative techniques.138 For example, in conducting an assessment,
the FBI may use unlimited physical surveillance, pretextual interviews, and
deployment of confidential informants, absent any suspicion of wrongdoing, and
with little to no procedural safeguards.139
First issued in 2008, and then revised in 2011, the FBI’s Domestic
Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG) provides direction for the
Guidelines’ implementation.140 The DIOG allows for five types of assessments,
which can be deployed mostly or partly based on First Amendment activity.141
The DIOG also authorizes mapping, accessing information in the possession of
other government agencies, Internet monitoring, and interviewing of
“complainants” even prior to the opening of an assessment.142 Importantly, the
137. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS,
supra note 136, at 17–18, 20–21.
138. Assessments do require an “authorized purpose.” Id. at 17; see also Memorandum from
the Fed. Bureau of Investigation to All Field Offices (Sept. 24, 2009), available at http://www.aclu
.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20111019/ACLURM004887.pdf (providing standards for the type of
information agents in the Counterterrorism Division should solicit in the assessment stage and
beyond).
139. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS
GUIDE 4-13 to 4-14, 5-2, 6-7 (2011).
140. Id. The DIOG is in a way the regulation to the Guidelines’ law. Muslim Advocates, a
California-based advocacy organization, filed a Freedom of Information Act request for the 2008
DIOGs. See Muslim Advocates Seeks FBI Guidelines on Racial Profiling of Muslim Americans, MUSLIM
ADVOCATES (June 17, 2009), http://www.muslimadvocates.org/muslim_advocates_seeks_fbi_
guidelines_on_racial_profiling_of_muslim_americans. The DOJ released redacted excerpts of the
DIOGs, available at http://documents.nytimes.com/the-new-operations-manual-from-the-f-b-I. The
current 2011 DIOG is available on the FBI’s website. Before the 2008 DIOG, there was the Manual
of Investigative and Operational Guidelines. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, MANUAL OF
INVESTIGATIVE AND OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES, available at http://vault.fbi.gov/miog/manual-ofinvestigative-operations-and-guidelines-miog-part-02-01-of-06/view; OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GEN., FBI COMPLIANCE, supra note 133.
141. Investigative activity cannot be based solely on First Amendment activity. Large sections
of the assessment-related rules are redacted. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 139, at 5-4
to 5-37; see also Charlie Savage, F.B.I. Agents Get Leeway to Push Privacy Bounds, N.Y. TIMES, June 13,
2011, at A1, A13; Charlie Savage, F.B.I. Focusing on Security over Ordinary Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24,
2011, at A16 (finding that between 2009 and 2011, the FBI opened 82,325 assessments, 42,888 of
which were to see whether people were terrorists or spies; the vast majority of assessments were
closed out “without finding information that justified a more intensive inquiry”). The 2008 DIOG
was similarly lenient as to the permissible role of First Amendment activity in the opening of an
assessment. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FBI DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS GUIDE (2008), available at http://documents.nytimes.com/the-new-operations-manual-from
-the-f-b-I; Berman, supra note 130, at 23–25. As with the 2008 DIOG, in the 2011 DIOG, the section
on “undisclosed participation” by “confidential human sources”—informants—is largely redacted.
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, , supra note 139, at 16-2 to 16-11.
142. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 139.
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Guidelines and the DIOG are not enforceable in court; nor are they the product
of any meaningful public engagement.
The NYPD is governed by its patrol guide and the Handschu Guidelines.143 A
federal consent decree resulting from a 1970s class action lawsuit complaining of
police infiltration and surveillance of that time’s radicals, the Handschu Guidelines
provide parameters and oversight for the NYPD’s surveillance of political and
religious activity.144 Mirroring the cyclical history of the FBI,145 meaningful
restraints on the NYPD were removed after 9/11. In 2002, the NYPD argued in
court that Handschu undermined the department’s ability to keep New York City
safe from terrorism and requested greater flexibility in its ability to gather and
disseminate intelligence.146 In 2003, the court approved modified guidelines
submitted by the NYPD, eliminating the prior required criminal nexus for
surveillance of political activity, insulating the NYPD from independent review by
the Handschu Authority, and relaxing the rules for collection, retention, and
dissemination of information.147 The revised guidelines allow the NYPD to initiate
143. Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); BARRY KAMINS,
NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT PATROL GUIDE MANUAL (2006).
144. Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 737 F. Supp. 1289, 1303–04 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Handschu,
605 F. Supp. at 1388–92. For information on the underlying activities of the Bureau of Special
Services, the NYPD’s then-intelligence arm, see, for example, Emanuel Perlmutter, Police Intelligence
Unit Watches Racial Activity: Undercover Detectives Play Major Role in Curbing Subversive Forces, N.Y. TIMES,
July 27, 1964, at 19. See also Targeted and Entrapped, supra note 58, at 12–13 (describing the background
of the litigation and the settlement terms). The original Guidelines required factual criminal predicates
for investigations of political and religious activity. More specifically, the consent decree prohibited
the NYPD from investigating political activity unless there was “specific information” that the group
was linked to a crime that had been committed or was about to be committed. Handschu also required
transparency in approval procedures for such investigations and provided for an oversight body to
ensure compliance and provide for review of alleged violations. Handschu, 605 F. Supp. at 1390–91.
Handschu further created an independent oversight body, the Handschu Authority, through which
investigation of political activity had to be preapproved, and grievances by members of the public
could be filed; this process limited the NYPD’s ability to collect, retain, and disseminate intelligence,
and provided grievance procedures for individuals. Id. For a survey of police surveillance oversight
mechanisms resulting from local police abuse in the 1960s and 1970s, see Chevigny, supra note 132.
145. See generally Chevigny, supra note 132 (providing an overview of actions in several
jurisdictions challenging political surveillance and a comparison of various regulatory approaches);
Fisher, supra note 22 (providing an overview of political surveillance practices conducted by the FBI
and local law enforcement).
146. Declaration of Deputy Comm’r David Cohen, Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., No. 71
Civ. 2203 (CSH) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2002). But see Jerrold L. Steigman, Note, Reversing Reform: The
Handschu Settlement in Post-September 11 New York City, 11 J.L. & POL’Y 745, 782–83 (2003) (rejecting
the NYPD’s reasoning for demanding the post-9/11 changes in the consent decree).
147. Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 288 F. Supp. 2d 411, 420, 429–30 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“In
order to carry out its mission of preventing the commission of terrorist acts in or affecting the City of
New York and the United States and its people, the NYPD must proactively draw on available
sources of information to identify terrorist threats and activities. It cannot be content to wait for leads
to come in through the actions of others, but rather must be vigilant in detecting terrorist activities to
the full extent permitted by law, with an eye towards early intervention and prevention of acts of
terrorism before they occur.”); see also Kassem, supra note 125, at 26; Leonard Levitt, NYPD Seeks to
Overturn Surveillance Rules, NEWSDAY, Sept. 26, 2002, available at 2002 WLNR 536399 (Westlaw); Police
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investigations based on speech or expression protected by the First
Amendment.148 They invest tremendous discretion to the Deputy Commissioner
to approve investigations and investigatory techniques.149 For example, there are
no restrictions placed on the use of informants except that their deployment must
be authorized by the Deputy Commissioner of the Intelligence Division.150
As discussed in Part III.B, the FBI and NYPD have come to rely on five
policing techniques key to preventative counterterrorism policing, with a focus on
“radicalization” in Muslim communities: mapping, aggressive recruitment and
deployment of informants in mosques and other Muslim community spaces,151
community engagement programs, voluntary interviews, and Internet monitoring.152 Each of these policing techniques is permissible within or prior to an FBI
assessment, so they can be deployed even where the police do not suspect illegal
activity.153 Similarly, while attorneys continue to litigate the NYPD’s tactics for
their compliance with the current Handschu Guidelines,154 the thresholds for
deploying these tactics are de minimis.
These tactics are also largely immune from post hoc review.155 Since the
surveillance tactics are used indiscriminately in Muslim communities, typically the
surveillance does not lead to indictment.156 In fact, a commanding officer of the
Surveillance of Political Activity—the History and Current State of the Handschu Decree, N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES
UNION, http://www.nyclu.org/content/testimony-police-surveillance-of-political-activity-history-and
-current-state-of-handschu-de (last visited Apr. 13, 2013) (testimony of Arthur N. Eisenberg).
148. Handschu, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 421.
149. Id. at 422–38.
150. Id. at 428.
151. Undercover police officers are also aggressively deployed. See, e.g., Apuzzo & Goldman,
Police Watched Devout Muslims, supra note 123, at 1 (“Every day, undercover officers and informants
filed reports from their positions as ‘listening posts’ inside Muslim communities.”); Adam Goldman et
al., NYPD Eyed US Citizens in Intelligence Effort, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.ap
.org/content/ap-in-the-news/2011/nypd-eyed-us-citizens-in-intel-effort (“[As part of the ‘Moroccan
Initiative,’] [u]ndercover officers snapped photographs of restaurants frequented by Moroccans,
including one that was noted for serving ‘religious Muslims.’”).
152. These major tactics draw on and relate to a broader set of tactics, like growing
information sharing and joint enforcement. See supra text accompanying note 128.
153. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 139, at 4-13 to 6-3. Mapping may also be
deployed as part of an assessment: the section on mapping states that “the relevance of the ethnic or
racial information mapped to the authorized purpose of the Assessment or investigation must be
clearly demonstrated and documented.” Id. at 4-14.
154. The Galati deposition was taken by Handschu attorneys in connection with current efforts
to determine whether the Intelligence Division’s Demographics Unit overstepped Handschu’s bounds.
Galati Deposition, supra note 123; NYPD Testimony on Muslim Surveillance Operation Highlights Futility of
Spying on Innocent People, ACLU (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.aclu.org/national-security/nypd
-testimony-muslim-surveillance-operation-highlights-futility-spying-innocent.
155. For a helpful discussion of the limitations to challenges to many of these tactics, see
Emily Berman, Regulating Domestic Intelligence Collection, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. (forthcoming 2014)
(on file with author).
156. Galati Deposition, supra note 123 (stating that none of the information collected by the
NYPD Demographics Unit resulted in leads for terrorism investigations); see also Goldman & Apuzzo,
NYPD: Muslim Spying, supra note 123 (noting that in more than six years of conducting surveillance on
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NYPD recently admitted that the Intelligence Division’s program to gather such
intelligence in Muslim communities resulted in not one indictment under his
watch.157 Nonetheless, there are other real harms associated with surveillance. But
the secret nature of surveillance makes it hard for plaintiffs to prove in court that
they are subject to surveillance. Plaintiffs are hard pressed to prove sufficient harm
to confer standing, deal as they must with the Supreme Court’s decision in Laird v.
Tatum.158 “Allegations of a subjective ‘chill’ are not an adequate substitute for a
claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm.”159
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA creates yet another hurdle to establishing
standing to challenge national security surveillance.160
Even when the FBI’s and NYPD’s tactics culminate in an indictment, there
are significant barriers to challenges. The Handschu Guidelines, Attorney General’s
Guidelines, and DIOG provide few limitations on police power.161 Nor do they
give rise to private causes of action. Voluntary interviews and community
engagement rely on consent; however facile that consent may be, courts are
unlikely to be any more sympathetic to Fourth Amendment challenges in the
terrorism context than in the ordinary crime context.162 Neither is the Fourth

Muslim neighborhoods, NYPD’s Demographics Unit “never generated a lead or triggered a terrorism
investigation”).
157. Galati Deposition, supra note 123, at 124.
158. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13 (1972); Lininger, supra note 22, at 1236–44 (discussing
Laird and other hurdles to challenges to post-9/11 surveillance of Muslim communities as authorized
under the 2002 Attorney General’s Guidelines); see also Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment
Investigations and the Inescapable Pragmatism of the Common Law of Free Speech, 86 IND. L.J. 1, 45–46 (2011)
(discussing different interpretations of Laird ); Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal
Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 143–45 (2007) (same).
159. Laird, 408 U.S. at 13–14.
160. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1149, 1155 (2013) (dismissing plaintiffs’
constitutional challenge to section 702 under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA)
on standing grounds—plaintiffs did not establish injury in fact fairly traceable to the law they wished
to challenge).
161. For example, the limitations on entrapment are scant. The rules for dealing with
informants are laid out in a specific set of guidelines. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN.,
GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS, supra note 136, at 33 (“Otherwise illegal activity by a
human source must be approved in conformity with the Attorney General’s Guidelines Regarding the
Use of FBI Confidential Human Sources.”). The relevant guidelines explicitly contemplate that
informants will be authorized to engage in illegal activity, with limitations only on acts of violence and
acts that would be unlawful if performed by an actual FBI agent. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN.,
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES REGARDING THE USE OF FBI CONFIDENTIAL HUMAN
SOURCES 30 (2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/docs/ag-guidelines-use-of-fbi-chs.pdf
(“The FBI is never permitted to authorize a Confidential Human Source to: a. participate in any act of
violence except in self-defense or b. participate in an act designed to obtain information for the FBI
that would be unlawful if conducted by a law enforcement agent (e.g., breaking and entering, illegal
wiretapping, illegal opening or tampering with the mail, or trespass amounting to an illegal search).”
(footnotes omitted)).
162. The two scholarly pieces considering Fourth Amendment challenges to voluntary
interviews in this context agree that courts are unlikely to find Fourth Amendment protections for the
typical case, given most FBI interviews would not constitute seizures because of the myth of possible
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Amendment likely to offer relief when it comes to physical or virtual dealings with
informants (or undercover officers), since the third-party consent doctrine
insulates undercover activity.163 Indeed, informant creation and deployment are
“methodically exempted . . . from the kinds of constitutional regulations that
cover other investigative techniques, including Fourth Amendment rules on
searches, seizures, and warrants, the Fifth Amendment requirement that suspects
be given Miranda warnings and counsel, and Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel
rules.”164 The entrapment defense may be raised at trial. But in its focus on the
defendant’s subjective state of mind, rather than the conduct of the government,
the threshold for entrapment is near impossible to meet:165 it has not once

refusal. Maclin, supra note 130, at 493–510; Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement, supra note 22, at 46–47;
see also Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 631–33 (2003); United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 203–04
(2002); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 439–40 (1991); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497
(1983) (plurality opinion).
163. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 744 (1979) (“Neither the Constitution nor any
Act of Congress requires that official approval be secured before conversations are overheard or
recorded by Government agents with the consent of one of the conversants.”); United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745, 750–54 (1971); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 748–51 (1952); see also
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244–45 (2009); Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine,
107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 566–70 (2009); Lininger, supra note 22, at 1248–49 (“An invited informer is a
person who has express or tacit permission to be on the premises, even though the informer would
have been denied permission if the informer’s true identity had been known. . . . The invited informer
may enter a religious institution, wear a body wire, and carry a pinhole camera without ever ‘searching’
the premises. Only when the informer exceeds the scope of his invitation does a ‘search’ occur.”
(footnotes omitted)); Tim Sobczak, Note, The Consent-Once-Removed Doctrine: The Constitutionality of
Passing Consent from an Informant to Law Enforcement, 62 FLA. L. REV. 493, 509–518 (2010). For a
comprehensive summary of the limitations of various challenges to government use of informants,
see David A. Harris, Law Enforcement and Intelligence Gathering in Muslim and Immigrant Communities After
9/11, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 123, 141–58 (2010), and ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF,
SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 45–81 (2009). For
general standards related to the government’s ability to surveil Internet-related spaces, see the Stored
Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2006) (requiring a warrant only for the contents of
electronic communications held on a third party’s server that are less than 180 days old), and the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010)
(determining that, under the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement needs a warrant to access contents
of emails); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) (determining that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in IP addresses). See also Theodoric Meyer & Peter Maass, No
Warrant, No Problem: How the Government Can Still Get Your Digital Data, PROPUBLICA, Dec. 4, 2012,
http://www.propublica.org/special/no-warrant-no-problem-how-the-government-can-still-get-your
-digital-data.
164. NATAPOFF, supra note 163, at 85–86.
165. Richard H. McAdams, The Political Economy of Entrapment, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
107, 115–19 (2005); see also Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548–49 (1992) (“Where the
Government has induced an individual to break the law and the defense of entrapment is at issue, as
it was in this case, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was
disposed to commit the criminal act prior to first being approached by Government agents.”
(footnote omitted)); Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988); United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. 423, 429 (1973) (explaining that the entrapment defense focuses “on the intent or predisposition
of the defendant to commit the crime”); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958)
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succeeded in the terrorism context, even on facts of outrageous government
overreach.166
Indictment or not, the government insulates its practices by relying on an
arsenal of secrecy tools, to which courts largely defer.167 In one recent case,
members of a Southern California Muslim community sued the FBI after an FBI
informant spoke publicly about spying on the community as part of an FBI
project dubbed Operation Flex.168 Relying on a classified declaration provided to
the court ex parte and in camera, a federal district court sustained the Obama
administration’s first invocation of the state secrets doctrine in relation to a
domestic program.169 In shielding a much-criticized FBI surveillance operation,

(“However, the fact that government agents merely afford opportunities or facilities for the
commission of the offense does not constitute entrapment.” (internal quotation marks omitted));
United States v. Harvey, 991 F.2d 981, 993 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Based upon Harvey’s prompt response to
the government’s single invitation to him to purchase child pornography, the jury could rationally find
that he possessed the requisite predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
166. For a review of the entrapment defense as raised in terrorism prosecutions, see Targeted
and Entrapped, supra note 58, at 15–18, 59–63 nn.101–26; Terrorist Trial Report Card 2011, supra note 59,
at 28 (“Ten defendants who have been caught up in sting operations since 9-11 formally presented
entrapment as a defense in court proceedings, but the defense has never been successful in a
terrorism prosecution.” (footnote omitted)). See also Said, supra note 58 (describing the legal standards
for and ineffectiveness of the entrapment defense). Most recently, the entrapment defense failed in
the closely watched prosecution of Mohamed Osman Mohamud, charged with attempting to place a
bomb at a Portland Christmas tree-lighting ceremony. See, e.g., Bryan Denson, Mohamed Mohamud
31,
2013),
Found
Guilty
in
Portland
Terrorism
Trial,
OREGON LIVE (Jan.
http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2013/01/mohamed_mohamud_found_guilty
_i.html; Kari Huus, Trial in Oregon’s Alleged Christmas Bomb Plot to Turn on ‘Entrapment’, NBC NEWS (Jan.
10, 2013), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/01/10/16436454-trial-in-oregons-alleged-christmas
-bomb-plot-to-turn-on-entrapment?lite; Joel Millman, Stings to Get Close Look in Oregon Terror Case,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 9, 2013, 8:30 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323706704578
227740396234744.html.
167. See, e.g., Joshua L. Dratel, Section 4 of the Classified Information Procedures Act: The Growing
Threat to the Adversary Process, 53 WAYNE L. REV. 1041, 1041–42 (2007); Aziz Huq, Structural
Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 887 (2012); Huq, supra note 23; Rovner &
Theoharis, supra note 58, at 1386–91; Sam A. Schmidt & Joshua L. Dratel, Turning the Tables: Using the
Government’s Secrecy and Security Arsenal for the Benefit of the Client in Terrorism Prosecutions, 48 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 69, 80–89 (2003); Steve Vladeck, The New National Security Canon, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1295,
1329–30 (2012); Ellen C. Yaroshefsky, The Slow Erosion of the Adversary System: Article III Courts, FISA,
CIPA and Ethical Dilemmas, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 203, 203–04 (2006); see also Jenny
S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013 (2008); cf. Aziz Z.
Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 227.
The most promising challenges may be to the NYPD’s program, since there is no state secrets
privilege available to the police department. See, e.g., Complaint, Hassan v. City of New York, No.
2:12-cv-03401-SDW-MCA (D.N.J. June 6, 2012), ECF No. 1.
168. Fazaga v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 885 F. Supp. 2d 978, 980–81 (C.D. Cal. 2012);
Fazaga v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1028 (C.D. Cal. 2012). Muslim
communities have attempted through the courts, with limited success, to learn about the FBI’s and
NYPD’s information-collection programs. Fazaga is just one example. See, e.g., Islamic Shura Council
of S. Cal. v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 635 F.3d 1160, 1166 (9th Cir. 2011); Complaint, Hassan v.
City of New York, No. 2:12-cv-03401-SDW-MCA (D.N.J. June 6, 2012).
169. Declaration of Att’y General Eric H. Holder, Fazaga v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, No.
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the court further immunized from review the intelligence-gathering practices
discussed here.170
Finally, there is a lack of political checks on these police practices, waged as
they are against Muslims in the name of national security. While there have been
some victories at the local level,171 neither Congress nor the administration seems
interested in any meaningful fix.
B. Tactics
The FBI and NYPD deploy a number of policing techniques shaped around
and responsive to a concern with radicalization and violent extremism: mapping,
aggressive recruitment and deployment of informants, voluntary or pretextual
interviews, community engagement, and Internet trolling. These tactics focus on
gathering intelligence on the religious and political cultures of Muslim
communities—and places where Muslims gather and such cultures may emerge.
They also rely on participation from Muslim community members, stemming
from and creating pressures that Part IV explores. The police tactics described
here are reminiscent of earlier periods of our history, where our law enforcement
agencies have spent tremendous resources monitoring and disrupting
communities and ideologies identified as outside the mainstream.172 From World
War II to the 1970s, the FBI conducted covert domestic operations aimed at
groups considered to be antagonistic to the U.S. government, including Black
nationalists, women’s liberationists, and members of the Communist Party.173 The
Senate Church Committee found that the FBI relied on:
secret informants . . . wiretaps, microphone “bugs,” surreptitious mail

8:11-cv-00301-CJC, (C.D. Cal., Aug. 1, 2011), ECF No. 32-3; Hamed Aleaziz, Want to Sue the FBI for
Spying on Your Mosque? Sorry, That’s Secret., MOTHER JONES (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.motherjones
.com/politics/2011/08/state-secrets-fazaga-v-fbi.
170. Fazaga, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 1042; see also Adam Serwer, FBI Sting Lawsuit Blocked by “State
Secrets” Doctrine, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 15, 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2012/08/fbisting-lawsuit-blocked-state-secrets-doctrine.
171. For example, for years Portland resisted participating in the local JTTF, since
participation typically deputizes local law enforcement to function under the FBI Guidelines.
Recently, Portland decided to join the JTTF, on the condition that local law enforcement would
continue to be bound by local law. See, e.g., William Yardley, Portland, Ore., Votes to Rejoin Task Force
After Terrorism Scare, N.Y. TIMES DAILY, May 1, 2011, at A31.
172. Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449,
449–50, 468, 498–500 (1985) (“[T]he overriding objective at all times should be to equip the first
amendment to do maximum service in those historical periods when intolerance of unorthodox ideas
is most prevalent and when governments are most able and most likely to stifle dissent
systematically.”).
173. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., FBI COMPLIANCE, supra note 133, at 33–34
(stating that the FBI investigated civil rights, antiwar, and women’s rights movements); Lininger, supra
note 22, at 1210–14 (discussing the FBI’s aggressive investigations in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly
of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference); Berman, supra
note 130, at 8–9 (listing both generic and specific abuses of power by the FBI).
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opening, and break-ins, [sweeping] in vast amounts of information about
the personal lives, views, and associations of American citizens [and]
conducted a sophisticated vigilante operation aimed squarely at preventing
the exercise of First Amendment rights of speech and association, on the
theory that preventing the growth of dangerous groups and the propagation
of dangerous ideas would protect the national security and deter violence.174
That these tactics predate 9/11 underline the importance of studying their
contemporary use against Muslim communities. Indeed, this policing paradigm
portends expansive surveillance practices more broadly, in particular against
groups the government identifies as nonconforming or threatening.175
1. Mapping
Mapping has become a key tactic of preventative policing.176 The FBI and
NYPD have each engaged in different mapping activities of Muslim communities
in the name of national security.177 Places for religious and political discussion and
gathering, and potential organizing, become important targets for intelligence
gathering. The purpose of identifying these spaces seems to be twofold. First, by
locating and then gathering intelligence on Muslim community spaces, law
enforcement claims to be looking for spaces where individuals may radicalize.

174. SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: BOOK
II, S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 5 (1976); SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF
AMERICANS: BOOK III, S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 3 (1976).
175. For coverage of policing of Occupy and antiwar activists from the last three years, see,
for example, Greenberg, New York: The Police and the Protesters, supra note 31; Colin Moynihan, F.B.I.
Searches Antiwar Activists’ Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2010, at A10; Madeleine Baran, Papers Shed Light
on FBI’s Anti-War Activist Probe, MPR NEWS (May 18, 2011), http://minnesota.publicradio.org
/display/web/2011/05/18/fbi-documents-anti-war-activist-raids.
176. The police practice of mapping jurisdictions predates 9/11: in 1919, a New York State
legislative committee commissioned the NYPD and the New York State Police to prepare maps
identifying neighborhoods where certain immigrants predominated, with a focus on organizations and
individuals suspected as socialists, communists, and anarchists. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 22, at
622–25; Sam Roberts, Police Demographics Unit Casts Shadows from Past, N.Y. TIMES CITY ROOM (Jan.
30, 2012), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/03/police-demographics-unit-casts-shadows
-from-past.
177. Interestingly, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) announced a plan for
mapping L.A.’s Muslim communities in 2007. That plan was pulled back after the announcement
drew public outcry. Richard Winton & Teresa Watanabe, LAPD’s Muslim Mapping Plan Killed, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2007, at A1; Richard Winton et al., LAPD to Build Data on Muslim Areas, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 9, 2007, at A1; Richard Winton et al., Outcry over Muslim Mapping, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2007, at
A1; see also Letter from Ranjana Natarajan et al. to Commander Michael P. Downing, CounterTerrorism/Criminal Intelligence Bureau, L.A. Police Dep’t (Nov. 8, 2007), available at http://makkah
.files.wordpress.com/2007/11/muslim_leaders_to_lapd.pdf (expressing “grave concerns” about the
LAPD’s community-mapping plans).
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Second, law enforcement claims to be looking for spaces where already radicalized
individuals may seek cover to avoid detection from law enforcement.178
By identifying and mapping spaces where Muslims gather, the FBI and
NYPD are literally constituting vulnerable geographies. The act of mapping makes
the communities subjects of surveillance and suspicion. The FBI’s DIOG
explicitly contemplates mapping as part of its ongoing “domain management”
efforts.179 The DIOG allows the FBI “to identify locations of concentrated ethnic
communities in the field office’s domain, if these locations will reasonably aid the
analysis of potential threats and vulnerabilities, and, overall, assist domain
awareness for the purpose of performing intelligence analysis.”180 The DIOG

178. Galati Deposition, supra note 123.
179. The concept of domain management is a bit obtuse, but seems to encapsulate an idea
that, in order to be effective, the FBI needs to know the territory in which it operates. Memorandum
from Detroit Fed. Bureau of Investigation Field Office 2 (July 6, 2009), available at http://www.aclu
.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20111019/ACLURM011609.pdf (“Domain management is the systematic
process by which the FBI develops cross-programmatic domain awareness and leverages its
knowledge to enhance its ability to (i) proactively identify threats, vulnerabilities, and intelligence gaps;
(ii) discover new opportunities for needed intelligence collection and prosecution; and (iii) [redacted]
to provide advance warning of national security and criminal threats.”); John S. Pistole, Deputy Dir.,
Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Statement Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC,
FBI (Jan. 25, 2007), http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/implementing-the-intelligence-reform-and
-terrorism-prevention-act (“Domain management is simply about ‘questions and choices’: What do
we need to know about our territory to protect the people in it? What do we know about the threats
and vulnerabilities that worry us most? What don’t we know about the threats and vulnerabilities that
worry us most? What are we going to do to address our threats and vulnerabilities? . . . [Domain
management is] designed to achieve a comprehensive understanding of a geographic or substantive
area of responsibility.”); see also Scott Shane & Lowell Bergman, F.B.I. Struggling to Reinvent Itself to Fight
Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/10/us/10fbi.html (discussing
the then-proposal for Domain Management by Philip Mudd—who had recently joined the FBI from
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—including internal challenges that the program was vague and
implied “ethnic targeting”).
180. The DIOG continues:
If, for example, intelligence reporting reveals that members of certain terrorist
organizations live and operate primarily within a certain concentrated community of the
same ethnicity, the location of that community is clearly valuable—and properly
collectible—data. Similarly, the locations of ethnic-oriented businesses and other facilities
may be collected if their locations will reasonably contribute to an awareness of threats and
vulnerabilities, and intelligence collection opportunities. Also, members of some
communities may be potential victims of civil rights crimes and, for this reason,
community location may aid enforcement of civil rights laws. Information about such
communities should not be collected, however, unless the communities are sufficiently
concentrated and established so as to provide a reasonable potential for intelligence
collection that would support FBI mission programs (e.g., where identified terrorist
subjects from certain countries may relocate to blend in and avoid detection).
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 139, at 4-13. It has been reported that after FBI
Director Mueller’s 2003 call for FBI field offices to map local mosques stirred outcry by civil
libertarians, the FBI switched its rationale for the effort from monitoring terrorist activity to
protecting Muslims from hate crimes. Lininger, supra note 22, at 1204 nn.7, 9. The prior DIOG
allowed the FBI to collect information regarding ethnic and racial behaviors “reasonably believed to
be associated with a particular criminal or terrorist element of an ethnic community” and to collect
“the locations of ethnic-oriented businesses and other facilities” (likely including religious facilities
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empowers FBI field offices to collect, map, and analyze racial and ethnic
demographic information, including the location of businesses and other facilities
servicing those demographic groups. Documents obtained by the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
indicate local FBI offices have mapped the demographics of concentrated Muslim
communities.181 The FBI data-mines commercially available information and
government databases to generate these profiles.182 A 2009 Detroit field office
memorandum opening a “domain assessment” provides as its basis that “[b]ecause
Michigan has [a] large Middle-Eastern and Muslim population, it is prime territory
for attempted radicalization and recruitment by these terrorist groups.”183
The NYPD has also mapped Muslim communities, through its Intelligence
Division’s Demographics Unit.184 The NYPD created records on businesses

such as mosques) because “members of certain terrorist organizations live and operate primarily
within a certain concentrated community of the same ethnicity.” FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
supra note 141, at 32–33.
181. Importantly, the power is not limited to national security investigations, though the
language of the 2008 DIOG shows particular concern with Muslims and national security, and the
2011 DIOG does too, though to a lesser extent. See supra text accompanying note 180. The
documents also suggest the FBI maps other communities. ACLU Eye on the FBI: The FBI is Engaged in
Unconstitutional Racial Profiling and Racial “Mapping”, ACLU (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.aclu.org/files/
assets/aclu_eye_on_the_fbi_alert_-_fbi_engaged_in_unconstitutional_racial_profiling_and_racial
_mapping_0.pdf (summarizing documents obtained by FOIA requests, including FBI mapping of
“Black Separatist” groups, Chinese, Russian, and Salvadorian communities).
182. Aaronson, supra note 113, at 33.
183. Memorandum from Detroit Fed. Bureau of Investigation Field Office, supra note 179. In
2003, prior to the rise of radicalization discourse, Newsweek reported that FBI Director Robert Mueller
directed all FBI field offices to develop “demographic” profiles of their local areas, including a count
of local mosques; this information would be used to “set specific numerical goals for
counterterrorism investigations and secret national-security wiretaps in each region.” Michael Isikoff,
Investigators: The FBI Says, Count the Mosques, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 3, 2003, at 6; Losing Liberty: The State of
Freedom 10 Years After the Patriot Act, MUSLIM ADVOCATES 10–12 (Oct. 2011) [hereinafter Losing
Liberty],
http://
d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/muslimadvocates/pages/47/attachments/original/Losing_Liberty
_The_State_of_Freedom_10_Years_After_the_PATRIOT_Act.pdf?1330650785. “Each of the field
offices received a six-page questionnaire asking for data about the number of mosques, as well as the
number of flight schools, charity groups, dams, bridges, nuclear plants, and other facilities or
organizations that the F.B.I. deemed relevant to its task of protecting national security.” Lininger,
supra note 22, at 1204–05 n.7. “After civil libertarians raised concerns about the burdens on religious
freedom, the F.B.I. offered an entirely different rationale, claiming in public statements that mosquecounting was necessary to protect Muslims from hate crimes.” Id. at 1205 n.9 (citing Marie Cocco,
Ashcroft Makes Federal Cases Hither and Yon, NEWSDAY, Feb. 27, 2003, at A31 (“Once word of the
briefing leaked, the F.B.I. changed its rationale, saying it wanted to count mosques to safeguard
them.”)); Larry Witham, F.B.I. Defends Inclusion of Mosques in Crime Survey, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2003,
at A12 (quoting FBI official who said mosque-counting would help the FBI to protect Muslims from
hate crimes).
184. The Demographics Unit was responsible for mapping “ethnic hot spots.” See Apuzzo &
Goldman, NYPD Moves Covertly, supra note 123; Goldman et al., supra note 124; The Demographics Unit,
supra note 123, at 2. That Unit has since been renamed the Zone Assessment Unit, it seems, in 2010.
Galati Deposition, supra note 123, at 16–17. A Commanding Officer of the Intelligence Division
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owned and patronized by Muslims, Muslim student organizations, mosques,
hookah bars, cafes, and schools all throughout New York City and into New
Jersey.185 The NYPD also created sets of “demographics” or “location” reports,
organized by ethnicity and location, even outside New York City. For example,
the AP published the NYPD’s Demographics Report on Newark, New Jersey, as well
as its Egyptian Locations of Interest Report.186 Similar sets of maps were released for
Suffolk and Nassau Counties on Long Island, and for Moroccan, Albanian, and
Syrian communities,187 suggesting the department had reports for the broader
New York City metropolitan area and for all its Muslim “ancestries of interest.”188
Each of the reports included area maps marking Muslim religious schools,
Muslim-owned and patronized businesses, Muslim houses of worship, and Muslim
gathering places.189 The reports also included more granular entries for particular
institutions, noting the address, ownership, services provided, and some
assessment of the constituency/clientele, often including their nationality,
ethnicity, and religious orientation.190 Where the NYPD created maps of Arab

admitted the program yielded no results in terms of terrorism prosecutions. Id. at 96–97; see also
Elliott, supra note 123.
185. The NYPD “dispatched undercover officers, known as ‘rakers,’ into minority
neighborhoods as part of a human mapping program, according to officials directly involved in the
program. They’ve monitored daily life in bookstores, bars, cafes and nightclubs.” Apuzzo &
Goldman, NYPD Moves Covertly, supra note 123; see also CYBER INTELLIGENCE UNIT, NYPD
INTELLIGENCE DIV., WEEKLY MSA REPORT (2006), available at http://hosted.ap.org/specials/
interactives/documents/nypd-msa-report.pdf; Apuzzo & Goldman, Police Watched Devout Muslims,
supra note 123; Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, NYPD Docs: ‘Focus’ Scrutiny on Muslim Americans,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.ap.org/content/ap-in-the-news/2012/focus-scrutiny
-on-muslim-americans; Goldman et al., supra note 124; Chris Hawley & Matt Apuzzo, NYPD
Infiltration of Colleges Raises Privacy Fears, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.ap.org/
content/ap-in-the-news/2011/nypd-infiltration-of-colleges-raises-privacy-fears; Hawley, supra note 93.
186. DEMOGRAPHICS UNIT, EGYPTIAN LOCATIONS OF INTEREST REPORT , supra note 124;
DEMOGRAPHICS UNIT, NYPD INTELLIGENCE DIV., NEWARK, NEW JERSEY DEMOGRAPHICS
REPORT (2007), available at http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/documents/nypd/nypd_newark
.pdf.
187. DEMOGRAPHICS UNIT, NYPD INTELLIGENCE DIV., ALBANIAN LOCATIONS OF
CONCERN REPORT, available at http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/documents/nypd/nypdalbania.pdf; DEMOGRAPHICS UNIT, NYPD INTELLIGENCE DIV., MOROCCAN LOCATIONS, available
at http://wid.ap.org/documents/nypd-intel-morocco.pdf; DEMOGRAPHICS UNIT, NYPD
INTELLIGENCE DIV., NASSAU COUNTY DEMOGRAPHICS REPORT (2007), available at http://hosted
.ap.org/specials/interactives/documents/nypd/nypd_nassau.pdf; NYPD INTELLIGENCE DIV.,
DEMOGRAPHICS UNIT, SUFFOLK COUNTY DEMOGRAPHIC REPORT (2006), available at http://hosted
.ap.org/specials/interactives/documents/nypd/nypd_suffolk.pdf; DEMOGRAPHICS UNIT, SYRIAN
LOCATIONS OF CONCERN REPORT, supra note 124; see also Target of Surveillance, http://hosted
.ap.org/specials/interactives/documents/nypd/nypd_omar.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2013) (providing
a map of a particular mosque in Paterson, New Jersey).
188. The nationality maps are consistent with a Demographics Unit PowerPoint enumerating
twenty-eight “ancestries of interest”—focusing on countries with a majority or large Muslim
population, and “American Black Muslim[s].” The Demographics Unit, supra note 123, at 5.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 184, 186.
190. Id.
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neighborhoods that included Arab Jews and Christians, the maps explicitly
excluded the non-Muslims from their purview.191
2. Voluntary Interviews192
Government reports on radicalization mark the content of the imam’s Friday
sermon and a neighbor’s trip to Mecca as relevant to determining the threat of
radicalization in an individual or community. The need for such information has
translated into the FBI’s and NYPD’s aggressive and regular use of “voluntary
interviews” in Muslim communities.193 Agents approach an individual at his home,
work, or community institution to request an interview. Though the interview is
technically voluntary,194 like in other contexts where communities of color deal
191. See, e.g., DEMOGRAPHICS UNIT, SYRIAN LOCATIONS OF CONCERN REPORT, supra note
124 (“The Demographics Unit found that the Syrian community in NYC is divided into two parts, a
Jewish Syrian and a Muslim Syrian community with the Jewish community being the larger of the two.
This report will focus on the smaller Muslim community.”).
192. Lapp, supra note 22, at 578–80 (discussing two waves of “‘voluntary’ interviews” ordered
shortly after 9/11 by Attorney General John Ashcroft); Maclin, supra note 130, at 478; Sinnar,
Questioning Law Enforcement, supra note 22, at 46–56 (discussing the First Amendment implications of
FBI “voluntary interviews” and Customs and Border Patrol interviews).
193. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-459, HOMELAND SECURITY: JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT’S PROJECT TO INTERVIEW ALIENS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, at 1 (2003), available
at http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/115.pdf; Thomas Ginsberg, Officials
Begin ‘Voluntary Interviews’ of Iraqi Nationals, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 21, 2003, at A15; Mary Beth
Sheridan, Interviews of Muslims to Broaden, WASH. POST, July 17, 2004, at A1; Jodi Wilogren, Michigan
‘Invites’ Men from Mideast to Be Interviewed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2001, at A1; ACLU Warns of Resurrecting
‘Voluntary’ Interview Program; Arab and Muslim Communities Should Not Be Targets of Racial Profiling, ACLU
(June 22, 2004), http://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-warns-resurrecting-voluntary-interview
-program-arab-and-muslim-communities-sh; Losing Liberty, supra note 183, at 10–11; Shamas &
Arastu, supra note 83, at 28–29. It is hard to know the volume or rate at which the FBI or NYPD
conducts these interviews, but estimates of the FBI’s voluntary interviews are 200,000 to 500,000
interviews: “staggering numbers, if accurate, given estimates that adult Muslims in the United States
number fewer than two million.” Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement, supra note 22, at 47. “[T ]he FBI
continues to interview U.S. Muslims, in waves and individually, in order to investigate specific
terrorist threats, gather general intelligence about communities, follow up on tips of suspicious
activity called in from the public, or solicit people to act as undercover informants.” Id. at 47–48
(footnotes omitted); see, e.g., Racial Profiling and the Use of Suspect Classifications in Law Enforcement Policy:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
111th Cong. 62–63 (2010) [hereinafter Racial Profiling and the Use of Suspect Classifications] (statement of
Farhana Khera, President & Executive Director, Muslim Advocates); Petra Bartosiewicz, The FBI
Stings Muslims, NATION, July 2–9, 2012, at 17 [hereinafter Bartosiewicz, The FBI Stings Muslims]; Phillip
O’Connor, St. Louis-Area Somalis Feel Intimidated by FBI, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 3, 2011,
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/st-louis-area-somalis-feel-intimidated-by-fbi/article
_45d06ac1-c3ea-5dcc-9ffc-5896a7e1598c.html; Turner, supra note 22, at 69 (documenting “reports of
law enforcement targeting of Muslim donors in Texas, Michigan, New York, Virginia, Florida,
Louisiana, California, Minnesota, Missouri, and Wisconsin for ‘voluntary’ interviews”).
194. With regard to coercion, the tactics sometimes “virtually compel[ ] compliance.” Sinnar,
Questioning Law Enforcement, supra note 22, at 50. Shirin Sinnar documents reports of the FBI
approaching people at work, where the ability to refuse without drawing more attention to the FBI
visit at work is limited to nonexistent; FBI agents pressuring individuals to interview immediately,
despite requests for counsel; late-night knocks on doors; and misrepresented purposes and threats in
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with law enforcement, this technicality escapes most Muslims when they are
confronted with law enforcement contact.195 Agents often pressure and harass
individuals into accepting the interviews, making repeated visits at home and at
work, threatening immigration consequences or placement on the No Fly List.196
These interviews seem to serve at least two overlapping purposes. First, the
interviews allow the government to gather as much information as possible on
Muslim communities without much transparency or oversight.197 Second, the
interviews serve as a way to seek out and cultivate potential informants—through
whom more information can be gathered.198
The FBI’s approach to “voluntary interviews” is better documented than the
NYPD’s.199 FBI agents regularly ask about religious and political opinions and
activities—posing questions such as what is your “honest opinion of the United
States”200 and inquiring about travel.201 The selection criterion for interviews is

order to induce interviews. Id. at 50–51. In an indeterminate number of cases, the FBI engaged in
even more overt intimidation to compel people to agree to ostensibly voluntary interviews. For
instance, after the arrests of a Lodi, California, father and son on terrorism charges, the FBI
aggressively sought information from other Pakistani Muslims: agents stationed their cars in front of
homes, followed people for days, circled a mosque hosting a “know your rights” presentation where
individuals they sought to interview had gathered, called individuals as many as ten times a day, and
warned people that they would be “bad mouthed” at work if they did not cooperate. Id. (footnote
omitted). “These measures conveyed a broader impression that the FBI would ratchet up pressure on
those who declined an interview request.” Id.
195. In fact, many Muslims approached feel they should go out of their way to comply with
such requests, to demonstrate they have “nothing to hide.” See Aziz, supra note 5, at 442 (“Many wellintentioned Muslims accept the FBI’s requests to speak with them (often without a lawyer) only to
find themselves prosecuted for making false statements on issues unrelated to terrorism.”). African
American Muslim communities tend to be more familiar with the idea that refusing the police is a
possible and often sensible option.
196. Bartosiewicz, The FBI Stings Muslims, supra note 193; Aaronson, supra note 113, at 32,
36–37; see supra note 194.
197. See Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement, supra note 22, at 41–45.
198. Bartosiewicz, The FBI Stings Muslims, supra note 193.
199. See Maclin, supra note 130, at 493–510; Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement, supra note 22,
at 46–47, 50–55; Under the Radar, supra note 22, at 4–5, 9, 14; Losing Liberty, supra note 183, at 10–11;
South Asian Americans Leading Together et al., In Our Own Words: Narratives of South Asian New
Yorkers Affected by Racial and Religious Profiling, SAALT 15 (Mar. 2012), http://saalt.org/wp
-content/uploads/2012/09/In-Our-Own-Words-Narratives-of-South-Asian-New-Yorkers-Affected
-by-Racial-and-Religious-Profiling.pdf.
200. Memorandum from L.A. Fed. Bureau of Investigation Field Office (May 28, 2003),
available at http://www.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20120217/ACLURM013019.pdf (memorializing what seems to be a voluntary interview conducted in response to a lead where there is nothing
on the face of the document to suggest any criminal predicate). Customs and Border Patrol asks
similar questions of Muslims relating to First Amendment activity. SINNAR ET AL., RETURNING
HOME, supra note 22, at 11–16; Muslim Advocates, supra note 22, at 6–9.
201. Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement, supra note 22, at 53–54; South Asian Americans
Leading Together et al., supra note 199, at 20 (showing that twenty-five percent of respondents who
provided details on interactions with law enforcement reported being subject to secondary screening
by TSA agents more than half of the time they traveled). Sinnar argues the nature of the interview
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based in part on ethnic, religious, or First Amendment profiling.202 The NYPD
seems to have similar practices, asking “about articles posted online and
downloaded content”203 and about “opinions regarding the Arab Spring.”204 These
interviews are also used as a way to cultivate informants who will then be asked to
spy on their communities and proactively share that information with law
enforcement.205
3. Informants 206
Radicalization’s emphasis on monitoring Muslim communities and spaces
has also affected the FBI’s and NYPD’s use of informants. Informants are
standard fare in the criminal system. The problems of police coercion in recruiting
and setting terms for the relationship, and secrecy and lack of accountability, apply
across the board.207 In the counterterrorism context, however, informants are

sends the signal that activity such as traveling triggers government scrutiny or is somehow disfavored
by the government:
Unlike covert investigative methods such as electronic surveillance, an interview is a highly
personal encounter between an individual and a law enforcement officer who embodies
the full force of the law—the power to arrest and imprison, to detain and deport, or to
exclude altogether from the country. . . . Thus, the exchange that occurs in an interview
signals the U.S. government’s beliefs as to what, or whom, it considers threatening.
Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement, supra note 22, at 54. There are traces of the FBI’s interest in travel, at
least to Mecca for Hajj, in documents obtained by the American Civil Liberties Union through FOIA.
Memorandum from S.F. Fed. Bureau of Investigation Field Office (Dec. 9, 2004), available at
http://www.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20120302/ACLURM017866.pdf (memorializing mosque
outreach conversation, including details about an upcoming trip to Mecca for Hajj); see also Eric Lichtblau,
Thousands from Muslim Nations Were Investigated Before ‘04 Election, Data Show, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2008, at
A17 (reporting that immigration agents asked Muslim foreign nationals what they thought of America,
whether violence was preached at their mosques, and whether they had access to biological or chemical
weapons).
202. Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement, supra note 22, at 54.
203. Kassem, supra note 125.
204. Id.; see also South Asian Americans Leading Together et al., supra note 199, at 29–32.
205. Bartosiewicz, The FBI Stings Muslims, supra note 193.
206. Informants have been long critiqued for their role in the criminal justice system.
NATAPOFF, supra note 163; Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences,
73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645, 658, 665–67 (2004); Amanda J. Schreiber, Note, Dealing with the Devil: An
Examination of the FBI’s Troubled Relationship with Its Confidential Informants, 34 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 301, 302–03 (2001); see also Sarah Stillman, The Throwaways, NEW YORKER, Sept. 3, 2012, at
38, 40 (describing the sometimes deathly consequences of law enforcement’s unregulated use of
informants).
207. Law enforcement draws on economic, immigration, and criminal vulnerabilities to recruit
informants. See, e.g., Natapoff, supra note 206, at 645 (“The use of criminal informants in the U.S.
justice system has become a flourishing socio-legal institution unto itself. Characterized by secrecy,
unfettered law enforcement discretion, and informal negotiations with criminal suspects, the
informant institution both embodies and exacerbates some of the most problematic features of the
criminal justice process.” (footnote omitted)); Aaronson, supra note 113, at 36. With regard to
informants’ vulnerability, Alexandra Natapoff explains:
When an officer first confronts a potential informant, prior to an arrest or formal criminal
charge, there are very few legal constraints. For example, a suspect’s right to receive
Miranda warnings is triggered only if he is in custody, so if the suspect has not yet been
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focused on assessing and fomenting radicalization in spaces where Muslims may
gather.208 From FOIA requests to investigative journalism to accounts from
current and former informants (including as government witnesses), the FBI’s and
NYPD’s widespread use of informants in Muslim communities and community
spaces is well established.209 There is reason to believe that there are informants at
each and every mosque in the United States.210 Informants are deployed broadly
among Muslim student groups, and Muslim student social networks, as well.211

taken into custody or arrested, his unwarned statements to police can potentially be used
against him. Similarly the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies only once a suspect
has been formally charged with a crime, so police can legally—and often do—negotiate
directly with uncharged suspects without a lawyer. As a result, police have wide latitude to
confront, threaten, and negotiate with potential informants without the presence of
defense counsel or other witnesses.
NATAPOFF, supra note 163, at 46–49 (footnotes omitted). With regard to their utility as investigative
tools:
Because . . . constitutional constraints generally apply only to official actors, a private
individual acting as an informant can obtain information that the government could not
easily obtain on its own. Criminal informants are thus potent investigative tools, not only
because they can be effective information gatherers but also because they are exempt from
many of the rules that otherwise constrain official investigative techniques.
Id. at 55–57.
208. The changes to the governing standards for the FBI and NYPD to collect intelligence
will likely mean changed approaches to informant deployment even outside of the counterterrorism
context.
209. See, e.g., Aaronson, supra note 113; Bartosiewicz, The FBI Stings Muslims, supra note 193, at
18; Jerry Markon, Mosque Infiltration Feeds Muslims’ Distrust of FBI, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2010, at A1;
Council on American-Islamic Relations, Greater L.A. Area Chapter, The FBI’s Use of Informants,
Recruitment, and Intimidation Within Muslim Communities (Mar. 26, 2009) (on file with author);
Targeted and Entrapped, supra note 58, at 9; Patel, supra note 12, at 21–23; see also Terrorists for the FBI,
MOTHER JONES, http://www.motherjones.com/special-reports/2011/08/fbi-terrorist-informants
(last visited Apr. 18, 2013) (detailing findings and conclusions of investigative report into over 500
domestic terrorist prosecutions). Reports by the Center for Law and Security suggest an increased
reliance on informants in terrorism prosecutions, which further suggests an overall increased reliance
on informants in the counterterrorism context. See Terrorist Trial Report Card 2011, supra note 59, at
43–46.
210. Indeed, the NYPD monitored all mosques within one hundred miles of New York City.
Apuzzo & Goldman, NYPD Moves Covertly, supra note 123; see also Shelby Grad, FBI Plans to Continue
Mosque Monitoring Despite Concerns in Orange County, L.A. TIMES L.A. NOW (June 9, 2009),
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2009/06/fbi-plans-to-continue-mosque-monitoring-despiteconcerns-in-orange-county.html (“The FBI plans to continue using informants to monitor mosques
in America despite strong criticism over such programs leveled this year by Muslim American leaders
in Orange County.”).
211. See, e.g., Hawley & Apuzzo, supra note 185; Hawley, supra note 93; Memorandum from
Sacramento FBI Field Office (Nov. 10, 2009) [hereinafter Memorandum 1], available at http://www
.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20111110/ACLURM007341.pdf (documenting outreach to the Saudi
Student Association at California State University Chico); Memorandum from S.F. Fed. Bureau of
Investigation Field Office (Jan. 17, 2006) [ hereinafter Memorandum 2], available at http://www
.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20120217/ACLURM017916.pdf (documenting “mosque outreach”
attempts with Muslim Student Associations at local colleges); Memorandum from S.F. Fed. Bureau of
Investigation Field Office (Sept. 27, 2005) [hereinafter Memorandum 3], available at http://www.aclu
.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20120217/ACLURM017906.pdf (same); Memorandum from S.F. Fed.
Bureau of Investigation Field Office (Oct. 28, 2004) [hereinafter Memorandum 4], available at http://
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Informants may serve as listening posts, gathering information about
religious and political cultures of Muslim communities.212 Under the Guidelines, it
is permissible for the FBI to instruct informants to gather information in the
broadest possible sense, without any nexus to suspected criminal activity.213
Informants have been tasked with recording license plates, ascertaining religious
and political opinions, attending mosque, and joining student groups in their
activities.214 The NYPD used informants dubbed “mosque crawlers,” who were
tasked with documenting contents of sermons and lists of those in attendance,
absent any concern with any crime.215 As with mapping and voluntary interviews,
the gathering of all-encompassing information becomes imperative when a
concern with radicalization defines your policing, and deploying as many
informants as possible serves that end.
Informants also function as agent provocateurs, who test community and
individual susceptibility to radicalization.216 In a number of prominent
investigations over the last few years, trial testimony and statements by informants
have made clear that the FBI and NYPD send informants into Muslim
communities to encourage and solicit political dissent to American foreign policy
and to disseminate and observe the resonance of the view that Islam requires

www.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20120217/ACLURM017858.pdf (same); see also Shamas &
Arastu, supra note 83, at 27.
212. See, e.g., Shan Li, FBI Violated 1st Amendment Rights of Muslims, Suit Alleges, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 24, 2011, at AA3; Kiran Khalid, Iowa Muslim Leader: Law Enforcement Betrayed Us, CNN (Feb. 3,
2012, 8:48 PM), http://inamerica.blogs.cnn.com/2012/02/03/iowa-muslim-leader-law-enforcementbetrayed-us. The distinction between listening post-styled informants and agent provocateurs is likely
not always clear. Craig Monteilh, for example, was directed to monitor opinions, and to draw out
reactions to suicide bombing. Li, supra. He was also encouraged to invite men from various mosques
to work out with him at local gyms, where the FBI would then record conversations. Scott Glover,
Informant Describes Work for FBI, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2009, at A3.
213. See, e.g., BJELOPERA & RANDOL, supra note 136 (noting the Guidelines and DIOGs
provide “the FBI more leeway to engage in proactive investigative work that does not depend on
criminal predication (i.e., a nexus to past or future criminal activity)”); Li, supra note 212; see also
Complaint, Fazaga v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, No. 8:11-cv-00301-CJC (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2011),
ECF No. 1.
214. See, e.g., Li, supra note 212; Paul Harris, The Ex-FBI Informant with a Change of Heart: ‘There
Is No Real Hunt. It’s Fixed.’, GUARDIAN (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/
mar/20/fbi-informant; Khalid, supra note 212. The FBI has even asked American Muslims to go
abroad and collect intelligence as informants. Bartosiewicz, The FBI Stings Muslims, supra note 193
(referring to cases of American Muslim men asked by the FBI to go to Afghanistan to collect
intelligence). Refusal can mean placement on the No Fly List and immigration consequences. Id.;
Aaronson, supra note 113, at 32, 36–37.
215. Apuzzo & Goldman, NYPD Moves Covertly, supra note 123; Goldman & Apuzzo, supra
note 126.
216. See generally Thomas Cincotta, From Movements to Mosques, Informants Endanger Democracy,
PUB. EYE, Summer 2009, at 1, 11–17 (“By and large, evidence shows informants do not merely
observe and collect data. They make things happen.”). There is also a concern that the informantinduced plots justify in circular fashion the FBI’s counterterrorism work. See Bartosiewicz, To Catch a
Terrorist, supra note 5.
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Muslims to take violent action against the United States.217 In a number of cases,
the FBI and NYPD have sent informants into mosques and other community
institutions not only to gather information on the communities but also to see
who responds, and how, when the informants speak of “jihad,” suicide bombing,
American foreign policy, Osama bin Laden, and so on. Informants have openly
espoused support for terrorism in mosques and other Muslim community
institutions, and have taken to aggressively criticizing American foreign policy,
while promoting the idea that Muslims have a duty to harm the United States.
Informants have also emphasized the need to act on such a duty, to the point of
pushing for, designing, and providing the means for a terrorist attack.218
In espousing political dissent from American foreign policies and religious
views that sanction violence against the United States, the informants seem most
directly concerned with identifying individuals who agree with (or could be
persuaded to agree with) those views. Indeed, while they provide something in the
way of a caveat, Silber and Bhatt’s report for the NYPD suggests that
radicalization works like a conveyer belt:219 one stage leads to the next to the next
and the next.220 If it is just a matter of eventuality between being open to or
adopting particular political and religious views, and committing a violent terrorist
217. See, e.g., Aaronson, supra note 113, passim; Hamid Aleaziz, Wondering if Your “Jihadist”
Friend Is with the FBI, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2012/
03/shahed-hussain-khalifah-al-akili; Wahajat Ali, Time for FBI to Stop Spying on American Muslims,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 7, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/dec/07/
islam-terrorism; Apuzzo & Goldman, Police Watched Devout Muslims, supra note 123 (describing how the
NYPD used informants and plainclothes officers to investigate mosques and Muslim businesses “for
reasons that included endorsing conservative religious views or having devout customers”); Goldman
& Apuzzo, supra note 126; Greenberg, New York: The Police and the Protesters, supra note 31; Harris, supra
note 214; Graham Rayman, The Alarming Record of the F.B.I.’s Informant in the Bronx Bomb Plot, VILLAGE
VOICE (July 8, 2009), http://www.villagevoice.com/2009-07-08/news/the-alarming-record-of-the-fb-i-s-informant-in-the-bronx-bomb-plot; see also KUMAR, supra note 110, at 124; Said, The Terrorist
Informant, supra note 58, at 715–32; Bartosiewicz, To Catch a Terrorist, supra note 5, passim; Shulman,
supra note 110; Targeted and Entrapped, supra note 58, at 41–45; Elliot, supra note 123; Entrapment or
Foiling Terror?, supra note 110; Terrorist Trial Report Card 2011, supra note 59, at 26.
218. The informants seem to focus their facilitation efforts on individuals open to their
viewpoints and vulnerable to their authority and/or resources. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 163, at 146
(detailing how an FBI informant built a case against Shahawar Siraj, described as “a suggestible young
man” and a “‘dimwit,’” by making “persistent efforts to arouse anti-American feelings in Siraj”);
Rayman, supra note 2177 (“[The FBI’s informant] initiated the conversations, introduced the idea of a
terror plot, and delivered the money, equipment, and resources to back it up. He quickly became
known as the guy with ready cash who was interested in the lives of others and was quick to provide
aid and comfort.”); Said, The Terrorist Informant, supra note 58, at 715–38; Targeted and Entrapped, supra
note 58; see also Rick Perlstein, How FBI Entrapment is Inventing ‘Terrorists’—and Letting Bad Guys Off the
Hook, ROLLING STONE (May 15, 2012), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/blogs/national
-affairs/how-fbi-entrapment-is-inventing-terrorists-and-letting-bad-guys-off-the-hook-20120515.
219. SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18, at 10 (referring to the radicalization process as a funnel
and then suggesting “[e]ntering the process does not mean one will . . . become a terrorist”).
220. Id. at 77; see also Patel, supra note 12, at 3 (“[T]he FBI, along with many state and local
law enforcement agencies, have followed the lead of the [NYPD] in affirmatively embracing the
‘religious conveyer belt’ model.”).

2013]

POLICING “RADICALIZATION”

865

act, it would be within law enforcement’s interests to hasten the process in a
controlled setting, rather than to wait for the inevitable. That might explain the
growing number of agent provocateur–driven sting operations,221 “premised on
the idea that individuals who would participate in schemes initiated by FBI
informants might otherwise have been approached by an actual terrorist
recruiter.”222
4. Internet Monitoring
Consistent with governmental focus on the Internet as a hub for terrorist
activity,223 the FBI and NYPD monitor Internet activity as part of their
counterterrorism efforts.224 This includes monitoring what people consume and
post on the Internet about their opinions and activities via email listservs, blogs,
websites, and chatrooms.225 These efforts seem to focus on those who download
content by particular Muslim scholars, like the late Anwar Al-Aulaqi; post on
Muslim-identified websites or participate in Muslim-identified online chat and

221. The most recent Terrorist Trial Report Card, published by the Center for Law and Security,
found:
The rise in indictments over the past two or three years is significantly affected by FBI
informant operations. Since 2009, nearly 50% of terrorism cases have involved
informants . . . . At least 15% of those informant cases can be considered sting operations.
Since the early years of America’s war on terror, the FBI has developed a strategy of
preventive law enforcement in which agents seek to identify not only individuals engaged
in terrorist activity, but those who, if approached with strong enough incentives, will agree
to participate in terrorism. In 2009 and 2010, ten of these cases, which can take years to
develop, came to fruition.
Terrorist Trial Report Card 2011, supra note 59, at 4. The report goes on to note that the “spike in
‘homegrown’ terrorism relies statistically on . . . those targeted by FBI stings.” Id.
222. Id. at 5.
223. See, e.g., King Hearing II, supra note 40, at 15–16 (statement of Paul N. Stockton, Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America’s Security Affairs, Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense); Prison Radicalization, supra note 40; S. COMM. ON
HOMELAND SEC., ONLINE ISLAMIST RADICALIZATION, supra note 40, at 50 (testimony of Gregory
B. Saathoff, Executive Director, Critical Incident Analysis Group, University of Virginia School of
Medicine); S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC., VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM, supra note 40.
224. See, e.g., Racial Profiling and the Use of Suspect Classifications, supra note 193, at 67 (statement
of Farhana Khera, President & Executive Director, Muslim Advocates); Kassem, supra note 125.
Though the Internet has been stigmatized as a terrorist haven, Steven Morrison persuasively argues
that that online communication is “no more dangerous than its real-world counterpart and may
actually be safer when it comes to terror recruitment.” Steven R. Morrison, Terrorism Online: Is Speech
the Same as It Ever Was?, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 963, 963 (2011); see also Dawinder S. Sidhu, The
Chilling Effect of Government Surveillance Programs on the Use of the Internet by Muslim-Americans, 7 U. MD. L.J.
RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 375, 389–93 (2007) (reporting the results of a survey about
Internet usage showing that American Muslims “overwhelmingly believe” that post-9/11 the
government monitors their “general and online activities,” and that “a segment of the Muslim
American population . . . has modified its Internet usage”).
225. Kassem, supra note 125; Hawley & Apuzzo, supra note 185; Shamas & Arastu, supra note
83, at 40; see also Racial Profiling and the Use of Suspect Classifications, supra note 193 (statement of Farhana
Khera, President & Executive Director, Muslim Advocates) (stating that FBI monitoring of Internet
use chills First Amendment protected activities for Muslim Americans).
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discussion forums focused on religious discourse and U.S. foreign policy; and
watch “jihadi” videos.226 Muslim social networks are also monitored in this way.227
Like other methods of policing radicalization, Internet monitoring feeds into the
other techniques; so, for example, Internet activity seems to trigger voluntary
interviews and other scrutiny.228
5. Community Engagement
Community engagement has become a cornerstone of national security
policing, and specifically to counter-radicalization efforts.229 These initiatives are
premised on the idea that Muslim communities can serve as key partners in
counterterrorism work.230 As with other community policing initiatives,
community engagement programs acknowledge the historical lack of meaningful
relationships between police and Muslim communities and emphasize the need for
police to have strong, trusting relationships with Muslims.
Both the FBI’s and NYPD’s community engagement programs serve to
gather intelligence on demographics, opinions, religious practices, and community
activities. Far from signaling a desire for trust-building, then, these community
226. See FBI COUNTERTERRORISM DIV., supra note 34, at 7 (“Internet Chat Rooms . . . [are a]
virtual arena [that allow] vulnerable individuals from around the world to discuss Islamic doctrine.
Radicalization is encouraged both directly and indirectly on the Internet: indirectly through extremist
propaganda (inflammatory speeches, videos, etc.) and directly through chat rooms and bulletin
boards.”); SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18, at 22 (“The Internet, with its thousands of extremist
websites and chat-rooms, is a virtual incubator of its own. In fact, many of the extremists began their
radical conversion while researching or just surfing in the cyber world.”); see also Kassem, supra note
125 (discussing NYPD e-mail monitoring of a student group at a state university).
227. Shamas & Arastu, supra note 83, at 27 (documenting an instance where NYPD offered a
college student ‘“400 or 500 dollars a month’” to “sit[ ] in front of [his] computer and look at what
people are doing”).
228. Kassem, supra note 125.
229. See Amna Akbar, National Security’s Broken Windows, 62 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming
2015); BJELOPERA, supra note 8, at 5 (“Following the 9/11 attacks, law enforcement agencies came to
realize the prevention of terrorist attacks would require the cooperation and assistance of American
Muslim, Arab, and Sikh communities.”); Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam?, supra note 8, at 153
(“Domestic counter-radicalization efforts have increasingly been predicated on the idea that
engagement—outreach to certain Muslim communities in order to make Official Islam a social
reality—can play a crucial role in promoting domestic security. . . . The precise nature of outreach
programs of this sort varies within agencies and from one agency to the next.”); Aziz, supra note 23, at
456–59. U.S. Attorneys are part of these efforts. See BJELOPERA, supra note 8, at 6–7.
230. Aziz Huq, Stephen Schulhofer, and Tom Tyler have done an important series of studies
looking at cooperation with law enforcement, including in the national security context, which
identify procedural justice, or the perception of it, as the most reliable predictor of the public’s
cooperation with law enforcement. Aziz Z. Huq et al., Mechanisms for Eliciting Cooperation in
Counterterrorism Policing: Evidence from the United Kingdom, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 728 (2011); Aziz
Z. Huq et al., Why Does the Public Cooperate with Law Enforcement?: The Influence of the Purposes and Targets of
Policing, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 419 (2011); Stephen J. Schulhofer et al., American Policing at a
Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice Alternative, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335
(2011); Tom R. Tyler et al., Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim
Americans, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 365 (2010).
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engagement programs feed into radicalization policing.231 FBI documents reveal
that: FBI agents who have attended “community events under the guise of
community outreach are recording the content of presentations given at the
events; the names, identifying information, and opinions of attendees; and
information about the community groups, the names and positions of leaders, and
the racial, ethnic and national origin of members.”232 FBI agents would then share
that information with other government agencies.233 For example, memorandums
from the San Francisco Field Office—prepared by FBI agents who attended
community iftar 234 dinners as part of their mosque outreach program—document
names of attendees, and conversations with and presentations by those in
attendance; memorandums also suggest follow up surveillance through Internet
searches.235 Documents generated by FBI community outreach efforts indicate
231. The NYPD seems to understand this, at least in theory. Falkenrath, supra note 31 (“[T]he
counterterrorism deputy commissioner and the intelligence deputy commissioner are not responsible
for community outreach. In part, we don’t want to stigmatize the interaction with these communities,
and if the counterterrorism deputy commissioner or the intelligence go to a community meeting or a
mosque, it sort of sends the message that the reason we’re here is we think there’s a threat.”).
232. Ending Racial Profiling in America: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights
and Human Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 22 (2012) (statement of Anthony D.
Romero, Executive Director, American Civil Liberties Union).
233. ACLU Eye on the FBI: The FBI Is Using the Guise of “Community Outreach” to Collect and
Illegally Store Intelligence Information on Americans’ Political and Religious Beliefs, ACLU 1 (Dec. 1, 2011),
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/aclu_eye_on_the_fbi_alert_-_community_outreach_as_intelligence
_gathering_0.pdf [hereinafter Eye on the FBI (Dec. 1, 2011)] (referencing a number of FBI documents
obtained through FOIA); ACLU Eye on the FBI: The San Francisco FBI Conducted a Years-Long Mosque
Outreach Program That Collected and Illegally Stored Intelligence About American Muslims’ First AmendmentProtected Religious Beliefs and Practices, ACLU (Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/aclu
_eye_on_the_fbi_-_mosque_outreach_03272012_0_0.pdf [hereinafter Eye on the FBI (Mar. 27, 2012)].
“Under this program, intelligence agents either make their own community outreach presentations . . .
or accompany FBI community outreach specialists to meetings to collect intelligence . . . .” Eye on the
FBI (Dec. 1, 2011), supra, at 2–3. “[T]he FBI categorized information about Muslims’ First
Amendment-protected and other entirely innocuous activities, as well as mosque locations, as
‘positive intelligence’ [uploaded and retained in FBI intelligence files] and disseminated it to agencies
outside the FBI.” Eye on the FBI (Mar. 27, 2012), supra, at 1; see also Memorandum from S.F. Fed.
Bureau of Investigation Field Office (Mar. 2, 2011), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/fbimapping
foia/20111110/ACLURM011275.pdf (memorializing community outreach conversation with
individual, including conversation regarding opinions on U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan).
234. Iftar is the meal that breaks the daily fast Muslims observe during the holy month of
Ramadan.
235. Memorandum from S.F. Fed. Bureau of Investigation Field Office (Sept. 25, 2008),
available at http://www.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20111110/ACLURM013443.pdf; Memorandum from S.F. Fed. Bureau of Investigation Field Office, (Oct. 10, 2007), available at http://
www.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20111110/ACLURM013438.pdf; Eye on the FBI (Dec. 1, 2011),
supra note 2333, at 2; see also, e.g., Memorandum from S.F. Fed. Bureau of Investigation Field Office
(Mar. 3, 2008) [hereinafter Memorandum 5], available at http://www.aclu.org/files/fbimapping
foia/20111110/ACLURM011160.pdf (documenting community outreach to a Pakistani community
organization, including organization activities, and identities of those involved); Memorandum from
S.F. Fed. Bureau of Investigation Field Office (Feb. 21, 2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/
fbimappingfoia/20120302/ACLURM017992.pdf (documenting a conversation conducted as part of
mosque outreach; after the call, the agent seems to have run the individual’s name through various
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they were “disseminated outside [the] FBI”236 and are marked “positive
intelligence.”237
Similarly, the NYPD has monitored its closest community partners.238 The
NYPD Demographics Unit listed as part of its activities, presumably to gather
intelligence, “[p]articipat[ion] in social activities,” including “[c]ricket matches.”239
Importantly, cricket matches are one of the NYPD Community Affairs Bureau’s
activities in New York’s Muslim communities; the overlap in programming
suggests collaboration between intelligence gathering and community policing.240
IV. RADICAL HARMS
What are the broader implications of law enforcement’s radicalization and
counter-radicalization narratives, programs, and priorities? At the heart of
radicalization is an idea that the religious and political cultures of Muslim

databases, including Lexis-Nexis, the DMV, and a federal criminal database); Memorandum from S.F.
Fed. Bureau of Investigation Field Office (May 11, 2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/fbi
mappingfoia/20111110/ACLURM012669.pdf (documenting mosque outreach meeting and analyzing
“demographics” of those in attendance, who represented twenty-seven Muslim community and
religious organizations); Eye on the FBI (Mar. 27, 2012), supra note 2333 (describing similar FBI
community outreach efforts). For documents regarding FBI mosque and community outreach
activities to Muslim student groups, see Memorandum 1, supra note 211; Memorandum 2, supra note
211; Memorandum 3, supra note 211; Memorandum 4, supra note 211.
236. Memorandum from S.F. Fed. Bureau of Investigation Field Office (Sept. 25, 2008), supra
note 2355, at 4; Memorandum from S.F. Fed. Bureau of Investigation Field Office (Oct. 10, 2007),
supra note 2355, at 3.
237. See, e.g., Memorandum from S.F. Fed. Bureau of Investigation Field Office, at 3 (May 31,
2005), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20120302/ACLURM017882.pdf
(showing “positive intelligence (disseminated outside FBI)” mark). Other documents are marked
“800.” See, e.g., Memorandum 5, supra note 2355. This is a coding internal to the FBI for “domain
management,” an intelligence program. Eye on the FBI (Dec. 1, 2011), supra note 2333; see also
Memorandum from Sacramento Fed. Bureau of Investigation Field Office 1 (Aug. 28, 2008), available
at http://www.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20111110/ACLURM007431.pdf (“The 800 series has
been established for the Intelligence Program.”). Other community outreach documents are marked
“domain management,” for example, Memorandum from Sacramento Fed. Bureau of Investigation
Field Office 1 (Apr. 20, 2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/fbimappingfoia/20111110/
ACLURM007538.pdf, or “domain awareness,” for example, Memorandum from Sacramento Fed.
Bureau of Investigation Field Office (Jan. 7, 2011), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/fbimapping
foia/20111110/ACLURM013178.pdf (noting the hire of a new, Pakistani, “very charismatic” imam).
238. Sullivan, supra note 125.
239. The Demographics Unit, supra note 123, at 6.
240. See Jacob Fischler, Cricket in Queens: A ‘Wicket’ Good Time, QUEENS CHRON. (July 8,
2010), http://www.qchron.com/editions/north/cricket-in-queens-a-wicket-good-time/article_1ecfa
70f-9405-5251-89aa-bbb42c5e4fe1.html; see also Bridging the Gap Between the Police and the Community at
N.Y.P.D., CTR. FOR HOMELAND DEF. & SEC. (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.chds.us/?player
&id=2545 (interviewing Amin Kosseim, NYPD Officer, about the NYPD’s community policing
initiatives); Amin G. Kosseim, Counter-Radicalization: Best Practices in the United States and
Lessons Learned from Abroad (Sept. 2011) (unpublished thesis, Naval Postgraduate School), available
at http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=691496 (discussing attempts at counter-radicalization through
community policing initiatives including cricket games).
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communities have the power to produce or inhibit terrorist violence.241 In this
narrative, Muslim religious and political cultures, real and virtual spaces for
congregation, come within the appropriate jurisdiction of state surveillance and
regulation. Muslims are reduced to either potential terrorists or informants (willing
to share with law enforcement information on religious activities of community
members) and counter-radicalizers (committed to fighting back Islam’s violent
tendencies). Legitimate differences of opinion—rooted in different conceptions of
the world, political and economic realities—are reduced to irrational pathology.
Radicalization and counter-radicalization programs may seek to create
precisely these pressures on Muslim communities. An accounting of these harms
is imperative to evaluating the radicalization project, however, because the
resultant impossible-to-navigate tensions have gone entirely unappreciated.242 This
Part lays out a schematic for the harms.
A. Religion, Politics, and Geography
Radicalization stigmatizes Muslim religious practices, political affiliations,
and geographies in overlapping, messy ways. A broad range of activities (such as
growing a beard or going to a mosque) and beliefs (such as opposition to
American foreign policy in Iraq and Afghanistan) trigger law enforcement
scrutiny. These activities draw scrutiny to the individual praying five times per day
or attending the antiwar protest. They also draw scrutiny to the communities or
spaces with which the individual may have contact of varying degrees: Is this the
type of community where beard growth and antiwar activism is tolerated and
growing? Is the beard growth and antiwar activism a result of local cultural
tendencies?
Muslim communities keenly feel the stigma that radicalization attaches to
their religious and political cultures. Reports suggest decreased mosque
attendance, reluctance to engage in “[p]olitical organizing, civil engagement and
activism” and “self-censorship on many religious and political topics . . .
[including] even the surveillance itself.”243 Similarly, imams have noted their

241. See, e.g., Tracy Russo, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Attorney General Holder Meets with Muslim Leaders
in Portland, JUST. BLOG (Sept. 30, 2011), http://blogs.justice.gov/main/archives/1617?print=1 (“The
Muslim leaders who met with the Attorney General pledged their support and are undertaking
practical steps resist [sic] violent extremists targeting their young people and help federal law
enforcement do its job better.”).
242. See Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 809 (2012)
(advocating that legal scholars pay attention to the harm efficiency of police practices, the law of the
police beyond federal constitutional norms, and comparative institutional analysis).
243. Shamas & Arastu, supra note 83, at 14–15, 20 (“Business owners, mosque leaders and
community members alike actively censor conversations, event programming, and internet usage in
hopes that avoiding certain political content will keep them and their respective religious and social
spaces off the NYPD’s radar.”). Mapping Muslims is based on experiences in New York City. See
generally id. The experiences of Muslims in New York may be somewhat unique, as the overlapping
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“inability to fulfill their role as spiritual advisors” because they cannot guarantee
confidential space in their mosques or cannot be sure who is an informant, and
Muslim student groups have banned political discussions from their campus
offices.244 Muslims feel the stigma in their bodies, and in their ability to move and
speak in the world.245
Radicalization policing reflects an almost obsessive desire to document and
understand the minutiae of religious ideologies and practices in Muslim
communities.246 At the same time that policing radicalization has become the
norm, the government has promoted certain (“moderate”) Muslim religious views
or leaders over others (“extreme,” “radical,” “fundamentalist”), with counterradicalization as the guiding ethic.247 In so doing, the government has placed itself
in the role of an arbiter of various practices of Islam. Sam Rascoff has elegantly
articulated this as a concern that government counter-radicalization “may
contribute to the ‘establishment’ of . . . ‘Official Islam’: a government-sponsored
account of ‘mainstream Islam’ offered by the state in place of radical doctrinal
alternatives.”248 As the government promotes certain faith leaders and religious
interpretations, it marks others as “beyond the pale.”249
Likewise, in policing radicalization, law enforcement most carefully scrutinizes communities viewed as conservative, traditional, fundamentalist, or radical.
The laser-beam focus on conservative or observant Muslims is embedded within
the radicalization narrative. While the first stage, preradicalization, could describe
NYPD and FBI jurisdictions result in even more focused surveillance than may be typical in Muslim
communities elsewhere in the country.
244. Id. at 14–18, 42.
245. See, e.g., Ahmad, supra note 22, at 1262.
246. See supra Part III.B; see also Goldman & Apuzzo, supra note 126 (“Informants who trawl
the mosques—known informally as ‘mosque crawlers’—tell police what the imam says at sermons
and provide police lists of attendees, even when there’s no evidence they committed a crime.”).
247. See, e.g., Matthew Lee, The Mosque Flap, Part 2: State Department Sending Imam of Proposed
Center on Mideast Trip, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 2010, at A13; Haroon Moghul, Remarks at the
Conference of the Center on Law and Security at New York University School of Law (Nov. 5, 2010)
(audio available at http://clsline.files.wordpress.com/2010/12/protectingrightslibertiesofamericans
.mp3) (discussing efforts by the U.S. government to “build[] networks of acceptable Muslim
intellectuals”); John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. & Counterterrorism,
Remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies: Securing the Homeland by Renewing
American Strengths, Resilience, and Values (May 26, 2010) (transcript available at http://csis.org/
event/statesmens-forum-securing-homeland-renewing-americas-strengths-resilience-and-values)
(discussing the meaning of jihad).
248. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam?, supra note 8, at 129–30 (footnote omitted).
249. Id. at 143–44. Importantly, radicalization makes much ado about Salafism, a term
insufficiently concrete or specific to refer to any particular sect or sub-set of Muslims. Salafism is a
mode of religious interpretation and practice that has been adopted in different historical and
geographical contexts. As much as Islam and terrorism should not be conflated, both as a matter of
ethics and based on facts, conservative religious belief and terrorism should not be considered
interchangeable either. See supra note 83; see also KUNDNANI, supra note 12, at 7 (“‘Extremism’ is a
vague concept that is easily exploited to demonise [sic] anyone whose opinions are radically
different.”).
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anyone living in a Muslim geography (Muslim neighborhood, mosque, etc.), the
second stage is more concerned with basic religious practice (growing a beard,
undertaking pilgrimage to Mecca), and the third with more intensive religious
practice (attending religious study groups). In so doing, the reductive discourse
muddles distinctions between espousing radical or nonconforming views, whether
religious or political, and intending to engage in terrorism or violence.
Radicalization policing brings to bear scrutiny on individuals who identify or
express sympathies with other Muslims in the United States or abroad—especially
those Muslims who fall victim to U.S. policies. This is in part because opinions
critical of the United States or U.S. policies are said to suggest radicalization.250 Of
course many Americans are critical of the United States, Islamophobia, and antiMuslim discrimination. But in the case of Muslims, these concerns, if expressed,
are not understood as legitimate civic engagement but as markers for potential
radicalization.
Radicalization policing is keenly focused on generating Muslim geographies—that is, in understanding and monitoring spaces where Muslims physically
or virtually congregate, and in producing them as sites of difference and scrutiny.
The FBI and NYPD have gone to great lengths to document mosques, Muslim
student associations, Islamic bookstores, halal butchers, and Muslim websites and
chatrooms.251 There is a transnational component, too. Alongside Customs and
Border Patrol, the FBI regularly interviews Muslims about their travels abroad,
including travel to see family.252 By virtue of associating with Muslim spaces,
whether inside or outside the United States, Muslims are subject to intense state
scrutiny.
At the same time that radicalization policing is concerned with Muslim

250. See supra Part III.B; see also Galati Deposition, supra note 123, at 30–31, 36 (“Their job
was, if they hear people talking about it, you know, they should inform us. If what they’re hearing is
hostility towards the United States or to the general public at large, you know, as a result of these
events, would something happen here as a result? Their job is to listen for that.”); The NYPD Will
Record Your Opposition to Drone Strikes, EMPTYWHEEL (Aug. 21, 2012) [hereinafter Opposition to Drone
Strikes], http://www.emptywheel.net/2012/08/21/the-nypd-will-record-your-opposition-to-drone
-strikes (noting Thomas Galati’s reference to a drone strike as “an example of a US-related world
event in response to which the NYPD might send people out to listen how people respond”).
251. These are, in the parlance of the NYPD Radicalization Report, “radicalization incubators.”
SILBER & BHATT, supra note 18, at 22. The FBI Intelligence Assessment similarly marks these places
as “[v]enues where interactions between converts and Islamic extremists can occur.” FBI COUNTERTERRORISM DIV., supra note 34, at 6.
252. See SINNAR ET AL., RETURNING HOME, supra note 22 (describing the questioning,
searching, and profiling of individuals entering the country and recommending procedures to avoid
civil rights violations); Muslim Advocates, supra note 22 (describing the interrogations and searches of
Muslims, Arabs, and South Asian Americans returning to the United States from trips abroad). See
generally supra note 94 and accompanying text. The U.S. government has also relied on “proxy
detention” arrangements to have foreign governments detain American Muslims in order to facilitate
FBI questioning abroad. See Nick Baumann, Locked Up Abroad, MOTHER JONES, Sept.–Oct. 2011, at
47, 68.
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communities as collectives and institutions, it simultaneously works to identify
those individual Muslims the theory understands to portend terrorist violence
most directly.253 American Muslims—young Muslim men in particular—are likely
to find themselves within the ambit of law enforcement scrutiny if they are openly
critical of American foreign policy, attend their local mosque or hookah bar,
partake in their university Muslim student association, or travel to Muslimmajority countries.254 While they may draw scrutiny by affiliating with other
Muslims, the scrutiny follows them as individuals.
B. A Fundamental Tension
Radicalization and counter-radicalization conceive of Muslim communities
and the government in fundamentally incompatible ways: as suspects and partners.
Radicalization constructs Muslim religious and political cultures as generative of
terrorism and therefore worthy of state scrutiny. Counter-radicalization
emphasizes the importance of partnerships in Muslim communities.255 Muslim
communities are necessary to monitor radicalization precisely because of the
threats lurking within—the problem is said (or suggested) to be in Islam. The
government needs Muslim partners to cultivate environments that sanction
acceptable, non-radical viewpoints and practices.256

253. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 48, at 6 n.6 (defining radicalization
as “the process by which inmates who do not invite or plan overt terrorist acts adopt extreme views,
including beliefs that violent measures need to be taken for political or religious purposes”).
254. Fisher, supra note 22, at 622–23, 625–26; Rovner & Theoharis, supra note 58, at 1348–57;
see Hussain, supra note 22, at 930–34; Kassem, supra note 125, at 25–26; see also Goldman & Apuzzo,
supra note 126 (reporting that the NYPD sent an informant to monitor a Muslim student group and
told the informant “to take pictures of people at the events, determine who belonged to the student
association and identify its leadership”). Commentators have wondered, for example, if the
government concerned itself with Fahad Hashmi as a politically outspoken critic of American foreign
policy. Rovner & Theoharis, supra note 58, at 1351–57; Jeanne Theoharis, My Student, the ‘ Terrorist ,’
CHRON. REV., Apr. 8, 2011, at B3.
255. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam?, supra note 8, at 153 (“Domestic counter-radicalization
efforts have increasingly been predicated on the idea that engagement—outreach to certain Muslim
communities in order to make Official Islam a social reality—can play a crucial role in promoting
domestic security . . . . The precise nature of outreach programs of this sort varies within agencies and
from one agency to the next.”); Russo, supra note 241 (“The Department’s engagement efforts have
two central components. First we seek to build trust by working with Muslim leaders to find out how
we can better serve the community on issues like civil rights enforcement to anti-bullying efforts. In
addition, we work to equip and empower local Muslim leaders to help them guard against violent
extremists who are targeting young people in their communities for recruitment to misguided, violent
causes.”).
256. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam?, supra note 8, at 138–40, 145–62 (footnote omitted)
(discussing government-sponsored sports leagues in Muslim communities, and governmentsponsored imam training); id. at 154 (“The phenomenon of engagement is also connected to the
selection of specific interlocutors within various Muslim communities—a choice which necessarily
implicates ‘theological criteria.’ These sorts of decisions are inevitable when the government
dispatches American imams and other exponents of American Islam on overseas delegations.”); Huq,
supra note 23 (manuscript at 21–73).
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These constructions exist in fundamental tension. On the one hand, Muslim
communities are expected to form trusting relationships with law enforcement: to
play in police soccer leagues and to host agents at iftar dinners. In other words,
they are expected to welcome law enforcement with open arms. On the other,
radicalization and counter-radicalization construct Muslim religious and political
cultures as central to the problem of terrorism.
Here, a deposition of Thomas Galati, Commanding Officer of the NYPD’s
Intelligence Division in the ongoing litigation surrounding the Handschu consent
decree, is illuminating. He was asked about the purpose of the Demographics
Unit’s mapping of Muslim communities. His deposition reflects a concern with
Muslim communities as geographies where individuals may radicalize. It also
captures a distinct fear that by virtue of their shared belief in Islam, Muslim
geographies might provide cover for coreligionists’ radicalization.257 (The FBI’s
DIOG captures similar fears in its provisions devising the FBI’s power to map.258)
In discussing how such geographies or locations of concern were identified, Galati
suggests any place where Pakistanis speak Urdu or talk politics would qualify.259
He asserts conversations by Lebanese immigrants in a Lebanese café regarding
from where in Lebanon they hail as important to document—these conversations
may indicate support for Hezbollah.260
What precisely marks these spaces as sites for radicalization? Is it an a priori
assumption of Muslim communities and community spaces as cauldrons brewing

257. Galati Deposition, supra note 123, at 24–26. Galati also makes passing reference to the
idea that the Intelligence Division of the NYPD pays attention to places from which terrorists might
recruit. Id. at 27, 36, 72–86 (“In order to fight terrorism, we needed to know where people lived from
countries of concern that could either recruit, hide or secrete themselves in these communities that
were radicalized towards violence and we needed to know where they were, to identify those
countries of concern, to find those people that were radicalized towards violence.”).
258. 2011 DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS GUIDE, supra note 139, at 4-13
(authorizing the consideration of individual race or ethnicity, community race or ethnicity, and geomapping ethnic and racial demographics).
259. Galati Deposition, supra note 123, at 72–87. For example, when asked why the NYPD
had recorded information about a particular location where Pakistanis were speaking Urdu, Galati
stated:
I’m taking the conversation as a whole. I’m looking in that conversation. I’m seeing Urdu.
I’m seeing them identify the individuals involved in [the conversation] are Pakistani. I’m
using that information for me to determine that this would be a kind of place that a
terrorist would be comfortable in and I’m retaining that for the fact that I can retain it, if
it’s going to help me detect or prevent a potential unlawful or terrorist attack. So, a
potential terrorist could hide in here and that piece of information is important for me to
know. That this is where I’m going to find somebody that speaks Urdu. And again, I’ll go
far beyond Pakistan. Most Urdu speakers from that region would be of concern, so that’s
why it’s important to me.
Id. at 85–86.
260. Id. at 34–35 (“[A] conversation overheard by people in the Lebanese cafe may indicate to
us that they are from South Lebanon or North Lebanon . . . . That may be an indicator of possibility
that that is a sympathizer to Hezbollah because Southern Lebanon is dominated by Hezbollah.”).
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radicalization?261 Alternatively, radicalization may imagine that Muslims who
choose to connect and commune with other Muslims are opening themselves up
to a radicalization process.262 In a slightly different gloss, the underlying logic
could also suggest that Muslims gathering, talking politics or religion, or grieving
the treatment of Muslims at home or abroad signals openness to radical ideas and
radicalization.263
The logic of radicalization imposes on Muslims a rigid hierarchy of social
relations, or, more plainly, a loyalty question. American and Muslim identities
become an either-or proposition: they cannot exist simpatico. By choosing to
commune with or feel sympathy for other Muslims, Muslims are seen to choose
Islam over America, Muslim identity over American identity. Alongside this
fundamental suspicion of Muslim cultures and geographies, how can Muslim
communities be conceived of as partners?264 Partnership exacts its own tax.
Because now if a Muslim does not want to cooperate in a community relationships
program, it suggests she is making a choice, she is picking “them” over “us.”
C. Surveilled Identities
To understand the dynamic harms of radicalization, identity performance
theories prove useful. In the legal academy, Devon Carbado, Mitu Gulati, and
Kenji Yoshino have theorized the work of performing and negotiating identities—
an ongoing task universal to the human condition—and the complex harms
imposed on those marginalized on grounds of race, religion, gender, sexuality, and
class.265 Carbado, Gulati, and Yoshino are just as concerned with documenting the

261. SHERENE H. RAZACK, CASTING OUT: THE EVICTION OF MUSLIMS FROM WESTERN
LAW & POLITICS 47–50 (2008) (citing Amit Rai, Of Monsters: Biopower, Terrorism and Excess in Genealogies
of Monstrosity, 18 CULTURAL STUD. 538 (2004)) (“In terrorism studies, the focus is on the motivations
and belief systems of individual terrorists. The psyche is thus the privileged site of investigation and
terrorism is explained as a compulsion or psycho-pathology.”).
262. In framing its concern with mosques and other institutions, the FBI Intelligence
Assessment suggests a concern with recruitment: while “[n]ot all Muslim converts are extremists . . .
they can be targeted for radicalization.” FBI COUNTERTERRORISM DIV., supra note 34, at 6; see also
Letter to Mueller, supra note 50 (arguing that the FBI’s “indicators” of a religious convert’s extremism
are actually “innocuous behaviors [that] may indicate strong religious beliefs”).
263. Serwer, supra note 123; Opposition to Drone Strikes, supra note 250.
264. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS, supra
note 21, at 2, 3, 5, 6. For an insightful analysis of this construct, see Huq, supra note 23 (manuscript at
21–26).
265. Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000);
Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002); see also Frank Rudy Cooper, Surveillance and Identity
Performance: Some Thoughts Inspired by Martin Luther King, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 517, 525
(2008) (“[S]urveillance encourages particular identity performances and discourages others.”). As this
Article went to press, Carbado and Gulati published an expansion of Working Identity. DEVON W.
CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE: RETHINKING RACE IN POST-RACIAL AMERICA
(2013).
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experiences of identity performance as with identifying antidiscrimination law’s
inability to imagine, let alone address, these harms.
Exploring their working identity theory in the workplace, Carbado and
Gulati presented the identity negotiating options on a continuum from selfaffirming to self-negating.266 Carbado and Gulati situated the options in a matrix
reflecting the dialectical relationship between stereotypes (positive and negative),
institutional criteria, and workplace standing.267 They highlighted how members of
outsider groups privilege their identities as workers over their outsider identities.268
The negotiation occurs consciously and subconsciously as a matter of survival in
the face of stereotypes:269
[B]ehavior and stereotypes are not independent. When the stereotype is
strong, and the conditions are such that ordinary behavior is likely to
dissipate it, an outsider subject to a strong negative stereotype has an
incentive to take actions to negate it. On the other hand, someone subject
to strong positive stereotypes need not work as hard to achieve the same
final evaluation as someone who is subject to negative stereotypes.
Further, the stronger the stereotype, the greater the effect to be on the
employee’s behavior.270
From the disproportionate costs placed on outsiders to work their identity, to the
psychic harm of self-negating and self-denying behavior, all options come with
heavy costs.271
In theorizing the relationship between assimilation, discrimination, and
antidiscrimination doctrine, Yoshino identified a range of assimilatory options for
gays and lesbians: to convert (underlying gay identity is altered), pass (underling
gay identity is hidden), or cover (underlying gay identity is downplayed).272
Yoshino observed the fluid nature of assimilation: the mode of assimilation one
might adopt in any particular moment would depend on the context. He
recognized “the relational aspects of presentations of the self”; “one must know
not only the performance of the actor, but also the literacy of the audience.”273
Both models offer insights into the harms of radicalization policing.274

266. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 265, at 1266–67.
267. Id. at 1271–72.
268. Id. at 1279–307.
269. Id. at 1267–70, 1278, 1307–08 (“[ W]e do not mean to suggest that outsiders invite
discrimination by performing their identities in certain ways; rather they are disciplined for not
performing their identities in ways that are palatable to their insider employers. The result is that
outsiders, to the extent they wish to survive in the workplace, often find themselves having to do
extra work to make themselves palatable and their insider employers comfortable.” (footnote omitted)).
270. Id. at 1270–71.
271. Id. at 1279–93.
272. Yoshino, supra note 265, at 772–73.
273. Id. at 772–73, 837–49.
274. For purposes of my analysis, I focus on the American and Muslim identities in American
Muslim identity negotiation. Of course, as with anyone else, an American Muslim possesses multiple
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Radicalization discourse feeds into preexisting Islamophobia in the United States,
lending legitimacy to anti-Muslim sentiment.275 Radicalization and counterradicalization produce a tension between Muslim-ness and American-ness. That
tension pressures Muslims to work their identity—to prove their American-ness,
or their loyalty to the project of the United States over that of Islam. That
pressure is intense given the weight of Muslim stereotypes and the scope of
radicalization policing.
To understand how the relational aspect of identity performance—between
viewer and viewed—defines Muslim identity performance, recall the allconsuming nature of radicalization policing. The radicalization policing techniques
rely on participation from Muslim communities, informants, and undercover
officers.276 By its system of policing radicalization, the government has brought
Muslim communities into its surveillance apparatus, and thereby exponentially
expanded the reach of surveillance. Radicalization policing effectuates a panoptic
system of discipline for Muslim communities.277 In elaborating on Jeremy

other identities that will affect their identity negotiations and performances. Even on the most basic
level, to add just one more vector: identity negotiation for American Muslim men will be different
than for American Muslim women.
275. See, e.g., Ahmad, supra note 22, at 1262 (“The physical violence exercised upon the bodies
of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians has been accompanied by a legal and political violence toward
these communities. In the first two years after September 11, the United States has developed a
corpus of immigration law and law enforcement policy that by design or effect applies almost
exclusively to Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians. These laws operate in tandem with the individual
acts of physical violence that have been carried out against these same communities, thereby aiding
and abetting hate violence. Taken together, the multiple assaults on the bodies and rights of Arabs,
Muslims, and South Asians produce a psychological violence as well and reracialize the communities
they target as ‘Muslim-looking’ foreigners unworthy of membership in the national polity.”).
276. Through voluntary interviews, law enforcement asks Muslims to share information on
other Muslims. Through informants and undercover officers, law enforcement sends Muslims into
physical and virtual Muslim collective spaces to gather information and test religious and political
opinions. Through community engagement efforts, law enforcement creates incentives for Muslims
to work with the state. Through Internet trolling, informants and undercover officers collect
information on Muslim social networks, and religious and political opinions. See supra Part III.B.
277. In the late 1700s, Jeremy Bentham envisaged the panopticon: a circular building with an
inspection tower at its center and inmates around the perimeter. JEREMY BENTHAM: THE
PANOPTICON WRITINGS 35–37 (Miran Božovi ed., 2d ed. 1995). The design would allow the
watchman to see all the inmates without the inmates being able to tell whether or not they were
actually under watch. The trick was ensuring constant apprehension of surveillance in the inmates:
[ T]he more constantly the persons to be inspected are under the eyes of the persons who
should inspect them, the more perfectly will the purpose of the establishment have been
attained. Ideal perfection, if that were the object, would require that each person should
actually be in that predicament, during every instant of time. This being impossible, the
next thing to be wished for is, that, at every instant, seeing reason to believe as much, and
not being able to satisfy himself to the contrary, he should conceive himself to be so.
Id. at 34. Whether or not they were actually under watch was beside the point. Then, in the 1970s,
Michel Foucault invoked the panopticon to describe the modern disciplinary society and its way of
deploying power to observe and shape people and institutions. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE &
PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 170–228 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995)
(1977). Since Foucault and Bentham, theorists have analyzed how technology allows for panoptic

2013]

POLICING “RADICALIZATION”

877

Bentham’s panopticon, Michel Foucault noted how constant apprehension of the
“[v]isible” and “[u]nverifiable” gaze of the state “automatizes and disindividualizes
power”:
The more numerous those anonymous and temporary observers are, the
greater the risk for the inmate of being surprised and the greater his
anxious awareness of being observed. . . .
. . . He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes
responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play
spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in
which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his
own subjection.278
The question of how to perform your identity arises in contexts where your
outsider identity is at play. That assumes there is an inside, where one can more
comfortably inhabit a particular outsider identity, where it is no longer outside.279
Radicalization policing’s reach into Muslim communities—at the same time,
extensive, undeniable, and covert—flips the inside out. Mosques are not
sanctuaries but the most intensive sites of surveillance. There is no inside where
you are not an outsider; or the inside is incredibly small, porous, and precarious.280
Always weary of being watched, Muslims adopt self-regulating behavior.
Muslims work their identity to claim full(er) standing in the polity, to avoid
being rendered an object of suspicion and surveillance. The pressure emerges in a
larger, hostile climate in the United States. As with other outsider groups, the
stereotypes Muslims deal with in relation to law enforcement and the public
overlap considerably. The pressure for identity work comes from both private
citizens—including other Muslims—and the government, though the
consequences might be distinct, and as always context matters. Making matters
more complicated, the pervasiveness of surveillance obscures the line between
private citizens and the government.
Radicalization and counter-radicalization situate Muslim and American
identity as antipodes. Imagine them as oppositional vectors: The choice to play up
Muslim identity is a decision to signal less American-ness; emphasizing American
identity destabilizes Muslim identity. The negative Muslim stereotype is so heavy,
the pressures to perform American-ness are profound. The identity work,
covering, or passing could take many forms. It could include removing a Muslim
aesthetic—shaving a beard, removing a hijab—or downplaying Muslim aesthetics
surveillance structures deeper into our lives. E.g., THOMAS ALLMER,
OF SURVEILLANCE IN INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM (2012).
278. FOUCAULT, supra note 277, at 201–02.

TOWARDS A CRITICAL THEORY

279. I do not mean to suggest a static, true, underlying identity exists. Identity is complex and
dynamic.
280. The precarity of the inside will be particularly pronounced in urban Muslim
communities—where, for example, mosque communities will be larger and less static, and large police
departments may prioritze counterterrorism alongside the local FBI office.
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in another way—exchanging a niqab for a hijab.281 It could include playing up
one’s American-ness—drinking beers or watching football. These decisions might
influence the law enforcement scrutiny you might draw.
A recent community-and-interview-based report documented just such
harms stemming from the NYPD Intelligence Division’s surveillance program.
Muslims reported feeling pressure to signal their Muslim identity less visibly or
differently, to cover, or to pass, in order to avoid state scrutiny. This signaling
takes shape in relation to religion, politics, and geography. Muslims do not want to
seem too religious: Men shave their beards and women remove their hijabs or
niqabs.282 Or too political: Students stop talking politics in their Muslim student
association office and switch out of political science majors.283 Muslims do not
organize or organize differently. They “feel the need to repeatedly emphasize their
peaceful position,”284 or to change how they inhabit Muslim geographies: Muslims
go to the mosque less frequently, or only for prayer and not for other community
and spiritual activities.285
Making the performance matrix more complicated, certain quintessentially
American activities, when engaged in by Muslims, are signs of radicalization. Of
course this is the case at higher levels of abstraction for mosque going (church) or
protesting the Iraq war (dissent). There are also certain activities that will have
heightened significance, especially for young Muslim men: for example, paintball,
target practice, and white-water rafting.286
The suspicion of Muslim identity runs sufficiently deep that decisions to
signal less Muslim-ness (covering or passing) can in themselves be read as
suspicious or attempts to hide. For the same reason, it is not altogether clear that
converting, at least not on its own, would wipe away the suspicion associated with
Muslim identity. So while the NYPD radicalization report frames as suspicious a

281. While the hijab covers the hair, the niqab also covers the mouth and the nose.
282. Shamas & Arastu, supra note 83, at 15–17, 23–26 (“Almost all our interviewees noted
that appearing Muslim, or appearing to be a certain type of Muslim, invites unwanted attention or
surveillance from law enforcement. Outward displays of Muslim identity could include the choice to
wear the hijab (headscarf), the niqab (full covering), grow a beard, or dress in certain kinds of
traditional or Islamic clothing.”)
283. Id. at 25, 44–45.
284. Id. at 23.
285. Id. at 14–15, 17 (quoting twenty-six-year-old Brooklynite Ahsan Samad: “I used to go to
the masjid [mosque] quite a lot. That stopped as soon as they [the NYPD] knocked on the door.”); id.
at 42 (quoting a nineteen-year-old college student: “‘[The upperclassmen] told us we encourage you to
have free speech and political conversations, just not inside the MSA room. Because we don’t want an
informant to be here to catch one of your lines or crazy rants and you would get in trouble. I don’t
want to go to the MSA room because I’m worried that someone will report what I’m saying. . . .’”).
286. See supra Part II; see also Paul Harris, Fort Dix Five: ‘If They Did Something Punish Them. But
They’re Innocent Kids,’ GUARDIAN (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/16/
fbi-fort-dix-five; Steve Huff, The N.Y.P.D. Covertly Went Whitewater Rafting to Track Muslim Students,
N.Y. OBSERVER (Feb. 18, 2012), http://observer.com/2012/02/the-n-y-p-d-covertly-went-whitewater
-rafting-to-track-muslim-students.

2013]

POLICING “RADICALIZATION”

879

name change from Mike to Maher (intensifying Muslim identity), the NYPD also
monitors name changes from Mohammad to Matt (passing, covering, or
converting Muslim identity). The Associated Press aptly captured how this
practice turns topsy turvy immigrant assimilation practices: “[f ]or generations,
immigrants have shed their ancestral identities and taken new, Americanized
names as they found their place in the melting pot. For Muslims in New York,
that rite of assimilation is now seen by police as a possible red flag in the hunt for
terrorists.”287
The question of identity work is relevant not simply to whether and how it
marks you for state scrutiny. It is also relevant to how Muslims perform their
direct relationship to the projects of radicalization policing and counterradicalization. Does one facilitate law enforcement’s efforts to collect intelligence
on the day-to-day affairs of Muslim communities? That would signal assent in the
American political project and affirmation of American identity. Refusal could
signal dissent, prioritization of Muslim affinity, an Islamist or secret “jihadi”
project. Indeed, recent efforts to conduct know-your-rights workshops and to
educate Muslim communities on their rights to counsel in the face of law
enforcement interviews—efforts replicating long-standing initiatives in
communities of color negotiating difficult and abusive relationships with the
police—have generated criticism along these axes: Muslim communities are not
cooperating with law enforcement’s efforts to protect against radicalization;
lawyers are advising Muslim communities against sharing tips with law
enforcement about terrorist activity.288 Whereas willingness to agree to share
information with law enforcement is constructed as serving American interests
and national security, refusals are suspect. Retaining a lawyer is another
quintessentially American act. When that retention positions a Muslim in the way
of the national security intelligence gathering, however broad or abusive, it
becomes a Muslim act, one drawing scrutiny and suspicion.
Operating in the void of serious regulation, law enforcement quite literally
incentivizes cooperation and penalizes refusals, creating dramatic performance
pressures. Consider the case of Mohammad Tanvir, a twenty-something, workingclass immigrant in New York City, working at bodegas to send money home to his
parents in Pakistan.289 For a few years, the FBI attempted to recruit him to

287. In fall 2011, the Associated Press reported that the NYPD runs comprehensive
background checks on New Yorkers with Arabic- or Muslim-sounding names, who change their
names. Apuzzo & Goldman, supra note 101.
288. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Laurie Goodstein, Deep Partisan Rift Emerges in Hearing on
U.S. Muslims, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2011, at A15; Amna Akbar & Ramzi Kassem, Are Muslims Allowed
Rights?, ALJAZEERA (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/11/2011
112415501938290.html.
289. I represented Tanvir during my time in the CLEAR project at CUNY’s clinical program.
See Bartosiewicz, The FBI Stings Muslims, supra note 193, at 20 (chronicling Tanvir’s experience).
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become an informant. The FBI asked him to collect information in local South
Asian Muslim communities. The FBI also wanted to send him to Afghanistan to
infiltrate terrorist training camps. The FBI offered to pay and to bring his wife
from Pakistan to the United States.290 Their efforts were dogged and included
threats of deportation. While Tanvir agreed he would call the FBI if he saw
suspicious activity, he consistently refused to work as an informant: it did not feel
right to him. In response, he was placed on the Department of Homeland
Security’s No Fly List, likely by the FBI. The stress of the FBI’s harassment was so
great, Tanvir decided to forego his green card and return to Pakistan permanently.
But his placement on the No Fly List made that impossible, effectuating a limbo
existence where he was stuck in a country that did not seem to want him, and yet
could not return to his country of birth.
Perversely, working with law enforcement provides purchase to signal
Muslim identity. It might even require religious Muslim identity performance—
growing a beard, praying five times a day, going to the mosque—as that
performance would give you the greatest access to religious Muslims. Rascoff
observes:
Imagine that the FBI is contemplating employing an individual as a
confidential informant in a mosque where authorities are concerned
about the proliferation of radical ideology. The individual is attractive to
law enforcement precisely because he possesses radical bona fides
(having previously been an exponent of radical Islam himself) and will
therefore have access to the institution. Further consider that the Bureau
might want to take measures to protect against the prospective
informant’s reverting to a radical sensibility as he operates within a radical
environment. It is conceivable under these circumstances the Bureau
would, in effect, furnish tutorials for the informant in “moderate” Islam
as a means of shoring up his participation in official work.291
While Rascoff expresses a distinct concern about the state establishing Official
Islam, his hypothetical also illustrates how cooperation might require Muslims to
simultaneously play up and maintain distance from Muslim identity. The resulting
identity performance calculus for Muslims wishing to partake in communal life—a
central aspect of Islam—is incredible. The more religious are now constituted
from the point of the view of the community as double suspect: as either radicalscum-terrorists or informants.
In many ways, Muslim collective spaces are the most vulnerable, where
performance matters most:

Tanvir’s experience is in many ways representative of a broader set of experiences; the FBI regularly
uses such pressure tactics. See supra Part III.B.
290. The FBI also offered to pay expenses for his parents to perform the religiously obligatory
hajj to Mecca. Bartosiewicz, The FBI Stings Muslims, supra note 193, at 20.
291. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam?, supra note 8, at 158–59.
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[R]eligious spaces, intended to provide a haven for new and old
congregants to forge bonds and support networks, [have become] the
opposite – a space where interactions [are] marred by mutual suspicion.
Many former regular mosque-goers have decreased mosque attendance,
and those who attend do so to just pray and leave, looking over their
shoulders for eavesdropping spies the entire time.292
The pressure to perform American-ness, then, extends to interactions with other
Muslims and within Muslim institutions. While many have commented on
constructions of the good Muslim / bad Muslim dichotomy by Western states and
liberalism,293 that these dichotomies have carved up Muslim communities has
gone lesser noticed. As a Muslim, you might be just as concerned with what the
uniformed officer makes of you as he passes you in the street as what the woman
at the mosque thinks when she engages you in conversation. That woman might
be an undercover or an informant testing your opinions. Regardless of whether
she is an undercover or informant, she might be keen on playing up her
American-ness, and if she thinks you are radical, she might share your name with
law enforcement. Or, she might suspect you as an informant, never engaging you
in conversation.
The ever-present gaze of the state heavily weighs on, defines even,
contemporary American Muslim identity performance.294 That its ever-presence is
brokered by other Muslims—or by those who appear to be Muslim—causes
profound individual and communal harm. There is distrust of “people who ‘talk
really passionately about Islam,’ or even by non-Muslims who come to the
mosque expressing interest in learning about Islam”; the “overly religious” and
those who “frequent[] the mosque”; those who “regularly attend[] [Muslim
Student Association] events . . . [and] those who only came once in awhile.”295
Indeed, as much as radicalization has stigmatized “radical Islam” or conservative
Muslims for the American public at large, that stigma has been internalized in
Muslim communities.
The gaze also gives rise to pressures for collective performances of
American-ness. While the individual Muslim might go out of her way to signal her
own American-ness, collectives also have moments of performative opportunity
and pressure. Mosques can choose to invite law enforcement in for community
292. Shamas & Arastu, supra note 83, at 18.
293. See generally MAHMOOD MAMDANI, GOOD MUSLIM, BAD MUSLIM: AMERICA, THE
COLD WAR AND THE ROOTS OF TERROR (2004); RAZACK, supra note 261; Sunaina Maira, “Good” and
“Bad” Muslim Citizens: Feminists, Terrorists, and U.S. Orientalisms, 35 FEMINIST STUD. 631 (2009).
294. See Shamas & Arastu, supra note 83, at 26 (“Nearly all interviewees thought they knew
someone who was an informant or an undercover officer. The reasons provided were diverse and
contradictory, reflecting the widespread internal suspicion that surveillance has triggered within the
American Muslim community.”); see also id. at 18 (“‘It’s very difficult, it’s very hard, you don’t know
what to say, I have to think twice about the sentences I say just in case someone can come up with a
different meaning to what I’m saying.’ Amira*, 22, Sunday school teacher.”).
295. Id. at 18, 26.
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engagement and counsel their congregations to talk to law enforcement, or
mosques can make announcements that “informants are not welcome here” and
refuse to give law enforcement access. Muslim civil rights organizations can go out
of their way to condemn terrorist attacks with which they have no connection and
to celebrate all new terrorism-related indictments, or they can choose to stay silent
on the occasion of a terrorist attack and engage critically in debate about the utility
of the aggressive policing and prosecuting tactics at work in Muslim communities.
The choices are ever-present and the decisions will trigger various outcomes,
predictable and unpredictable alike.296
CONCLUSION
Policing radicalization exacts impossible pressures and real harms on Muslim
communities. The police practices and the resulting pressures on Muslim
communities are largely unregulated by law and almost untouched by critical
public debate. Naming these practices and their harms was the project of this
Article.
Where the state marks ideology as tending towards criminality, the state
generates a basis on which to discipline that ideology. Importantly, where the
targeted are subaltern297—locked out of the channels of power and
accountability—as Muslims are in the United States, the subaltern-ness is both
what is targeted and what facilitates the targeting. Policing radicalization draws its
legitimacy from proposed connections between certain Muslims and terrorism
violence. But the government has not made its case. Government-produced
radicalization theories reflect, and then reproduce, intense suspicion of Muslims
and Islam, creating a dangerous self-perpetuating cycle.
Deploying the language of radicalization implicitly counters charges of biased
policing. Now, in monitoring Muslim communities, it is said law enforcement is
not monitoring Muslims for being Muslim, but instead for radicalization to
terrorism. Radicalization theories move the idea that Muslim communities and
cultures threaten national security from the world of bias to the realm of savvy
expertise. In turn, radicalization and counter-radicalization impose heavy costs on

296. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 265, at 1277–79 (observing that strategic identity
performing behavior is “risky and can backfire”).
297. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in MARXISM AND THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 271–308 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds., 1988). Subaltern
studies arose in response to orientalist studies of South Asia, as a movement to revise historiography,
a movement that excluded the experience of the colonized. The term subaltern connotes those who
are peripheral to or excluded from power and privilege structures on the grounds of race, gender,
class, sexuality, and geography. See, e.g., Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, The New Subaltern: A Silent
Interview, in MAPPING SUBALTERN STUDIES AND THE POSTCOLONIAL 324 (Vinayak Chaturvedi ed.
2000).
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Muslim communities and lay the groundwork for the state to police other
subaltern communities.298

298. See, e.g., Josh Harkinson, The Turncoat, MOTHER JONES, Sept.–Oct. 2011, at 48–67
(discussing FBI informant Brandon Darby’s involvement in left-wing protest groups in Austin,
Texas); Greenberg, New York: The Police and the Protesters, supra note 31 (comparing the NYPD
Counterterrorism Unit’s investigations of Occupy protestors with its investigations of Muslims); Peter
Krouse, FBI Stings, Like One in Cleveland, Become More Common in Terrorism Investigations,
CLEVELAND.COM (May 6, 2012), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2012/05/fbi_stings
_become_more_common.html (discussing the FBI sting taking down Occupy Cleveland protestors
who attempted to bomb a bridge with fake assistance from undercover FBI agents); James Sanna,
MN: Peace Activists Targeted by FBI Call Minneapolis Home Raids Harassment, AM. INDEP. (Sept. 25, 2010,
10:30 AM), http://americanindependent.com/143757/peace-activists-targeted-by-fbi-call-minneapolis
-home-raids-harassment (discussing the FBI’s investigation of the Twin Cities-area Anti-War
Committee for “‘material support for terrorism’”); Thomas J. Sheeran, 3 Suspects Plead Guilty in Ohio
Bridge Bomb Plot, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 5, 2012, 6:50 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/huff-wires/20120905/us-bridge-bomb-plot (discussing the progression of the case against the
Occupy Cleveland bridge bombers).

